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
Vaiṣṇava Vedānta

Mahanamabrata Brahmachari



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VAIṢṆAVA VEDĀNTA

(The Philosophy of Śrī Jiva Gosvāmī)

By

MAHANAMABRATA BRAHMACHARI

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"Philosophies are intimate parts of the universe.
They express something of its own thought of itself."

—*William James*

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Dedicated
To
The Lotus feet of my
Spiritual Preceptor
ŚRĪ ŚRĪPĀD MAHENDRAJĪ
who preached Mahānāma
as did
NITYĀNANDA

FOREWORD

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚRĪ JĪVA GOSWĀMĪ

(By Śrī Mahānāmabrata Brahmachārī)

A very well-known verse in the Bhagavad-Gītā utters—‘Code’ words—Jñātum, Draṣṭum, Praveṣṭum—for the seeker who aspires to be ushered into the innermost sanctuary of the Temple of Truth. “Know, See and Enter” render in common terms the three code words. But common terms can commonly touch only the fringe of what is uncommonly vast and deep in significance. They do not make it clear for instance why the words are given in that order and not in any other which appears to be more sensible and natural from our common appreciative standpoint. Why not—Enter, See and Know, for example? In the few words that follow, it is likely that a possible clue to an answer may be found; but, to begin with, we may say—categorically that the order in which the words have come from the Lips Divine is the order in which the Philosophy of Śrī Jīva has opened the ‘mystery locks’ one after another and ushered us into the Hṛt and Hṛllekhā—the inmost ‘core’ and ‘core picture’ of Ultimate Reality (Parama Tattva). First, *know* that the whole cosmic order has no being, no activity and no power separate from and independent of the Supreme Reality; then, *See* that its being is not ‘brute’ and blind unconsciousness, but is the Pure Plenum of Consciousness itself; and finally, *enter* into the core essence of Consciousness itself, which is Ānanda or Rasa.

The brightest star or the meanest straw outside, the sublimest sentiment and thought or the merest freak and fancy in the mind, when interrogated, will lead me to the three locked doors one after another, and ask me to find a key to try each one with, and open if I can. First of all, I am to *know* as it ‘looks’, and also its behaviour and relation to other objects. The method is mainly ‘out-door’ and objective, though it may relate to what are called subjective phenomena. I thus gather much information which when brought to a system and presented as a rounded whole, is called my Science. But the information, though cogent and instructive in the context of a space-time representation, touches only the outer fringes of the problem of substance, origin and

causation. In other words, it does not tell me what the thing in its essence or reality is ; nor does it enlighten me as to *where* it has ultimately come from, or truly *how* and *why*.

When we inspect a distant star through a telescope or a tiny living cell or a crystal under a microscope, we have to 'see' in order to know. But this is outwardly directed seeing ; so is the seer and so is his instrument. It is out-door reviewing and reporting. This is followed no doubt by calculations, comparisons and more or less sensible guesses as to the nature and manner of the objects and their behaviour. But both Truth and Reality as regards fundamentals recede and elude as the net is knit closer and its sweep made wider in our objective theories. Not only so ; our vision beyond the Milky Way has blurred and blinded true insight into the heart and core of things ; the colossal genie released from the 'sealed vase' of matter has made us feel so abysmally helpless and 'powerless' now as we never felt before.

So we have to turn round and 'evolve' a new way and technique of 'seeing'. We have to knock at an inner door, where Ātman, the indwelling Spirit, resides. We have to 'face' the Self within, and ask it to give us back the Light that has been confounded and lost in the mirage outside ; and also the Power that we have forfeited in the rupture and capture of power outside. It is Self that reveals and reassures that being or existence is consciousness (Cit) ; that movement has no intrinsic meaning without life (Prāṇa) that 'throbs and breathes' in us ; that power or energy has no ultimate significance without Cit-Sakti that wills, urges and impels in us. And what is even more vital—it is the Self that shows beyond doubt that existence is the expression of Basic Joy (Ānanda), and the fundamental mode of its expression is spontaneous everflowing as play. In short, it is by Self's own revelation that we are assured of the identity of Asti-Bhāti-Priyam, Being-Consciousness-Joy.

Without this inalienable 'home' guarantee and assurance, both our Science and Philosophy are sure to come to grief in their 'foreign' expeditions and explorations. Philosophy which is and ought to be the love of Wisdom, will develop a tendency and habit to close her office when she thinks she has docketted and summarised the findings of Science ; she will look askance at such home 'helpers' as introspection, intuition and so on, which found favour with the a-priori school. Kant said that it was Hume who

had roused him from his dogmatic slumber. But there is dogmatism in avoiding dogmatism, and the 'Self-exiled' dogmatism of the so-called realistic and positivistic philosophies is the 'Serbonian Bog' where the abiding values of life and existence have sunk. So the exile must now be shown the way to come home—back to what is inalienably and unquestionably his own—his Svadhāma, Svabhāva. If a 'neutral stuff' with no intrinsic consciousness and joy and freedom be your starting premise, or a merely mathematical Space-Time Continuum, then, by your laws of statistical probability, a Supreme Cold and Callous Neutrality, devoid of grace and love, will, as likely (or more likely), be your 'emergent' conclusion as a Sovereign Deity of bliss and benevolence.

So we must look and 'see' within for a definite promise and positive sanction as regards the highest values. Now, if by doing so we find that existence has no sense without consciousness, movement has no 'momentum' without that consciousness being dynamic as life as will, and further, if both existence and life are devoid of soul, of creative interest and consummating fulfilment, without Joy overflowing and expressing itself as love and play, then we feel realize that our 'seeing' has neither missed the Way nor mis-carried us. The Way does not take us to a realm of dreary or dubious values. The world we live in and we ourselves are manifestations of a Divine Consciousness and Will. As Rāmānuja taught—all, cit or acit, sentiment or not, make His 'Body' of which He is the Indwelling Soul and Spirit. May we call Him Paramātmā, as He is the Archetype of the Ātman in us and its Lord? The Philosophy of Śrī Jīva fully keeps company with us so far on the Way. But the Way really begins here with Him and not ends. The wayfarer still lives on a mixed nourishment—Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti; though stress is laid on the last as the main. But where is his pure Annam or Amṛtam to be found? In pure Jyotiḥ (Light) or in pure Rasa (Delight)? Is it to be pure Illumination and Peace absolute, or Joy perfect in its richness of theme, rhyme and measure?

To abstract thought, this confronts us with a dialectic dilemma. If Being-Consciousness-Joy with all the infinite richness of its significance in content and relation, theme and rhyme, movement and measure, is to be maintained even at the fundamental levels, then 'pure' (formless, attributeless, functionless) Being and so forth must be discarded as an unreal abstraction sought to be hypostatized by Sankara and his school; if, on the other hand,

such pure Being etc. (Suddha Asti-Bhāti-Priyam) be regarded as the unchallenged Ultimate Reality, then not only the passing show of the name and form, but even all the abiding Values of our love and yearning, endeavour and achievement, can have a secondary and subordinate, conventional and conditional reality. Now, if Sankara's position be the thesis, that of Rāmānuja will be its antithesis.

Srī Jīva's Philosophy which 'sees' the Supreme Reality as Bhagavān—par excellence, the God of Love and Līlā—is naturally more inclined to the antithesis of Rāmānuja than to the thesis of Sankara ; but it claims that by seeing 'deeper', it has found a 'silken cord' and a mantram by which the two 'poles' can be brought together and joined, so to say, in a happy wedlock. Pure Asti-Bhāti-Priyam is an unquestionable deliverance of one who has sought the fundamental Background (Adhīṣṭhāna) of all experience ; it is also the undeniable Plenum (Ākāśa-Paramākāśa, Cidākāśa, Ānandākāśa) in which all existence, mundane or supermundane, 'lives, moves and has its being'. Srī Jīva's Philosophy cannot dismiss this as only transcendental abstraction. After the analogy of the Sun, it may be thought that Bhagavān, Who 'at His Core' is Ānanda and Rasa, cannot be separated from His Own infinite pure Radiance (Suddha Bhāti), nor from the unbounded immensity of His Own pure Dominion (Suddha Asti). The Brahman of the Upanishads is His 'Tanubhāḥ', Kaviraj Goswami would say.

We cannot enlarge upon this, but the Book of which this is to be a Preface has admirably dealt with a dialectic dilemma. Be it borne in mind that it is the call of what we 'see' that has landed us in this dialectic pass. To Kant it was Pure Reason. To get out of the *impasse*, Kant had to try and enter by another door, Practical Reason. So here to find a point of sympathetic contact and cordial concord, we must open and unfold 'seeing' in what we may call its 'third' dimension, by which it may enter into the Hṛt and Hṛllekhā, not only of things on this mundane plane (Prākṛta), but also of the Pure Ideas of Being-Consciousness-Joy, in the transcendental altitude of Ākāśa where all differentiations are lost. This we may characterize as the Altitude or Vertical dimension as contrasted with the Prākṛta which relates to 'this' plane of our—of Aparā prakṛti—including orders of relative change and stability (Kṣara and Kṣarākṣara). The Altitude dimension aims at the Akṣara-parama—the Unchanging Absolute.

It is the Parā Prakṛti—supra or sublimating Self in us that so aims, and may also reach the End. Jīva realizes himself as Brahman. But if by the way of devotion and love, the third dimension also opens, he is ushered into the Parama Prakṛti of Bhagavān Puruṣottama, Who is both transcendent and superior to the contrasted orders of change and no-change. The third 'eye' is then the 'eye' of the heart's aspiration, love and surrender. And it is this that opens God's Own Realm or Dhāma.

All creation without beginning or end is His dominion, where His majesty reigns and rules the unruly, it becomes His 'Kingdom' to the 'faithful flock'; it becomes His Temple and Shrine to the devotee; but it is to His lover alone that it becomes His Own 'Home' and 'Bower'—'Goloka' or 'Vṛndāvana'. In this Home or Līlā-bhūmi of His, the core quintessence of all being and becoming, conscious and enjoying, is to be sought and found. All sublimated human relations and emotions are consummated in this Realm of Platonic archetypal purity, with this vital addition that the consummation proceeds for and ever from sweeter to still sweeter novelty, charm and fascination. And in order that this may be so, Bhagavān projects from His Svarūpa-Sakti Yogamāyā, Who bids His 'Majesty' to 'retire', so that His Sweetness may 'play' alone with His beloved. His Flute shall call, enchant and enthrall, and not His Thunder shall roar, awe and appal. As we have said in our Japasūtram, Yogamāyā is what renders His Svalasita Ānanda 'Vilasta'—the Play of Līlā. (Vide Japasūtram, Vol. III, Sutras 17, 18, 19, 20=I. Adhyāya, IV, Pada.)

The God of Love is not 'content' with His retirement in Goloka and enact the Play that His Yogamāyā prepares for Him. It is Madhura Līlā with Nitya Rūpa and Nāma, and it continues and grows from eternity to eternity, in unending variations in theme and rhyme, movement and measure. The God of Love yearns for descending into this deluded world of ours of bondage and suffering, because it is the nature of love to overflow, to endear and embrace. Peace desires to be left alone; love desires communion, concourse and company. So love incarnates.

The world today is not only a deluded and confounded world, but very nearly 'promises' to be a doomed world. So it hath need of Thee, O God of Love and Mercy !

I had known Srī Mahānāma by his name and fame before I saw him, a few years ago. It was an intuitive heart attraction

first with me. Then as we 'saw' each other closer, many kindred points of intellectual contact stood out in relief as regards matters fundamental; and what is more vital, we both discovered more notes of concord in our deeper heart-beats. I met him in his inimitable discourses on *Srīmad Bhāgavatam* and also on *Srī Śrī Candī*. We also met in soul to soul and heart to heart talks. In the former, what impressed me deeply was the unique freshness of his view-point, the depth as well as the breadth of his line of approach, the compact reasonableness of his analysis, and the lucid and logical mode of his presentation. As regards our private Sanga, what appealed to and attracted me most was his humility and love which would lay aside all name and fame, and seek light and blessing from 'all and sundry'. This was as I saw Mahānāma in his comparatively maturer days. The present book has been written several years earlier as his thesis for an American doctorate. The book bears the stamp and impress of the Mahānāma I 'saw' later. It is comprehensive and comparative; *synthetic in its summing-up; logical in its analysis; lucid in its expression*. Many a congenial stream of lore and wisdom from the East and the West has been brought to a happy confluence here, where the reader who aspired to 'see' and 'enter' can bathe for stimulating light and delight. May the Lord bless us !

Pausa Sankrānti
1367 Bengali era

Śwāmī Pratyagātmānanda Saraswatī

ŚRĪ JĪVA GOSVĀMĪ

[Glimpses of life]

Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī was born in Rāmkeli situated near the kingdom of Hussen Shāh, the then king of Gaurh (Bengal) most probably between 1530 and 1540 A.D. His father was Anupama alias Ballavadeva, the younger brother of India-famous Rūpa and Sanātana, the two high officials under Hussen Shāh and later on, the two pillars of Vaiṣṇava-movement of Chaitanya. Anupama, the father of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī, too, was a high official under Hussen Shāh.

Śrī Jīva inherited not the huge wealth of the royal family but the invaluable spiritual treasure of his parents and two uncles, Rūpa and Sanātana. He lost his father in his childhood.

After the resignation of Rūpa and Sanātana from worldly life and death of Anupama, the family lost its glamour of wealth and social status. Thereafter, Śrī Jīva was brought to Chandradwipa in the District of Barisal (now in Bangladesh). Śrī Jīva had to live there with his mother in a lonely big old palace. Śrī Jīva's mother was a very pious lady and orthodox in performing the rituals in the day long. Basically a Bhakta of Mahāprabhu Śrī Chaitanya, she did not forget to narrate the details of the glorious lives of the trio — Rūpa, Sanātana and Anupama — to her son, as a result, the boy Śrī Jīva grew while playing with mates, with deepest respect for his parents and uncles and a zest for a life of other worldly happiness.

Śrī Jīva was an extraordinarily brilliant and a handsome boy of pleasing and charming personality, — and as a result, was loved by all. At the age of only twenty (within a very short span of time indeed !), Śrī Jīva completed the studies of Sanskrit grammar and other primary courses of vast Sanskrit language. From the very boyhood days Śrī Jīva was docile, indifferent and introvert ; his eyes were fixed on the horizon ; he was a born denizen of the deep and a citizen of an utterly different world. At this age of twenty Śrī Jīva determined to renounce the worldly life and to follow the footprints of his uncles, Rūpa-Sanātana. With an intention of higher studies Śrī Jīva left for Navadwipa, the then

Oxford of India. On the way he dressed himself as a conventional Vaiṣṇava monk and reached Navadvīpa to meet Nityānanda, the right hand of Chaitanya Mahāprabhu and the embodiment of forgiveness, kindness and faith. Śrī Jīva left home for ever.

In Navadvīpa he was most welcomed by Vaiṣṇavas and was introduced to Nityānanda Mahāprabhu; Nityānanda embraced Śrī Jīva with deep affection and readily recognized him as the future leader of Vaiṣṇavism and founder of theoretical basis of Chaitanya-cult. His joy knew no bounds; Nityānanda was Śrī Jīva's guide and showed him every nook and corner of Navadvīpa — the sacred site of Mahāprabhu Śrī Chaitanya. Then Nityānanda Mahāprabhu sent Śrī Jīva to Banaras for the studies of Vedānta and other higher treatises of Indian philosophy.

Śrī Jīva reached Banaras — the greatest centre of Sanskrit culture in India for ages, and went to Madhusudana Vāchaspati — the then best scholar of Vedānta and the most favourite disciple of Vāsudeva Sārabhauma, another famous scholar of Vedānta and later on a staunch follower and devotee of Mahāprabhu. The Vāchaspati admitted him as his student and gave him lessons on Vedānta. Within a very short span of time Śrī Jīva had the loftiest academic attainment. Soon he became famous in Banaras as a scholar of uncommon talent. He acquired great proficiency in all schools of philosophic thought known at that time in India. Also he became well versed in the vast lore of sacred literatures.

After finishing his studies, Śrī Jīva went to Vrindāvan — the sacred place of divine sports of Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the dreamland of the Vaiṣṇavas of all time. Śrī Jīva rubbed the golden dust of Vrindāvan on his forehead; the fond tales of Kṛṣṇa's sports with cowboys and gopīs captivated his imagination at this romantic perspective; Śrī Jīva observed the sublime beauty of the dancing blue waves of the river Jamunā under the azure, the green wood, the flowers, the birds; the Bhakta reached his abode Vrindāvan — Vrindāvan got her true inhabitant — the *Emperor* of Bhaktas and Bhakti.

Śrī Jīva met his uncles. They embraced their affectionate Śrī Jīva — the only son of their family, who in time would be the only heir of their spiritual wealth and kingdom of Bhakti. Śrī Jīva gradually became acquainted with all the fellow travellers on the way, the dwellers of Vrindāvan — the Messiahs in the world. All became highly pleased with his scholarship, simplicity,

renunciation and determination and blessed him from the core of their heart.

Śrī Jīva began the new chapter of his life. Rūpa set the ideals and gave the initiation, Sanātana and Raghunātha provided the support and encouragement of kindred soul. Śrī Jīva began Sādhana (religious practice) — the practice of blossoming of self and realizing the 'Sat-Chit-Ānanda', with keenness and determination. Soon he became an expert on Vaiṣṇava theology. The spiritual wealth and experience of Rūpa and Sanātana was added to the inborn talent of Śrī Jīva.

This was the golden age of Vrindāvan. She soon became famous with her galaxy of saints and scholars. Students and scholars from different parts of the country began to come there seeking instructions, knowledge, spiritual guidance and discussion and debate on different issues.

There was a popular practice amongst the Indian scholars in those days that a scholar wishing to establish himself as the best scholar could invite other scholars in a debate. The defeated one used to admit the winner's victory in black and white. Rūpa Gosvāmī, the then leader of Vaiṣṇava scholars of Vraja would never accept such invitation from any Proud Scholar; he was rather used to admit the supremacy of the scholar in writing without any debate and hesitation. Rūpa, a rare combination of a philosopher and a poet, fully blossomed beyond his ego in the love and light of Kṛiṣṇa and a dweller of mystic world, was usually underestimated by the Proud Scholars. But Śrī Jīva knew the vastness of scholarship of Rūpa and he became aggrieved to see that the most substandard egoistic scholars underestimated Rūpa. This was unbearable to him, but he could do nothing before his master. When Śrī Jīva found such pedants in the absence of Rūpa, he used to teach them good lessons; and they were astomished at the sparkling talent of Śrī Jīva. This attempt of Śrī Jīva caused a melodramatic incident in his life. When Rūpa Gosvāmī was composing his celebrated book 'Bhakti Rasāmṛita Sindhu', Śrī Jīva was his greatest help in this work; a south-Indian Vaiṣṇava preacher (Vallava Bhatta) came to Vrindāvan and expressed his willingness to read 'Bhakti Rasāmṛita Sindhu'. Rūpa welcomed him and read out from his book. Śrī Jīva was nearby. Vallava Bhatta talked about some mistakes committed by Rūpa. Both Śrī Jīva and Rūpa knew that they were correct, and Vallava was

wrong; still Rūpa, being a true exponent of Vaiṣṇavism and egolessness, immediately conceded to it. But as soon as Rūpa went out of the cottage, Śrī Jīva invited the conceited man and immediately disappointed him by his superhuman talent. Ballava understood that his arguments were baseless and became ashamed of his ignorance and action before such scholars. He immediately went to Rūpa to repent for his action. Rūpa understood that Śrī Jīva was responsible for it and became highly displeased to see that Śrī Jīva was not behaving properly like a true Vaiṣṇava. A real Vaiṣṇava, in his estimation, should have forbearance, or perfect indifference even to irreparable loss or unexpected gain in worldly affairs, no desire for public esteem and should feel himself as the worst of all, though perhaps, the best. Knowledge is for intellectual conviction and firmness of devotion, and not for material gain whatsoever.

But what Śrī Jīva was doing ? ... Rūpa Gosvāmī took stern measure to rectify their loving Śrī Jīva and scolded him severely and ordered him to leave Vrajadhām immediately, because Śrī Jīva had not yet acquired the citizenship of that place.

Śrī Jīva realized his mistakes in his heart of hearts ; egoism, pride, name and fame, and other passions are the rocks where a Vaiṣṇava monk may be shipwrecked. So, Śrī Jīva determined to purge himself of egoism and entered a deep forest, built a hut and decided to offer himself in the pure flame of the immortal (āhuti) — total and unconditional — complete replacement of the ego by Kṛiṣṇa's will. By virtue of his total renunciation and pure devotion, Śrī Jīva's whole being was set on fire with the love of Kṛiṣṇa. Śrī Jīva passed day and night by chanting the name of Hari with the firm belief in his heart that Kṛiṣṇa would be merciful. He was completely indifferent to his body which dwindled down gradually. Because of that extreme Sādhana, Jīva's whole being underwent a total transformation ; his whole self was divinised. He got Bhakti — the concrete love of living manifestation of God and became a Bhakta — an associate of Kṛiṣṇa and a true citizen of Vrindāvan.

Rūpa Gosvāmī, after banishing Śrī Jīva, was not passing his days happily. It was very difficult to replace a disciple like Jīva — his right hand in composing 'Bhakti Rasāmṛita Sindhu'.

Sanātana knew the story of Śrī Jīva's Sādhana and Rūpa's feeling of separation from Śrī Jīva. At his request and information, Rūpa condoned Śrī Jīva who had already been a new man ;

the re-union was happy. Rūpa presented his dearest idol (Vigraha) of Kṛiṣṇa to Śrī Jīva. Śrī Jīva worshipped the holy idol as the manifestation of Supreme Reality — “Archāvatāra” according to Rāmānuja. This holy idol is still lying in Jaypur.

After a few years Rūpa and Sanātana, and other Vaiṣṇava apostles left this mundane plane, and the leadership of Vaiṣṇava movement fell on the shoulder of Śrī Jīva. The Āśrama was now his, and he had to take the responsibility of being a Guru — the beginning of a new Dharma (duty) and appearance of new Karma (work) — a new man had come to birth. It was his mission then to induce people to turn their mind to Kṛiṣṇa.

Śrī Jīva was not only a scholar-monk but also a good administrator and organiser. He sent throughout the country a trained group of Vaiṣṇava monks to propagate Vaiṣṇava theology and philosophy and to give a systematic process of Sādhana to the common man. He established a big library of old Sanskrit literature in Vrindāvan. He managed for the first time to collect paper from the Moghul capital for easy copying and propagation of Vaiṣṇava literature. It was due to his ardent effort and desire that King Mansingh constructed the Temple of Govindajī in Vrindāvan.

Along with his constructive and organisational work, he maintained his literary and intellectual activity. He composed a number of books which placed the Chaitanya-cult for the first time on a philosophical basis with a systematized process of Sādhana (religious practice) and well-defined goal. The major work of Śrī Jīva is known as ‘Ṣaṭ Sandarbha’, which means six treatises on philosophy. They are as follows :

1. Tattva Sandarbha (Discourses on Truth)
2. Bhāgavata Sandarbha (Discourses on God)
3. Paramātmā Sandarbha (Discourses on the Absolute)
4. Bhakti Sandarbha (Discourses on Devotion)
5. Prīti Sandarbha (Discourses on Love)
6. Kṛiṣṇa Sandarbha (Discourses on the Lord Kṛiṣṇa)

Besides these writings, he has left about a dozen of minor works. His best work is the ‘Bhāgavata Sandarbha’ — which placed him in the assembly of great philosophers of the world.

There is a great good deal of difference of opinion among the philosophers regarding the relation between the jīva (monads) and Brahman. In one view, there is no difference whatsoever ; in another view, there is ; and yet in a third view, there are both — difference (bheda) and non-difference (abheda).

Śrī Jīva established that God is Personal, and the relation between jīva and Brahman is one of “achinyta-bhedābheda” (inexplicable difference and non-difference). By “achintya” he means ‘incapable of being considered under either of the categories of absolute difference and absolute non-difference’ — as in the case of fire and heat. This is known as the “Achintya-Bhedābhedavāda” (theory of inexplicable difference and non-difference) of Bengal School. The Bhakti-cult or Vaiṣṇavism based on the doctrine of “Grace” and germinated from the Upaniṣads which announce that “the Self cannot be realized by the study of the Vedas, nor by intelligence, nor by deep learning ; It can be realized by him only whom It chooses or favours, to him the Self reveals Its own nature” — was developed into a full-grown system of Philosophy and Theology of its own. The Upaniṣads call Him Rasa, the most relishable and Ānanda (absolute bliss) being the essence of Brahman. Vaiṣṇavism could not remain satisfied with inert impersonal Brahman but converted Him to Personal God. Śrī Jīva’s work made a thorough synthesis of the Upaniṣadic thought sporadically segregated with apparently contradictory ideas but intrinsically inclined towards a doctrine of a blissful absolute reality, Ānanda or Rasa-Brahma. Now it is our duty to understand and appreciate the Philosophy of Śrī Jīva and divert our desires and passions towards the infinitely relishable all-merciful Kṛiṣṇa with full knowledge that Kṛiṣṇa is the dearest to us.

After long many years of activities, the philosopher cum religious teacher left this mundane plane for his eternal abode — the eternal Vrindāvan.

Dulal Chandra Ghosh

PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA
15th August, 1974

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I : ORIENTATION

	PAGES
INTRODUCTION	1—4
<i>Chapter</i>	
I. ONTOLOGY	5—38
Vedāntic Ontology, 5	
Dimensions of Consciousness, 7	
First dimension : 'Waking', 7 ; Second dimension : 'Dreaming', 8 ; Third dimension : 'Dreamlessness', 12 ; Fourth dimension : 'The Fourth', 21 ; Satchid-ānanda, 29 ; The nature of the approach, 29	
The Sources and Their Rationale, 30	
The Progression of Reality, 35	
The Task of a Vedāntist, 36	
II. ŚAṆKARA	39—45
The Approach of Śaṅkara (6th-7th century), 39	
The World View of Śaṅkara, 40	
III. RĀMĀNUJA (1017—1137)	46—54
The Approach of Rāmānuja, 46	
The World View of Rāmānuja, 51	

PART II : THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚRĪ JĪVA GOSWAMI AND HIS SCHOOL

I. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ŚRĪ JĪVA GOŚWĀMĪ	57—60
II. ŚRĪ JĪVA	61—73
The Approach of Śrī Jīva, 61	

	Power of Consciousness and Its Analysis, 63		
	Reality, 70		
III.	METAPHYSICS 74—97
	The Absolute, 74		
	The Nature of the Absolute, 87		
IV.	SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES		98—104
	Immediacy, 98		
	Various Ways of Knowing, 103		
V.	THEOLOGY 105—133
	God, 107		
	The Trinity, 109		
	<i>Līlā</i> or the Divine Sport, 113		
	The Personality of the God-head, 116		
	The Eternal Abode of the God-head, 119		
	The Attributes of the God-head, 120		
	The Concept of <i>Rasa</i> or Ultimate Essence, 122		
	The <i>Sweet</i> Activities of the Lord : Dialectic of Love, 125		
	Manifestation of the God-head : <i>Avatāra</i> , 129		
VI.	INDIVIDUALS—MONADS (<i>JIVAS</i>)	134—139
VII.	PRAKRTI : THE WORLD ORDER	143—182
	The Theories of Causality, 144		
	The Theory of Transformation, 147		
	Analysis of Nature, 151		
	The Evolution of Nature, 153		
	The descending order, 157		
	The ascending order, 160		
	Back to equilibrium, 163		
	Time and the Cycle, 165		

The Law of <i>Karma</i> , 177	
An Estimate, 179	

VIII. ETHICS	183—228
--------------	------	------	------	---------

Introductory, 183	
Moral Science, 185	
Metaphysics and Moral Science :	
<i>Tètè-a-tètè</i> , 189	
Metaphysics of Morality, 190	
Moral and Spiritual, 205	
The Nature of Realization and the	
Fifth End, 208	
Reconsidering the Moral Order, 220	
<i>Bhajanā</i> : Discipline and Dedication, 223	

BIBLIOGRAPHY	229—234
--------------	------	------	------	------	---------

APPENDIX	235—240
----------	------	------	------	------	---------

PART I
ORIENTATION

VAIṢṆAVA VEDĀNTA

The Philosophy of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī

INTRODUCTION

When Professor Whitehead says that the “general characteristic of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato,”¹ he, of course, uses the word “footnote” as a metaphor, since we all know that there are a good many European philosophers, dead and alive, from the great Stagyrīte to Bertrand Russell who are fundamentally in disagreement with Plato. But when it is said that all Indian philosophies are but a series of footnotes to the Upaniṣads, the term “footnotes” need not be taken in a metaphorical sense, since what is stated is a fact literally true, which no philosopher of India would ever deny. One can say, and very justly, that the philosophy of India has been written once and for all by the seers of the Upaniṣads. And this is so because of the fact that the Upaniṣads are the spontaneous expressions of the deepest intuitions of the ancient sages and not dry fabrication of purely discursive intellect. Like the expressions of profound aesthetic and mystic intuitions, the texts of the Upaniṣads embody experiences which are flexible, free, and broad. Thus they have remained the inexhaustible source of information and inspiration, profoundly rich in their suggestiveness and implications, for the use of the philosophers throughout the ages.

Results of purely intellectual gymnastics are generally finished products, cut and dried. They have nothing more to them when once understood; they leave no mystery when once analyzed; whereas the free expressions of intuitions, sensuous, aesthetic, romantic, mystic, of whatever type may be, are elusive; they never can be grasped in their completeness; they never can be stabilized by the categories of thought—an irrational surd, a residue, a mystery is always left over. This is the

¹A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 63.

reason why they continue to be the unfathomable fountainhead of suggestions for all time and to all seekers who know how to unlock the mystery. Such are the Upaniṣads of the early Hindus.

Vedānta philosophy, literally "the end of the wisdom-teaching," is the name given to the essential purport of the principal Upaniṣads that were brought out and systematized in five hundred and fifty-five aphorisms attributed to the sage Bādarāyana. Being written in aphoristic form, this work of great veneration had to be commented upon. Dozens of commentaries have been written upon these aphorisms by the foremost thinkers of the country. Judging from the standpoint of originality, depth, and their bearings on the religion and culture of India, the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Mādhva, Ballava, Nimbārka and Baladeva are regarded as of highest importance and greatest influence. All these philosophers and their disciples are called Vedāntists. Their philosophies are embodied mainly in their commentaries and super commentaries and in other original works which they produced. Another ancient work of profound philosophic value is known as Bhagavad Gītā, the Song Celestial, as it has been called. It forms a part of the great epic Mahābhārata. The Gītā attempted to bring about a very thorough synthesis of the existing Upaniṣads of the time. This book has attracted the interest of the philosophers as much as have the aphorisms of the Vedānta. Almost all of the great Vedāntists have some commentary on this little book of seven hundred stanzas.

Apart from the Vedānta philosophy, there exist other systems of thought, such as Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya. These systems of thought are not in any sense in serious disagreement with the Vedānta. An attempt has been made to bring about a synthesis of all the systems of thought by the Purāṇas, literally, ancient truths. They are semi-philosophical works. There are eighteen of them, attributed by tradition to one person, Vyāsa. The most outstanding of these Purāṇas is the Śrīmad Bhāgavata which itself is considered as a commentary of the Vedānta. In this book have been fused all the great systems of Hindu philosophic thought with wonderful genius and skill. This book commands, perhaps, the combined veneration that, the Christians cherish for the New Testament and the Platonists for Plato's dialogues. What is meant is that it is a work of both religious

and philosophical value. Those who are especially influenced by this book commonly go by the name Bhāgavata or Vaiṣṇav. Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī whose philosophy we are about to study in this paper is one among those Bhāgavatas who wrote illuminating commentaries on this book of great veneration and left immortal contributions to posterity. The overwhelming tendency on the part of the Indian philosophers for writing commentaries and commentaries on commentaries is to be explained by the fact that they wanted to contribute their thoughts to one common fund of their culture. No one intended to make a fresh start like Bacon or Descartes, decrying all the past tradition as "idols". No great philosopher has lived on the soil of India who did not have profound respect for his tradition and who did not enrich his tradition profoundly by his contributions, mostly in the form of commentaries.

In the pages that follow, I shall try to consider the metaphysics of Vedānta in general and the contributions of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī in particular. My attempt may be compared to that of one who would try to write the philosophy of Neo-platonism with special reference to Proclus. Such a person would have to make a very general survey of the philosophy of the Platonic dialogues and then through Plotinus arrive at Proclus. Here, in an analogous fashion, I intend to write about the general ontological position of the Upaniṣads, which is virtually the metaphysics of Vedānta, and after a brief review of the approach of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, consider the philosophy of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī. It has already been remarked that the groundwork of the Vedānta was laid by the Upaniṣads. The ontology of the Upaniṣads, therefore, constitutes the background of all the Vedāntists, including Śrī Jīva. We shall therefore start with the general metaphysical position of the Vedānta. This will also acquaint us with the background on which Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Śrī Jīva worked in common with all Vedāntists. Next we consider the contributions of the two great predecessors of Śrī Jīva, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. These two Vedāntists are to Śrī Jīva what Aristotle and Augustine are to Thomas Aquinas. In our account of Śrī Jīva we shall first consider his general position in relation to his ontological background of the Upaniṣads and next the synthesis he attempted between the two opposing views of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Lastly, we shall include four sections on theology, psychology, cosmology, and

ethics of Śrī Jīva and his school. These four fields are, however, traditionally treated : Śrī Jīva's philosophy simply gave them a new colouring. Posterity developed a new outlook towards these fields owing to his contribution. It is this, I believe, that constitutes one of the major contributions of a philosopher in relation to a culture as a whole. Not a radical change of tradition but a new outlook, more systematic, more thorough and more integrated with the needs and demands of the time, is what mankind owes to the philosophers. This may not and need not be the immediate aim of the philosopher; but this is what his work amounts to for posterity as it appears in the perspective of history. If this be so, Śrī Jīva occupies a great place in the history of thought.

My sole aim is to present the subject with all possible presuppositions and implications. The exposition is primarily historical. Attempts, however, have been made to make it logical as well but that does not mean there is any intention to defend the position presented. Usually Indian philosophers are quoted to substantiate and Western philosophers are quoted to clarify the subject under discussion. If at times polemical language is used to criticize or reject any aspect of Western thought it is done in sympathy with the particular point that happens to be under consideration so that European and American students may better understand this unknown subject in terms with which they are well acquainted.

CHAPTER I

ONTOLOGY

Vedāntic Ontology

The first and the last court of appeal in the Vedānta philosophy is experience (*anubhava*). With experience it begins, with experience it ends. Experience is synonymous with reality, which is to be analyzed, synthesized and plunged into, so that its ultimate nature may be immediately apprehended.

What is experience? Experience is consciousness (*caitanya*) answers the Vedāntist. The two are identical. "I experience" means I am conscious. Consciousness is, in the language of Kant, "the lawgiver of nature."¹ For the Vedāntist it is consciousness that makes experience. Experience goes to pieces without consciousness. The essential factor that makes experience what it is, and without which it is next to nothing, is consciousness. Consciousness, therefore, is the essence of reality.

Consciousness is reality since reality to a Vedāntist is that which cannot be denied. Consciousness is just that. Its very denial presupposes its existence. Its "essence" in the language of Spinoza, "involves existence".² Śaṅkara says :

The existence of *Brahman* (absolute reality) is known on the ground of its being the self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of his self and never thinks 'I am not'. If the existence of the self was not known everyone would think 'I am not'.³

It cannot be denied since the denier himself is that consciousness.

Experience without consciousness is for the Vedāntist a meaningless term. He would contend that in order to be something existent, manifold of sensation or a thing-in-itself or something unknown and unknowable or even nothing that what is

¹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. F. Max Mullar (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 103.

² Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. R. H. M. Elews (New York : Tudor Publishing Co., 1933), p. 1, 39.

³ Śaṅkara, "Bhāṣya" 1. 1. i., *Sacred Books of the East*, trans. F. Max Muller (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1890), XXXIV, 14.

in question must be the object of some awareness however paradoxical this may appear.

There is an eternal connection between my self and the world, because this world has its other side in my consciousness. If there were no conscious being and no supreme consciousness at its source and centre there could not be a world.¹

Everything can be denied save consciousness. The famous statement of Descartes "*Cogito, ergo sum*" indeed expresses a deep truth. It requires consciousness to doubt or deny consciousness and hence it is undeniable. The very essence of reality, therefore, is consciousness. A short dialogue between two philosophers of the Upaniṣads illustrates this position of the Vedāntist very clearly.

King Janaka asked Yājñavalkya what was the light of man. Yājñavalkya first said that the light of man was the sun. It is on account of the sun that man is able to sit and move about, to go forth for work and return. 'When the sun has set, O Yājñavalkya,' asked King Janaka, 'what is the light of man?' Yājñavalkya said that then the moon was the light of man. For, having the moon for light man could sit and move about and do his work and return. 'When both the sun and the moon have set,' asked King Janaka, 'what is the light of man?' 'Fire, indeed,' said Yājñavalkya, 'is man's light, for having fire for his light man can sit and move about, do his work and return.' 'When the sun has set, when the moon has set, and when the fire is extinguished what is the light of man?' asked Janaka. 'Now, verily,' says Yājñavalkya, 'you are pressing me to the deepest question. When the sun has set, when the moon has set and when the fire is extinguished the self alone is man's light.'²

Consciousness and that alone is real. Consciousness (*caitanya*) is identical with existence (*sat*). The whole of existence is consciousness and their unity is called bliss (*ānanda*). "My consciousness and the vast world outside me are one. And

¹ Rabindranath Tagore, *Personality* (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1917), p. 186.

² *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, iv. 3. 2-6, quoted from R. D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy* (Poona : Oriental Book Agency, 1926).

where is that Unity? It is that Great Power, who breathes out Consciousness in me and also in the world outside myself.”¹ How Consciousness can be the whole of existence and what their identity means we shall grasp fully when we have acquainted ourselves with consciousness in all its dimensions. Consciousness has four dimensions in Vedānta philosophy, and when it has all of them it is said to be full and blissful. To these four dimensions of consciousness we now turn our attention.

DIMENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

First Dimension—“WAKING”.—Ordinarily when we think of conscious experience we look around us at sensible objects, including our own bodies. It is with these immediately perceived objects that we equate our conscious experience. We think of it, to use a spatial metaphor, as an extended plane. This is said to be the first dimension of consciousness. It is the sensible corporeal world. As there are four dimensions and all the others are approached only through this it is called the first.²

When we stop to analyze a moment we discover that our percepts have hardly any meaning without concepts or ideas. In order to be conscious of a red rose, for instance, one has to borrow numerous ideas from one’s earlier memories. Mere percepts give very little. Thus we begin to realize that consciousness has not only length and breadth but depth too. To a Vedāntist consciousness is solid, so to speak, or even more than solid; a solid has three dimensions while Vedāntic consciousness has four. Psychologists tell us that mind is like an iceberg only one-ninth of which is floating on the surface. By four dimensions the Vedāntists seek to encompass the whole consciousness. Those dimensions are named as follows : (1) Waking consciousness (*jāgrat*), (2) Dream consciousness (*svapna*). (3) Dreamless consciousness (*suṣupti*), (4) The Fourth consciousness (*turiya*), so-called perhaps for want of a technical term, although in course of time the term “Fourth” acquired a technical status. We shall capitalize these four terms in order to indicate their technical meaning.

¹ Tagore, *op. cit.*

² *Vide* Śaṅkara, *Commentary on Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, trans. M. N. Dvivedi (Theosophical Publication, Bombay, 1894), p. 7.

The first dimension as we have already mentioned is the corporeal sensible world which is technically called "Waking". "Waking has its experience limited to the gross plane and its fruition therefore consists of gross objects. It is named *vaiśvānara*, which is a collective name of all beings on the gross plane."¹

In spite of such names as "Waking" or "Dream" it should not be supposed that this is a mere psychological study of the mind. The dimensions are so named not because they are psychological but because they have been discovered through psychological analysis. That they are preeminently ontological, we shall see as we proceed.

Second dimension—"DREAMING"—The second dimension is called "Dream" consciousness. Dreams are studied by our psychologists today usually to satisfy their curiosity about the psyche. Psychologists are not interested in the metaphysical implications of dreams. Our metaphysicians also neglect them for no good reason. If our waking consciousness does supply us with materials that enable us to philosophize, there is no reason why the dreaming and dreamless states of our existence should not also do so, says a Vedāntist. Dreams or dreamless sleep are nothing abnormal. Every sane person sleeps daily; some nights he dreams; some nights he sleeps soundly without any dream. As a matter of fact, we spend almost one-third of our life in dreaming and while dreaming, dreams are no more dreams than waking perceptions are dreams. They appear as equally real. To a Vedāntist, however, these aspects of human experience reveal different dimensions of consciousness and consequently of existence, since they are two sides of one reality like two faces of one piece of paper.² A psychologist's account of a dream is somewhat like this : when a man goes to sleep he sees images, some of which are due to an actual external stimulus, present at the time of sleep, while others are the copies of his waking perceptions arising spontaneously and at random. Now let us see how a Vedāntist would distinguish his dreaming states from his waking ones.

Waking experiences are restricted to the actual presentative elements whereas dreams are not. Waking consciousness

¹ *Ibid.*

² D. N. Tagore, *Gitā pātha* (Allahabad : Indian Press, 1926), p. 301.

is directed by practical interests whereas dreams are not. A continuously connective attention gives waking states a more definite pattern than the dream images. Free play of imagination gives the dream a wider scope and flexibility than the waking states. The connections that are contradictory and impossible in waking states are quite commonplace in dreams. Our practical needs of life have a very commanding voice in our waking consciousness. This is selective and gives rise to beliefs and prejudices which rule out certain associations. In waking states certain things demand more attention than others. Certain objects we are serious about, others we pass by, and these choices are mostly determined by the biological drives of our life. In dreams, on the other hand, while our biological demands are at their minimum the tyranny of practical needs ceases for a moment to exorcise the function of our free mind. The images find an unfenced field in which to play freely. Perhaps we see our own ideas, but they are not known to be *our* ideas. They seem to be as much "given" as the objects of waking life. The waking life is presented with a real given and the dream life with a *belief* that something is given. The real given also involves belief, but that it is more than belief and that the belief of the dream is *mere* belief is not known until the two beliefs are taken together and compared. Justly or not our waking experience is regulated by a sense of uniformity, continuity, and limitation of space and time. But utter discontinuity, lack of uniformity, and absence of space-time reference seem to characterize the dream state. To be sure, the dreams too appear to take place in space and time and to possess some pattern, but what is altogether lost is their rigidity. "There is no tyrannic continuous memory, no rigid demand for uniformity, no compunction for not being in a line with truth—a glorious life of thoughtless thoughtfulness."¹ Such are dreams. What do they indicate to a Vedāntist?

Dream states signify to the Vedāntist that there is the possibility of "perception without sensation," since dreams are just such perception. What of it? we ask. Granting that it is so, what metaphysical import does it have? It suggests, answers a Vedāntist, that there is the possibility of a realm of pure ideas and meanings which are not limited by impressions. There is

¹ K. C. Bhattachārya, *Studies in Vedāntism* (Calcutta University, 1909), p. 2.

a world of thoughts, of ideas ; and there consciousness is free of externalities. This is the more intimate nature of our consciousness, since here it exhibits its freedom and spontaneity. "Internal perception is prior to external logically if not chronologically."¹ The world of sensation appears to be real to us only because it is sustained and given meanings by ideas and thoughts. "The sensation is felt to give us reality only because the idea unconsciously animates it."² Is perception, apart from thought, experience at all ? Emphatically not. It is with thought, with judgment, that our knowledge truly begins and not with mere presentation. What makes perception feel real to me is my interpretation of it, and this interpretation is preeminently an act of thought. Presentation is representative, and hence thought is more fundamental and basic than sense. It is this realm of free thought that constitutes the second dimension of consciousness. If we have to know reality, we have to know it more from thoughts than from sense. This is the lesson of the dream. Professor Bhaṭṭācārya writes :

Sensation and idea are not co-ordinate in reality and to overlook this is a fundamental vice of Empirical psychology. The idea may unconsciously animate the sensation (perception is a 'presentative-representative' cognition) but this unconscious working is absolutely different from its conscious existence. The conscious idea, while recognizing itself to have been operative in the percept, absolutely disowns its unconscious sensuous character, *e.g.*, when an illusion is corrected by careful observation, the idea stimulating a percept is known to be a *mere* idea, but the illusory percept vanishes altogether without caring to court a comparison with the true percept. Thus we have three distinct mental states throwing light on one another : (1) perception in which ideas unconsciously work, (2) such perceptions coexisting with a conscious idea, where the idea is regarded as inferior in reality to the percept and (3) the pure idea, hardly ever realized in waking consciousness (except probably in the fluid transparency of the poet's intuition in spontaneous clairvoyance, or in the settled vision of the Yogin) to which the waking world would appear unsubstantial. The last state is one to which all have not

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

access, and would be disbelieved altogether, were it not for the fact that we have a daily illustration of its *possibility* in our dreams. In dreams, the ideas do not consciously remember the corresponding waking percepts, they are at once percepts.¹

What has been said does not however mean that dreams as such are more real than waking life. Dreams only suggest the *possibility* of such power of consciousness as has to be utilized and delved into in reflection, introspection and abstract thinking. In the language of Plato, "And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure—when she has as little as possible to do with body and has no bodily sense or feeling but is aspiring after being."² Into this realm of consciousness we have access only to the degree that we have been able to free ourselves from the needs of the body. In dreams the body is reduced to a minimum, and so the lesson that it gives us is that the more successful we are in reducing our practical demands, the more shall we see into the depth of reality and make our consciousness free. Our speculative aspirations approximate their goal when they are not tied to practical considerations but have learned to transcend them. From Aristotle and also from the forest-dwelling philosophers of India we have learned that philosophy is the result of leisure hours, when biological demands are either minimized or satisfied (if that is possible). Dreams themselves may be utterly useless, but their teaching is of supreme value. They tell us, to sum up, that could we once minimize all the persistent and sometimes tyrannical demands of our body and be forgetful of it as we are in sleep, and at the same time *possess ourselves* and not lose control as we do in sleep, we would have a more complete and comprehensive vision of truth. The most valuable things of which human culture today has reason to be proud seem to be in proportion to this ideal, namely the ideal of negating body and asserting idea.

The experiences of the states of dreams is called *Taijaśa*, because, it being entirely of the essence of light be-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

² Plato, *Phaedo* 656, trans. B. Jowett (New York : Charles Scriber's Sons, 1891), I, 391.

comes the cognizer of the mind, irrespective of the objective. The experience of this condition is therefore rightly called experience of the subtle.¹

This is the second dimension of reality.

Third dimension—"DREAMLESSNESS".—Next we try to fathom the third stratum of consciousness which lies one layer deeper than thought. We have reached the realm of ideas, of concepts. But a single isolated concept is almost nothing. It is no thought at all. Thoughts are judgments. Concepts therefore appear and disappear in clusters and not in isolation. They always present themselves in groups, and they seem to be tied together by a sort of internal bond. They may be two, three or more in number, in every case they are in a system. Within the system they take up various forms. Kant has told us of twelve categories, although they do not all appear together. Pāṇini, the old grammarian-philosopher tells us that six such concepts may appear clustered on one single judgment, fastened by one relation. Take for instance : on the sacrificial ground in the evening Rāma, the son of Daśaratha, with his own hand is giving alms from the treasury to the poor. Here by a single relation of giving, Rāma, alms, hand, poor, treasury, sacrificial ground, and evening; agent, patient, object, instrument, source, space, and time are held together. This is one judgment or thought. What holds this judgment and the divergent factors together? The factors are concepts. They spring up from somewhere and arrange themselves in a pattern. Whence do they come, whither do they disappear? Why do they form one pattern rather than another? All this suggests a background from where they rise and to which they return and which accounts for their pattern, something that gives them unity, keeps them in shape and order. The soaring imagination, the deepening reflection, the penetrative introspection, these are all players. They require a stage and a stagemaster to import rhyme and reason to them, to make their relationship possible and meaningful, rather than chaotic. In one word, thoughts, concepts, categories need, to use a Kantian phrase, a synthetic unity, in order to be what they are.

Let us look at the picture from a somewhat different angle. Whenever there is thought, there is a thinker. Whether in

¹ Śaṅkara, *Bhāṣya on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, trans. M. N. Dvivedi (Theosophical Publication, Bombay, 1894), pp. 9-10.

sense experience and the thoughts of waking life or in a free play of images in dream experience, a knower and a known are indispensable for any experience, actual or possible. Why do the subject and object coexist? What accounts for their close bonds? Their relationship cannot be accidental since it is universal. All knowledge involves the subject-object relationship. It therefore cannot be that subject and object just happen to come together. Their inseparability is so real that they appear like twin sons of one mother. They are two aspects of one reality that includes them. That underlying reality cannot be any object of thought, since in all thought it is presupposed. It therefore transcends thought and at the same time embraces the two relata, knower and known, that are bifurcated within it.

If experience is allowed to speak for itself it will tell us that subject and object are presented as one. Knowledge becomes intelligible when we recognize that the fundamental relation in all conscious experience is a relation of members which are in an organic unity which exist as terms, is a living process in and through each other, or in and through a universal which transcends them both, though it does not exclude them.¹

Thus through two paths we have come to the postulation of another level of consciousness, which is the synthetic unity of all relations, of the ideal realm in general and of the knower-known relation in particular, and which at the same time transcends them all.

But, after all, this is an hypothesis. We have no right to assert it as an existential reality and term it as a level of consciousness. Undoubtedly so. And this is the reason why Kant does not assert it as existential. The Vedāntist is well aware of this and he would not affirm the existence of a hypothetical principle however reasonable it might be, until somewhere it is experienced, and something in experience positively guarantees its existence.

Wherein lies the importance of dreamless sleep for a Vedāntist? Some nights we sleep very soundly and do not dream at all. In dreams we have perception without sensation, thoughts without things; in dreamless sleep we have an experience without any content, a knowledge without any thought.

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (The Macmillan Co., 1927), II, 306.

A question might possibly be asked : Why call dreamless sleep knowledge without thought? Is it knowledge at all? In dreamless sleep we have simply no experience. To call it an experience without content is just playing with words. We first answer by a counter question. How do you know that you had no experience? Does a color-blind person know that he does not see certain colors? He simply has no experience of that particular color, but he cannot be aware of his non-awareness by any effort of his own except from memory if some time in his early years he was not a color-blind man. In order to know that one had absence of awareness in dreamless sleep, some awareness of his must be present there. It would possibly be urged that one can easily infer it in the morning from the environing circumstances and freshness of his mind. This, we say, is not possible unless one has actual experience. In order to have a valid conclusion, such as "experience was contentless" from a syllogism, one must require some middle term "M" which should be distributed in at least one premise. If "M" is distributed in the premise in which "experience" occurs, then "M" should have to be included in experience. In that case "M" will be the content of experience which is against the desired conclusion unless "M" is null. To admit that "M" is null is to say that there is no middle term and hence no syllogism—a fact which is not desired because what is desired by the opponent is to prove that it is valid inference. If, on the other hand, "M" is distributed in the premise in which "experience" does not occur then "experience" has to be included in "M". But nothing can include experience unless it is an experience itself. The syllogism is therefore valid only when "M" is an experience. Hence Q. E. D. There can be a valid inference whose conclusion is that "experience was contentless" only when there is another experience "m" which includes as its content the experience which was contentless. The inference then simply proves that what is thus proven namely "the experience was contentless" is not an inference but a fact of previous experience, that is to say, a fact of memory. In other words, there cannot be a valid conclusion such as "experience was contentless" unless there is a middle term which is either the object or subject of that experience. That experience has no object according to the hypothesis and hence it has a subject, a knower if the inference is valid. But in that case that the

experience was contentless is itself no inference but a fact of memory.

Or, let us put it psychologically. We cannot infer anything in the world that was not somehow or somewhere presented. Non-existence of any object during deep sleep has to be given as a fact experienced somehow and sometime. It does not improve the situation a bit when one argues that one had no object of experience because one feels refreshed, unless feeling refreshed and having no object of experience are sometimes given related together. Therefore when in the morning, one says that one had sound sleep last night and had no dreams, one says it from memory and not from inference. To concede that it is memory is to admit that there was a consciousness which did no sleep but was aware of the non-existence of any thought. And hence dreamless sleep proves the existence of knowledge without thought. Suppose one is sitting in a very dark room. In order to know that he is in a dark room, he must have some consciousness which need not necessarily be the consciousness of the darkness but must be consciousness of himself at any rate. As long as he knows he is there he knows he is in darkness. He would not know that there was no light in the room if he himself were asleep. A sleepless consciousness that knows itself should be there in order to witness darkness. And this also justifies the statement of Yājñavalkya, the Upaniṣadic philosopher who said that "when the sun sets, the moon sets, the fire is extinguished, self is the light of Man."

The above argument should not be considered fallacious on the assumption that it commits the fallacy of "*argumentum ad ignorantiam*". That fallacy is committed when one seeks to prove something merely by showing that its absence cannot be proved. In the above case, we are proving the existence of knowledge, not disproving the absence of knowledge, by proving the presence of the knowledge of "absence of knowledge". It is held that presence of knowledge is necessary to be aware of "absence of knowledge" as much as it is necessary to be aware of any other object. And that presence of the "absence of knowledge" is proved by the memory that one has when one gets up in the morning. In the morning I *remember* that "I was in a sound sleep and did not know anything." This fact of "not-knowing anything" requires the presence of a consciousness to witness. It is only in syllogistic reasoning that *argu-*

mentum ad ignorantium can possibly be committed. It is expressly declared that this is no case of argument or syllogism or inference. We have argued simply to show that it is not an instance of argument. It is a case of memory.

When a man rises from dreamless sleep, he becomes aware that he had a blissful sleep during which he was conscious of nothing. This he knows from memory. Now memory is only of a presentation. Therefore the bliss and the consciousness of nothing must have been presented during the sleep.¹

If there were no consciousness present to witness the non-existence of any object at that time, one would not recognize his self-identity in the morning. "The same self wakes up again. The recognition of the identity in waking proves the continuity of consciousness through these states."² If one does not feel at liberty to accept the conclusion the difficulty lies not in Vedāntic logic but in one's metaphysics.

In *susupti* (dreamless sleep) then the self is neither non-existent nor unconscious. The soul is consciousness. It exists independently of the relativity of Empiric consciousness. The difficulty of understanding the semi-transcendent consciousness in dreamless sleep is perhaps due to the common sense view that self-consciousness is relative to not-self-consciousness, so that in dreamless sleep, the self, dissociated from empirical mind, must be unconscious.³

In dreamless sleep I am in myself. The Sanskrit word *susupti*, which is used for dreamless sleep, means "to be well in one's-self". Dreamless sleep therefore suggests that one can be conscious of one's self without any percept or concept. This points towards a deeper strata of consciousness which can know itself without the use of thought. Or, in other words, there can be knowledge without thought, that is to say, there is a level of consciousness which transcends thought processes and imparts meaning to them. The lesson of the dream is that there can be thoughts without things, and the teaching of dreamless sleep is that there can be awareness without thought. This means there is a level of existence where knower and known are blended

¹ K. C. Bhaṭṭācārya, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

² M. N. Sircar, *Vedāntic Thought and Culture* (Calcutta University, 1925), p. 161.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

into one, in the consciousness of self, where knower knows the known by being identical with it. It may be asked why do we go into a dreamless sleep to gain this knowledge? The answer is that just as we could never show in our every experience an "idea" anywhere without an impression along with it, so do we fail to exhibit in such experience a self without a thought process. In dreams we pointed out the former separation and in dreamless sleep we found the latter. Though the self is always with us, yet nowhere in experience do we find it singly, pure and simple, save in dreamless sleep. Hence the importance of such a phenomenon.

Here the point is not that we are clearly conscious of self in dreamless sleep any more than we are thinking in a dream. It is the possibility of a pure self-consciousness that dreamless sleep warrants. What is demanded by reason is now warranted by experience. When in our ordinary way we try to introspect or reflect, we certainly do not see ourselves, and Hume was right when he said that it was the series of states and process only of which we are aware. But Hume was wrong when he said that this was all that there was. Hume failed to see his self because, as G. H. Mead has aptly put it, he had gone out of his study to look through the window to find it empty. His procedure was faulty. The self is not one of the many states that follow one another, like a continuous stream; it is that to which the stream owes its origin, organization and continuity. But it is hidden from our view by those very thoughts that constitute the stream, much as the stem of a lily is hidden by the very petals which thrive and have their being in it and for it. The clouds that cover the sun are visible by the very light of the sun which they hide. This is the position of a Vedāntist.

Before we proceed further we may contrast the position of the Vedāntist regarding the self with that of Kant.

The level of synthetic unity, which we may call the intuitive or self-conscious level, was recognized by Kant more fully than anyone else to be indispensable for experience. He calls it the "supreme principle of all our knowledge". He writes in his *Critique of Pure Reason* :

The absolute identity of apperception in relation to all the determination given in perception involves a synthesis of those determinations and it is possible only through con-

consciousness of the synthesis. For, the empirical consciousness which accompanies each determination as it arises is in itself broken up into units and is unrelated to the one identical subject. Relation to a single subject does not take place when I accompany each determination with consciousness but only when I add one determination to the other and am conscious of this act of synthesis. It is only because I am capable of combining in one consciousness the various determinations presented to me that I can become aware that in every one of them the consciousness is the same. The analytic unity of apperception is therefore possible only under presupposition of a certain synthetic unity.¹

But Kant did not find any warrant in his experience that could enable him to assert the existence of the synthetic self. Regarding this point he writes :

That I, who think, can be considered in thinking as subject only and as something not simply inherent in the thinking, as predicate is an apodictical and even identical proposition, but it does not mean that as an object, I am a self-dependent being or a *substance*. The latter would be saying a great deal and requires for its support *data* which are not found in thinking, perhaps (so far as I consider only the thinking subject as such) more than I shall ever find in it.²

Kant therefore upholds it as a postulate ; not as a “doctrine” but as a “discipline,” which fixes “unpassable limits to speculative reason in this field, partly to keep us from throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless materialism, partly to warn us against losing ourselves in a vague and with regard to practical life, baseless spiritualism”.³ Kant says that his reason refuses to give any satisfactory answer to this “curious” question. He calls it “a fruitless speculation to a fruitful practical use”.⁴ It is practically useful because he says it “regulates our comfort as if our destination reached far beyond experience”.⁵

¹ B. Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers* (New York : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), p. 402 or J. Watson, *The Philosophy of Kant—The Critique of Pure Reason* (London : The Macmillan Co., 1908), p. 65.

² Rand, *ibid.*, p. 429 ; also *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. F. Max Muller (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1922), sup. XXVII, 793.

³ Rand, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

The point of difference, therefore, between Kant and the Vedāntist, lies in this : what is a useful postulate for Kant is an ontological existent for the Vedāntist. Kant, by using his searching logic says that the self may be there, or even must be there, while the Vedāntist depending not only on logic, but deeper experience, says that the self "is" there. This difference again is due to the fact that to Kant "knowledge involves two elements : *firstly*, the conception or category by which an object in general is thought ; and *secondly*, the perception by which it is given".¹ He believes that this is always true. Hence follows the well-known principle of Kant that percepts are blind without concepts and concepts are empty without percepts. Kant does not believe that there can be an experience in which these two factors are identified. In other words, Kant holds that knowledge is co-terminus with thinking and since thinking is impossible without categories knowledge must involve them also. Synthetic apperception, being, even by definition, the presupposition of all categories, cannot involve categories and consequently cannot be knowledge. But the Vedāntist says that knowledge is a wider term than thinking. It will be true to say that all categories and thoughts are knowledge but it will be wrong to assert that all knowledge is categorized. Dreamless sleep warns us against such a hasty assumption. Self-consciousness means that I know myself identical with myself. "It is existence aware of itself."² Here is therefore a specimen of knowledge without the aid of any category. It may be felt here that there seems to be an argument in a vicious circle. The thesis of knowledge without thought is proved by self-consciousness which again is established on that very principle. It is indeed precisely to avoid this circle that the Vedāntist has taken recourse to in the state of dreamless sleep. This again is not fully satisfactory to him until he has actually realized that state of pure self-consciousness by his conscious attempt, in what is known as *yoga-samādhi*—the most pitifully misunderstood chapter of Indian philosophy.

It may also be remarked here in passing that since Kant equates knowledge with thinking, he has always a residue over

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 403.

² S. Rādhākrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life* (London : Allen & Unwin, 1932), p. 145.

which he called the thing-in-itself. Kant, being determined by his predispositions, finds no way to be aware of the given as it is. In order to be aware he has always to throw the net of categories to catch the given, which by that very act, gives up its primitive status and puts on the civilized robe of the categories. No amount of herculean effort can make Kant know the given in its native state. Agnosticism is therefore the necessary outcome of the Kantian position. If the thing-in-itself requires repudiation, as it would seem by the attempts of many Kantians, it could be done not as Hegel did, by giving the royal throne to the categories, but by going beyond the categories, as does the Vedāntist and asserting that there is such a thing as immediate knowledge without the help of categories. We are, however, not interested in criticizing or refuting Kant. We simply point out that it is by one and the same principle, namely that experience does not necessarily mean what is stabilized by categories, that the Vedāntist does take within the realm of experience all the transcendent fringes of the Kantian philosophy. The Vedāntist does not only lay down the principle and remain satisfied with it, but he makes an actual attempt in his contemplation to arrive at those factors which Kant's system leaves outside experience. In dreamless sleep we have the indication of a genuine self-conscious level but at that time we possess no control over ourselves. Therefore, when through actual conscious effort that state is made real in contemplation by the Vedāntist, the state which is known as *asamprajñāta samādhi* in *yoga* philosophy, may be called actualized dreamlessness. Thus the hypothesis is verified by genuine experience. Like a true scientist, the Vedāntist starts with a suggestion from experience, formulates hypothesis by reason and then verifies it by more thorough experience.

Kant, however, felt the need of his transcending factors at least those of the subjective side—the so-called Ideas of Reason, again, in his *Critique of Practical Reason*. He called them back and set them up as the moral postulates. A criticism of this position of Kant by a Vedāntist, is quoted below in order to make the Vedāntist's position clearer.

That the self is believed in and is yet actually unknown is itself to me ground for holding that it is knowable without *thinking* and has to be so known. The self or freedom is taken to be a moral postulate, but why is a moral pos-

tulate formulated at all? Neither morality nor metaphysical theory gains anything by the formulation in theoretic form. A moral postulate is not simply an Idea of the Reason nor is it a construct of the aesthetic imagination. It appears to me to be formulated for the contemplation of it not as moral good or as an enjoyable value but as a truth to be known. Such contemplation cannot be a spiritual luxury or make-believe but must have behind it the faith that it is just the process of reaching truth without thinking. It is not indeed a duty to contemplate but the contemplation being already there, it demands fulfilment in knowledge.¹

The Vedāntist's emphasis on contemplation reminds us of Aristotle's intuitive reason. As he writes in his *Ethics* :

If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth and are never deceived about things invariable or even variable are scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom and intuitive reason and it cannot be any of the three (*i.e.*, practical wisdom, scientific knowledge or philosophic wisdom) the remaining alternative is that it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principle.²

Thus we arrive at the third stratum of reality. It is the level of subjective soul. We discover it normally in dreamless sleep and deliberately in self-meditation.

In the most profound depth of dreamless sleep when the objective world is completely withdrawn from mental vision and when every memory is dormant and does not work up a picture of the outer world within, nothing but consciousness is left to itself or the subjective soul. The same condition is assured in a state of profound self-meditation or self-concentration when consciousness is made to turn exclusively upon itself.³

The fourth dimension—"THE FOURTH" (*Turiya*).—The self which we have reached, the "I" in me, the "I" in you, is what accounts for the consciousness of self that you and I possess.

¹ K. C. Bhattachārya, "The Concept of Philosophy," *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. J. N. Muirhead (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1936), p. 66.

² Aristotle, *Ethics*, vi. 6. 1141a. ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1912).

³ D. K. Shastri, *The Bhakti Cult in Ancient India* (Calcutta : B. Banerjee & Co., 1922), p. 172.

As you and I are two distinct individuals, so there are innumerable self-conscious units in the world. Everyone's self-consciousness is private to him. Everyone is distinct from the other and isolated from the rest. But this is only half a truth. We are also related to each other. We are, to begin with, sure about the existence of other individuals, so much so that solipsism is enough to condemn any philosophical system which leads to it. Not only are we conscious of each other's existence, but by the tie of friendship and various other social relationships we are associated with each other. In spite of apparent isolation, very intimate communication also seems to be possible between the selves. This gives rise to a problem. What makes this recognition, inter-relation, and communication possible? If we think of it deeply enough we can readily see that even to acknowledge the very existence of our fellow beings, not to speak of fellowship with them, is utterly impossible unless we postulate that there is something "other" than all of us but common to all of us, embracing us all. Just as without a synthetic unity of apperception the realm of categories, *i.e.*, formal relationship between ideas, falls apart, so does friendship, *i.e.*, social relationship, go to pieces if there be no synthetic unity of communion. There must be some common underlying universal consciousness, if interchange of ideas and feelings between individuals is at all genuine.

A similar question arises when we consider how we know objective nature. No one except perhaps a rare subjectivist denies that there is a "given" in experience and no one save a strict materialist denies that in the structure of our knowledge there are some factors which are constructions of mind. If that be so, we may ask why then on the occasion of a "given" just the right interpreting ideas materialize? Why does not the "manifold of intuitions" enter into the wrong form? Unless there is a deeper correspondence between the life within and the life without, experience itself is an utter impossibility. Very truly has Professor Hocking said, "That which makes naturalists of us is the very thing which taken with more complete self-consciousness, should make of us objective idealists."¹

Thus in order to make correspondence possible between

¹ W. R. Hocking, *Types of Philosophy* (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 292.

individual and individual, and between individual and the world, we are forced to postulate an "other" that transcends them all but at the same time embraces them within itself. In order that communion between man and man, and nature and man can be a true one, an all-encompassing greater consciousness must exist.

The "other" which is thus postulated in order to make all communication between individuals possible, needs to be verified if we are going to assert that such an "other" constitutes a real dimension of existence. By the strength of arguments we can go ever so far as to say that such an "other" must exist, but we cannot say it "is" until experience warrants us to do so. This has always been the attitude of the Vedāntist. What we have called "other" the Vedāntist calls "that" (*tat*). "That" is the universal consciousness. "That" and its experience is called "the Fourth". The "experienced" and the experiencing go by the same name since it is held that in such cases their difference almost vanishes. The Vedāntist has to show that we have the experience of the "that". *Firstly*, in our normal everyday experience we have an experience of "that", however vaguely. When an empiricist, for example, speaks of "experience" he of course does not mean the little fraction of the universe that he happens to experience. Whenever we want to make a significant statement about experience we cannot help transcending ourselves. It is really the experience of "that" which we speak about. Even Leibniz who upheld the dogma of windowless monads had to transcend that limitation in order to believe in such things and make assertions about them. He could not philosophize as long as he did not cease to be one of the windowless monads. In every moment of our life we are, however paradoxically it may seem, more than just ourselves. This "more" in us is explained by the fact of participation by us in a greater "that" whose experience we share. *Secondly*, we have experience of that "other" not only when we feel competent to speak significantly about the world, but also when we realize the inadequacy of ourselves and of our world. Whenever we realize what insignificant, insufficient creatures we are and how transient and ephemeral the world about us is, when thus criticize and even condemn our affairs and those of the world we do it because we experience something greater, nobler and more perfect in comparison to which we are small and imperfect.

Paradoxical though it may sound, it is nevertheless a fact, that there is something in man which is more than himself ; which sees beyond and thereby knows that he is not self-sufficient, and neither is the world he lives in. Otherwise why has mankind, throughout the ages, speculated about the Deity ? Even if that speculation is said to be a sad but useful mistake of man (as has been said by not a few distinguished thinkers of our time), still the diagnosis of that mistake would reveal the fact that somehow man's vision did penetrate to a reality beyond the visible. However this phenomenon may be explained it still remains a fact that there is something in me, which not only knows me, my society and the world about me as positive matters of fact, but also judges them as insufficient, imperfect incomplete existences. Not attempting to pass any judgment on the different explanations of the different schools on this point, I simply say that in Vedāntic literature this is considered to be an overplus in man which goes by the name "*antaryāmi*". It is the part of the one universal consciousness in me. It constitutes the fourth dimension of my consciousness. When I evaluate and pass judgment on myself and the world and even condemn them as defective and imperfect, I do this because I see the "Fourth" outside of me by the eyes of the "Fourth" within me.

When the Upaniṣadic seers exclaimed that this world is the most glorious place¹ and life is worth living they saw the "Fourth" in it and conversely when they declared that all this manifoldness is empty words,² that it had no existence, that the world is illusion and life a mirage, they saw the same "Fourth" beyond it. It is a curious fact indeed that it is due to one and the same reality that the world is declared to be meaningful and meaningless almost in the same breath. Both appreciation and depreciation of a "translation" require the knowledge of the original. "Every creature who is capable of the consciousness of an objective world and of the consciousness of the self is capable also of the consciousness of God."³ Thus we find that the experience

¹ *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* ii 2 II. See Appendix, note 1 (for Sanskrit notes the reader is in each instance referred to the Appendix).

² *Katha Upaniṣad*, iv. 22. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* vi. 1. 4. See Appendix, note 2.

³ E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion* (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1893), 1, 68.

of the "Fourth" is just as normal to everyone as dream and dreamless sleep. But is not this experience too vague, it will be asked, to prove anything? Of course it is vague and that is why vigorous attempt is made by the Vedāntist, to turn this experience into a clearer and more vivid one. More real and more comprehensive experience of the universal consciousness is also called "Fourth", which is nothing but ecstatic experience (*turiya*). Let us see what is the nature and lesson of the ecstatic trance of the Vedānta philosophy.

As long as we were speaking about the dream, dreamless sleep, and moral conscience we knew that we were appealing to the normal experience of common man. But to speak of the ecstatic trance is to appeal to the experience of a few individuals of the world; and the authenticity and genuineness of their versions are often looked at with an eye of suspicion by the world of science. But it is hoped that the particular aspect of those experiences in which we are interested at this moment has very little, if anything, to do with the authenticity and interpretation which is put on them. We are looking neither for the genealogy of those experience nor for the veracity of their expositors. Neither do we seek to investigate the physical or neural factors involved. We simply endeavour to see the light, if any, that ecstatic experience throws on the subject under discussion—namely, the ontology of consciousness. We simply try to see whether any new dimension of consciousness is or is not revealed by such experience.

Let us start with an experience which all of us have more or less access to the ecstasy of the experience of love. We take our start with the authority of Plotinus, who remarks while speaking about his own mystical experience, "It is that union of which the union of earthly lovers who wish to blend their being with each other is a copy."¹ From the copy we shall gradually try to proceed towards the original as far as is possible and necessary. I may mention that this has been the procedure of investigation in the Vedānta philosophy, especially in the Vaiṣṇava School of Bengal. From human love they proceed to realize the nature of divine love. In the following analysis I follow the steps of the Vaiṣṇava theologians.

¹ W. R. Inge. *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1918), p. 135.

The experience of love begins with falling in love (*pūrva-rāga*) and finds its rapturous consummation in receiving the beloved within one's arms (*milan*). The ecstasy takes place when the two personalities are blended. It is said by the Vaiṣṇava teachers to be a concrete experience of delight at the close of a rhythmic process. As soon as a person is in love, the object of love becomes the centre of his attention. The beloved occupies the central position in his life. As the love grows all other things gradually begin to drop out of his mental focus. The more intense the love grows the stronger becomes the concentration around that one object alone. All other objects in the world either do not exist for the lover, or if they exist at all, their existence and his cognition of them have meaning only insofar as they bring him some message, real or imaginary, of his beloved. The loved one is seen everywhere. The whole world exists only for that one thing. All he knows is that he loves and wants to possess his beloved. This much he knows of himself, and the beloved as an unattained, longed-for object appears to him as something greater, higher and more sublime than anything in the world. These ideas and ideals go on increasing until they reach the summit, when the longed-for object is attained, with all the idealized charms. The person plunges within the sea of experience and an ecstasy results.

Now, if the love is very pure and the object of love is a divine being instead of a mortal one, then, the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntists tell us, in such ecstasy time ceases to flow, the heart ceases to throb, the pulse forgets to beat, the eyes cease to blink. Consciousness of the body exists in its minimum. No thought, not even a faint one, passes through the mental horizon and the self is said to dissolve in a greater self. When the person comes out of such an ecstatic experience he remembers, they say, not that he possessed anything but that he *was possessed* by something much more inclusive than himself and his self is now a richer one than it was before. As long as love was *in* him he was aware of himself, of his love and beloved, but when love overflowed and he was lost *within* it he did not know that he existed or that he had love or that love had a beloved for its object. The love itself with its object becomes a transcendent subject and turns the earlier subject into its object and receives him as it enriches him with an inflow of supreme delight. This blending of self with divine in love-

experience is called ecstasy or the "Fourth". In the language of Wordsworth¹ :

In such access of mind, in such high hour
Of visitation from the living God
Thought was not : in enjoyment it expired.
No thanks he breathed, he proffered no request.
Rapt into still communion that transcends
The imperfect office of prayer and praise
His mind was a thanksgiving to the Power
That made him, it was blessedness and love.²

In the foregoing analysis we have tried to see the original through the copy as much as possible. Let us first see where-in this ecstasy differs from dreamless sleep, since that comparison alone would help us to recognize what extra light ecstasy can throw on the character of consciousness and make us see another deeper stratum of it—the "that",—the overplus and reality.

In dreamless sleep the mind with all its thoughts and modes disappears altogether, whereas in ecstasy, they do not disappear but become concentrated. In dreamless sleep self-consciousness alone is left, since there is no other object of attention ; from contentless experience consciousness rebounds to self-experience. In ecstasy another higher and wider self, which was the only object of attention is found. In the dreamless sleep the pure self is left and when one wakes up one feels joy to be in oneself but there is no feeling of enrichment of self. In ecstasy, on the other hand, the self enters into a deeper self by denying itself and therefore turns back to find itself supremely rich as well as joyful. In dreamless sleep the self stands over against nothing. In ecstasy self-consciousness stands blended with a vaster consciousness. Rising from dreamless sleep one remembers that he knew nothing, that he was the subject of contentless experience. Coming out of ecstasy one recalls that he was the object of a profoundly deep experience. Instead of possessing anything one remembers having been possessed by something more sublime. In order to remember that one was

¹ "Excursion," *Poetical Works*, Bk. I (New Haven : Peck & Newton 1836), p. 213.

² I quote this passage of Wordsworth relying on its face value without committing Vedāntist to the psychology of Wordsworth, whatever that may be. For a significant passage of Kṛiṣṇadās Kavirāj see Appendix, note 3.

the object one has to be somehow identified with that greater subject of which one's self was the object. This identification is the assertion of a greater self which was made possible through the denial of one's primitive self. In both dreamless sleep and ecstasy there was no duality. In the former duality lapsed simply because there was nothing else except the self. But in the latter the duality is no more since one of the two blending selves is denied. One is overpowered and enveloped by the other which is greater. In the former, the world is negated, because one is in one's own self. In the latter the self is denied because one has found a greater world. The denied self is lost in the trans-subjective self which is then the only assertive one. That it was possessed is only remembered afterwards, not while the ecstasy lasts, and then one says with Eckhart : "The eye with which I saw God was the same with which God saw me." The "eye" in such statement is the asserted self and "me" the negated self. By this two-fold aspect of one concrete experience the denied self comes back ennobled, enriched and totally transformed ; regenerated, in religious terminology. In brief, dreamless sleep speaks for pure self-consciousness, and ecstasy suggests supraconsciousness to us which is universal.

The point, however, is not that whenever I have an experience of love with my fellowman I have reached the state of supraconsciousness, any more than in dreamless sleep I am self-conscious. As dreamless sleep gives us an insight into a frequently concealed aspect of self, telling us of the possibility of the essential character of the fundamental reality. This is the pure self-consciousness, so does experience of love bring to us a message of a hidden stratum indicating that there exists a possibility of a state in which our self regains its genuine integrity by losing itself in a profoundly greater consciousness. That there is an all-embracing "other" and that man has the capacity to commune with it since he is a part of it, that a delight can be had by denying all delights including that of the self—such is the suggestive teaching of the parable of human love. This suggestion is actualized and verified in the genuine ecstasy of mystic love, the object of which is the Absolute Self. This highest state of experience is variously expressed. Liberation (*mukṭi*), extinction (*nirvāṇa*), ultra-cognitive trance (*nirvikalpa samādhi*) are different names of the same thing. The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntists call it *Prem-mahā-Bhāva* (solidified-love-conscious-

ness). Plotinus calls it the "Flight of the alone to the Alone," the Neo-vaiṣṇavites call it the sport of the child with the Eternal Child. Although when an attempt is made to explain these technical terms or figures of speech in the language of logic they may (as a matter of fact they do) appear to be very divergent, the fact still remains that they all unanimously affirm a very profound dimension of consciousness which they call immeasurable and incomprehensible and which, for lack of a better term, the Upaniṣads have preferred to call the "Fourth" (*Turiya*).

Satcidānanda.—Reality thus begins with "Waking" consciousness, where the consciousness is said to be at its minimum and ends in the "Fourth" where consciousness is at its maximum. This reality is called Full (*Pūrṇa*). This fullness is comprised of pure delight. Perfect joy or supreme bliss (*paramānanda*) is said to constitute the essential being of this full reality. Bliss (*ānanda*) is the completeness of existence. Existence, consciousness, and bliss (*sat*, *chit*, and *ānanda*) : these three terms express the essential character of the fundamental reality. This is the famous Vedāntic conception of "*Satcidānanda*" : "Existence-consciousness-bliss".

The nature of the approach.—I may repeat here that owing to the fact that we have spoken a good deal about dreams, dreamless sleep and ecstasy in this chapter, let not anyone misunderstand this to be mere psychology. What has been said is the genuine account of reality as Vedāntists conceive it. If you take even a piece of stone and ask a Vedāntist about its real nature, he would tell you that what you see on the surface is the "Waking" consciousness (which is sensible) and behind it lies the dream consciousness and further behind is the dreamless consciousness or pure consciousness, and beyond them all arises the "Fourth", the universal consciousness. Only in man are these layers more or less distinct but they exist just the same in a piece of stone,¹ a plant or an animal. Their development is gradual. The reason why the above accounts sound psychological is perhaps the fact that the subject has been approached psychologically by the Vedāntists. There are, as has been said by Caird, three types of approaches to the problem of ultimate reality : cosmological, theological, and psychological. According to Caird

¹ See Appendix, note 4. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* iii. 14. 1.

man is by his very nature, so constituted that only these three ways are open to him.

Man, by the very constitution of his mind has three ways of thinking open to him. He can look outwards upon the world around him, he can look inwards upon the self within him and he can look upwards to the God above him.¹

Decartes started with the "*cogito ergo sum*"—the self, Spinoza with the one substance—God. The approach of the scientifically inclined realistic thinkers, such as Alexander or Russell, may in a certain sense be termed cosmological. The approach of the Vedāntist is strictly psychological. As Professor Ranade says with very profound insight into the philosophy of the Upaniṣads :

The problem of the ultimate Reality to the Upaniṣadic philosophers is a cosmo-theo-psychological problem. Finding both the cosmological and theological approaches deficient, they take recourse to the psychological approach and arrive at the conception of self which they call *Ātman*.²

The approach of Bergson in our day may be termed psychological in the sense that Bergson discovers the nature of the "*Élan vital*" which plays such an important role in his philosophy, not by the empirical analysis of the world about us, but by the direct perception of the flow of man's inner life. Hocking says, "We have a direct knowledge of our own Ego—in spite of the miracle by which knower and known are the same—and this knowledge is the original by which all false judgments must be corrected."³ Hocking seems to support what we have called the psychological of the Vedāntist.

THE SOURCES AND THEIR RATIONALE

The sources from which the foregoing ontology is derived are the principal Upaniṣads. In all of them certain traces of it can be pointed out. But it is the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* in particular whose special subject matter is ontology. Gauḍapāda (c. 530 A.D.) elaborated the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* in what is known as his "*Kārikā*" (stanzas). Śaṅkara and Maṇḍhva are

¹ Caird, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

² Ranade, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-49.

³ Hocking, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

among those who commented on both the stanzas and the texts of the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*. The following texts from that Upaniṣad illustrate all that has been said previously.

Māṇḍukya II. All this is Reality (*Brahman*). Consciousness (*Ātman*) is Reality and this consciousness has four quarters.¹

Māṇḍukya IX. The first part "A" is *Vaiśvānara* whose sphere is the condition of Waking on account of all pervasiveness or on account of being the first. He who knows this has all his desires fulfilled and is the first.²

Māṇḍukya X. The second part "U" is *Taijasa* whose sphere is the condition of dream on account of superiority or on account of being in the middle. He who knows this has his knowledge refined to the highest point of superiority. He finds no cause of difference with anyone nor is anyone ignorant of Reality (*Brahman*) born in his Family.³

Māṇḍukya V. That is the state of deep sleep wherein the sleeper does not imagine anything and does not see any dream. The third quarter therefore is deep sleep in which all melts into one who is a mass of all sentiency, who is all bliss, whose fruition is of bliss and who is the way of sentiency (to the objective).⁴

Māṇḍukya XI. The third part "M" is *Prajñā* whose sphere is the condition of sleep on account of its being the measure or on account of its being that wherein everything loses its identity. He who knows this is able to measure all and to comprehend all within himself.⁵

Māṇḍukya VII. The fourth is not that which is conscious of the subjective, nor that which is conscious of the objective, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is a mass of all sentiency, nor that which is all darkness. It is unseen, transcendent, unapprehensible, uninferable, unthinkable, the sole essence of the consciousness of self, the negation

¹ M. N. Dvivedi, trans. *The Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* (Bombay: Theosophical Publication, 1894), p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

of all illusion, the ever-peaceful, all bliss, the one unit—this indeed is self (*Ātman*) it should be known.¹

Māṇḍukya XII. That which has no parts is the Fourth, indescribable, free from the illusion of experience, all bliss one without a second. This is “*Aumkāra*”. He who realizes self in himself loses self in the Self.²

From the above quotations it should be clear that the foregoing ontology is an elaboration of these texts of the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*. One point is very important to mention here. There are, tradition informs us, 108 Upaniṣads and thirteen of them are of great importance. It has been, among the Vedāntists, an age-old method that when one Upaniṣad is interpreted, the knowledge of the other Upaniṣads is presupposed. Each one of them is commented on in the light of the rest, since it is held that all Upaniṣads are harmonious.³ Owing to this fact the ontology that we have sketched has not been so much derived from the above texts of the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* as it has been read into them. As is evident, dreams and dreamless states may be explained very differently by Western psychologists. I am well aware of the fact that attempts have been made to explain all those experiences I mentioned, such as dreams, dreamless sleep, love, ecstasy, mystic trance, from the standpoint of biology, pathology or even physics and kinematics. But the reason they are explained as they are here is that a definite type of metaphysics is accepted on the basis of the other Upaniṣads. One may very easily point out a circularity in this procedure. But no thinker, I believe, can avoid this sort of circularity, however much he may try to conceal it. Even when a bold and fresh start is made no thinker can possibly avoid the influence of the past, neither can he avoid presupposing, however vaguely or dimly, the conclusion which he is going to reach at the end of his inquiry. We should also remember that all circularity is not vicious.

In Indian philosophy metaphysics has generally preceded epistemology. In most of the schools the nature of reality and the possibility of knowledge have been ascertained on the ground of the revealed texts, which have

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³ *Vedānta Sūtra* i. 1. 4. See Appendix, note 5.

come to be regarded as the embodiment of spiritual experience.¹

In situations such as this, we shall better understand the position of the Vedāntist if a few more statements are made as to what is meant by consciousness.

In modern thought of the West there are many theories of consciousness. Attempts have been made to deny its existence altogether or to identify it with physiological processes. Being inspired by the theories of biology and evolution some thinkers equate consciousness with certain functions of the organism, while others call it an emergent. My endeavour here is neither to support the Vedāntist theory nor to refute theories opposed to it. A clear statement of the general conception of consciousness, accepted by the Vedāntist is what is attempted.

Consciousness is conceived of as a self-luminous substance. It transcends both what we usually call body and mind. As to whether in itself it is static or dynamic, active or inactive, Vedāntists are divided among themselves. But they more or less agree to the fact that in all cases of empirical knowledge consciousness is an "impartial spectator which takes no part in the ever-changing process of knowledge, but only lights it up and passively witnesses it."² Body and mind, subject and object, are modifications or differentiations of that one stuff called consciousness (*chaitanya*). Mr. Datta points out that in this sense Vedāntic consciousness may be called neutral and a likeness may be found between the Vedāntist and the neo-realist. "Pure experience" which William James conceives of as the primal stuff, or the neutral stuff the neo-realists conceive of as the self-subsistent reality has a certain similarity with the Vedāntic consciousness. The same author calls into question the doctrine of neutral particulars inasmuch as its advocates do not tell us how the neutral particulars are known to exist.³ To a Vedāntist, however, this consciousness is the self-luminous truth. It is the substance of pure sentiency which, we have observed one experiences daily in deep sleep.

Ordinarily we equate consciousness with the mental and contrast it with the physical but the Vedāntist under all circum-

¹ D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing* (London : Allen & Unwin, 1932), p. 32.

² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 80—83.

stances contrasts consciousness with both the mental and the physical. The empirical ego is by no means the ultimate consciousness. Apparently therefore for a Vedāntist, a person has two selves, the one an empirical self and the other his true metaphysical self—soul and oversoul, in the language of Emerson. The problem of how this empirical self came into existence is as important and as pertinent for a Vedāntist as it is for any sociologist. The Vedāntist's acceptance of metaphysical consciousness does not beg the question any more than the "neutral entities"¹ of Russell do when an attempt is made to derive mind from them. If the self that Professor Mead,² for instance, has shown to originate within the social process is the empirical self, as undoubtedly it is, then the Vedāntist would not object to such a doctrine. He would simply argue that unless what he calls pure consciousness be there in the beginning, the rise of the empirical self would not be possible. Vedāntic consciousness has no less reality than the neutral substance of Russell and it is, at the same time, as meaningful as the "generalized other"³ of Professor Mead. If this conception of consciousness as self-luminous self-existent neutral substance be borne in mind we would better appreciate the Vedāntist as we proceed.

It may, however, be asked, why then it is called consciousness (*chaitanya*) if it is neutral to mind as well as matter. I answer in the language of Professor Haldar.

The term 'mind' has two meanings. It is the knower opposed to the object of which it is conscious. Further, it is the unity presupposed in the distinction of subject and object and manifested in that distinction. This all-inclusive spirit within which distinctions of every kind arise, which is bifurcated into subject and object is the ultimate reality—the universe in its last interpretation. It is not mere mind nor abstract matter but the source and presupposition, the truth of both.⁴

It is this substance that the Vedāntist calls consciousness.

¹ B. Russell, *The Analysis of Matter* (New York : Harcourt Brace & Co., 1927), ch. XXXVII.

² G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, ed. C. W. Morris (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1934).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁴ H. Haldar, "Realistic Idealism," *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. by S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1936), pp. 220-21.

This notion of consciousness, I repeat, is first accepted on the authority of the revealed texts and then vindicated to the satisfaction of the Vedāntist in dreamless sleep and occasionally in actualized dreamlessness called (*samādhi*). The highest state of "the Fourth" is experienced by those who live a thoroughly spiritual life in accordance with the Vedāntic discipline and worship. Our previous statement of the "psychological approach" and later statement of an acceptance of the doctrine on the authority of revelation should not be considered contradictory. Revelation itself has been considered to be the experience of the seers who sought for the realization of the ultimate reality psychologically, that is to say inwardly, and not by scientific investigation of objective data or by *a priori* ratiocination. The term "inwardly," however, requires further elucidation, but that would lead us far from the immediate subject matter under discussion.

THE PROGRESSION OF REALITY

One and the same Sanskrit word "*Tattva*" is used by the philosophers to mean truth, existence, and significance (value).¹ This is no accident. The derivative meaning of the word "*Tattva*" is "thatness", *i.e.* the essence of that. Reality, truth and value are identical with the essence of a thing. The most real is the most true and has the most value and meaning. The least real is the least true and therefore possesses the least value. This being so, a scale of reality is necessarily a scale of truth and value. We have sketched the four dimensions of reality, Existence, we have said, is consciousness, and therefore consciousness is the standard of evaluation. The more the consciousness, the fuller the existence, the richer in value and truth.

The first of the four dimensions is the "Waking stage." This plane is identical with the sensible corporeal world. In this plane, if considered in isolation, consciousness is at the minimum. Hence this is considered to be the lowest rung in the ladder of graded reality. This therefore has the least value and least truth. The "Fourth" or the supra consciousness, where consciousness is at its fullest (*Pūrnatama*), is the highest and constitutes the dome of the entire structure of existence. It possesses the maximum of truth and value. From the highest to the lowest there are infinite variations of which only two, thought and conscious-

¹ Cf. Baladeva, *Commentary on Tattvasandharva*, ed. N. Brahmachari (Calcutta : Devakinandan Press, 1918), p. 187.

ness, the second and third dimensions are definitely mentioned, owing to the fact that in them the difference in degree seems to give place to the difference in kind. In this way the whole of existence is conceived of as a gradual system of value and truth. The trinity of ideal value, *satyam* (truth), *śivam* (good), and *sundaram* (beauty) are said to be eternally (*nitya*) realized in it in their most complete manifestation. It is called concrete solidified bliss (*anandaghana*). It is the pure form of Aristotle, the good of Plato and the beautiful of Plotinus.

The levels of consciousness are some times arranged differently and expressed with different imagery. Instead of being conceived as different levels, one above the other, they are looked upon as a number of sheaths one enveloping the other like the sheaths of an onion. The outermost one is called the sheath of matter (*anna*) which is the same as waking consciousness. The next interior sheath is the level of thought. It is divided into two sheaths. They are called the sheath of life (*Prāna*) and the sheath of mind (*manas*). The third level thus becomes the fourth sheath. It is named the sheath of intelligence (*vijñāna*). The innermost sheath, which is the fifth from the outside, is called the sheath of bliss (*ānanda*). The Vedāntists are divided among themselves in their opinion as to whether this last one is also a sheath or is the very core itself.¹

THE TASK OF A VEDĀNTIST

As soon as a Vedāntist accepts the four-fold levels of reality, he finds two tasks awaiting him, one of which is theoretical and the other practical.

The former consists in bringing out the distinctive character of and the interrelationship between the four levels of existence. This virtually means formulating a rational and systematic account of the nature of God, man and the world, and the relation between God and man, God and the world, and man and the world, considered cosmologically, psychologically and epistemologically. God is the "Fourth," man is the third, and the world comprises the second and first levels of the reality which we pictured.

The practical task of the Vedāntist has two aspects. One concerns his own self and may be called private, while the other

¹ See Appendix, note 6. Vedānta Sūtra i, 1. 12.

concerns his fellowmen and may be termed public. The former consists in regulating his own life in such a way that he may be able to have actual experiences of the higher levels of reality. This duty of his is called "*Śādhana*" or "*Tapasyā*" which means literally penance and austerity. The latter is the duty that the Vedāntist owes to the public. This is to give out a systematic method or graded steps, so to say, by following which others may come to have the same realization. He must formulate the method and then teach others. This duty of his is called "*Lokaśikṣā*". The philosopher who accomplishes this three-fold duty as far as is humanly possible, is honored with the title "*Āchārya*", such as *Śaṅkarāchārya*, *Rāmānujāchārya*. The *vaiṣṇava* Vedāntists, after the Chaitanya movement (15th-16th Cent.) prefer the designation "*Goswāmī*" to "*Āchārya*".

All this means that Vedāntism is not only a speculative philosophical discipline but also a very practical religion. It is a theology and philosophy in one. A true Vedāntist is not only a thinker and theologian but also a seer to a certain extent.

These tasks, it may be remarked, are not arbitrarily imposed on the philosopher. This demand is the necessary outcome of the Vedāntic ontology itself. As we have noticed, reality is identified with consciousness. It is an object of genuine experience and no phase of it is an object of mere speculation or faith. Hence it follows that only the person who has experienced the higher levels of reality has justifiable right and claim to speak about them. His own life and teaching strengthen and testify to the genuineness of his speculative system.

Furthermore, when there is a realm of existence set aside to be accepted on faith, there naturally arises a need of justification of that particular realm by ratiocination, the specimen of which is the proof of the existence of God and immortality, made so much of by the mediaeval scholars of Europe. Hardly anywhere in the vast literature of Vedānta philosophy does one come across such a thing as proof of the existence of God. One finds instead descriptions of the experiences of God and various formulations of methods and disciplines, ways and means which lead one to such experiences. Strenuous attempts to prove that there is a God in order to establish the validity of religion seem to me very interesting but inadequate procedure. God is the object of religious experience. How can abstract logic, divorced as it is from

the concrete experience of living, prove or disprove the reality of God? Can anyone prove that there is light if we all shut our eyes? God, to be sure, is a necessary being but He is not a category of logic any more than light is. A man who does not believe in God is compared to an owl, who would not see the sun.¹ No argument is put forward to prove the existence of a certain reality but methods are supplied so that one may follow them and learn how to open his eyes to have the experience of the sun for himself. The rationale of this procedure lies in the fact, as has been pointed out, that what is ordinarily considered to be the realm of faith is very boldly declared to be the realm of experience by the Vedānta philosophy.

This should not be understood to mean that faith has absolutely no place in the Vedānta philosophy. *Śraddhā* or *Biśvās* (faith) has a very important place but it is not paramount. One begins with faith²—faith in the existence of an Overplus reality, in the possibility of experiencing it and also in what the Upanisadic seers and the acknowledged authorities had said about those things. But he must end with “*Preman*” or deepening experience of love of the ultimate Reality. Then he has ascended; he *knows* and loves and has no need of the ladder of faith. As Swami Vivekānanda is reported to have said, “If a young man does not go to church, he ought to be condemned; but if an old man goes to church he ought to be condemned also.”

The different duties of a Vedānta philosopher which were just mentioned are interdependent. His speculation and teaching are moulded by his own experiences and those of the great ones who have gone before him, whose findings he takes on faith. His own experiences, on the other hand, are shaped by the speculation that he achieves and also by that which he accepts consciously or unconsciously from the authorities of the past. Under these circumstances for the orientation of Sri Jiva's philosophy we need to consider the philosophies of at least two of his predecessors Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, in their outlines. To the philosophy of Śaṅkara therefore we now turn our attention.

¹ See Appendix, note 7.

² Viśvanāth Chakravorty, *Bhakti Ratnamālā* ed. P. G. Goswāmī, (Navadvīp 1930) p. 117. See Appendix, note 8.

CHAPTER II

ŚAṆKARA

*The Approach of Śaṅkara (6th-7th Century)*¹

The philosophy of Śaṅkara follows, one may almost say, from one single principle. We have seen how and why reality is said to be that which can never be denied. Śaṅkara's philosophy is the outcome of exclusive emphasis on this one principle.

Reality is that which can in no time, in no place, and under no circumstances be the object of denial. Reality is what can never be sublated.² From this follows : What can be denied is unreal. What are the things that we can deny ? The answer is that we can deny anything whatsoever that has the possibility of being the object of our knowledge. Anything that we can possibly know can be sublated. Hence all objectivity is unreality.

Reality is that which is not unreal, that is to say, which is not 'object', which never is, was or will be 'object' (*viṣaya*). This is of course a negative way of stating what reality is, and Śaṅkara would not allow any positive statement about reality, since a positive statement involves predication. To posit some character of it is to predicate that character of it. But to predicate something of reality is to say that in reality there is something which is the object of knowledge and hence unreal. To predicate anything of reality therefore amounts to indicating that it is not reality. Hence nothing can be said in positive terms as to what reality is. Only negatively it may be said that reality is that which is not objectivity or unreality. Even this, 'that which is not unreal' is not something predicated of reality, but simply stated to point out what reality is not.

To lay hold of any of its properties and define it is out of place inasmuch as it has no properties whatsoever. It can

¹ According to some historians Śaṅkara lived in the 8th century A. D. But according to Sarasvatī Prajñānānda, Śaṅkara lived in the 1st century A. D. See his *History of Vedānta Philosophy* (Śrī Śaṅkara Math, Barisal, 1927), Vol. I.

² Śaṅkara *Bhāṣya* ii. 1. 14. See Appendix, note 9.

never be positively described by a name in any manner. It is unthinkable and therefore indescribable.¹

But if anywhere in the universe there exist two entities, no matter what kind of entities they are, or what sort of co-existence they have, predication becomes possible if not necessary. If there are two points in space, or two moments in time or two attributes of one thing or two objects of one apprehension, or in general, if there exist two real things, then there is no avoiding the possibility of some relation or other between them and one could be predicated of the other on the basis of that relation. Absence of predicability therefore means absence of any duality whatsoever, and consequently absence of any relation actual or possible. Reality is, therefore, non-dual and non-relational. This also substantiates the position that reality cannot be an object of knowledge, since knowing, whatever else it might be, is unquestionably a relation and hence it involves duality of the knower and the known.

From the denial of relation of any kind to reality follows the denial of change, since change involves variations and plurality, which, if asserted of reality, would make it relational.

The entire realm of objectivity, relativity, duality, changeability and plurality is thus deprived of reality and relegated to the sphere of unreality. The reality is therefore non-dual, non-relational, unchangeably eternal (*advītya*, *akhandā* and *kūṭastha*). What is this reality after all? It is the self itself, the denier who can never be denied, who transcends all objectivity and relativity of knower and known. It is the Absolute Universal pure consciousness, 'which is never subject to any change'.²

THE WORLD VIEW OF ŚAṆKARA

Now, let us see what actually happens when this devastating logic of Śaṅkara is applied to the four dimensional reality which we have previously sketched.

The 'Waking' world of corporeality becomes unreal, because it is the object of knowledge, and it is changeable. Thoughts, ideas and categories are likewise unreal because they are obviously relational and objects of knowledge. Thus the entire realm of the psychophysical and logical existence is condemned to be unreal. These two lower rungs of the hierarchy of existence are thus

¹ Śaṅkara, *Commentary on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, op. cit., p. 25.

² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

deprived of any claim to ultimate reality, since both of them can be sublated. The question now arises about the self-conscious and supra-conscious level of existence, since both these realms seem to have claim to be real. We have seen how in the 'Dreamless' state and the 'Fourth' all duality and objectivity lapse. Absence of duality means absence of relation and predicability, and so forth. Both of these levels, therefore, seem to satisfy the definition of reality. In both of them the knower and the known become one. But we know that Śaṅkara cannot accede reality to two dimensions because that will introduce internal distinctions into reality and hence make it relational. Śaṅkara, therefore, consistent with his logic, denies one of them and accepts the other. To consciousness of self he denies ultimate reality, and accepts only supra-consciousness as the absolutely real. But how does he do it? We saw that both levels satisfy his demand. He accomplishes his ends, however, by interpreting dreamless sleep somewhat differently. Dreamlessness means to him not self-consciousness but pure consciousness, and so does the 'Fourth'. And thus he identifies them. He does not call the 'Fourth' superconsciousness in order to indicate that it is over and above the consciousness of self. For him, both are levels of pure consciousness, and that is the only reality for him. A question still remains. Does not Śaṅkara then recognize any difference whatsoever between the third and the fourth dimension of reality? Is there no distinction between the dreamless state and the ecstatic state of consciousness? The answer to this question is in the affirmative. Śaṅkara does make some difference. He shows that in the dreamless state there is some vestige of duality whereas in the ecstatic trance there is none. In the dreamless sleep there lingers in the background a contentless darkness of non-experience. In the 'Fourth' that, too, is transcended and there only shines pure consciousness without any trace of relation or objectivity. This, by the way, is the experiential counterpart of the logical principle that even such predicate as 'other than unreality' should not be predicated of reality.

Even if the distinction that we have drawn between self-consciousness and supra-consciousness is maintained, still according to the rigorous logic of Śaṅkara, self-consciousness would have to be unreal. For we have seen that in the 'Fourth' self-consciousness is denied in the ecstasy. It gets lost within a greater whole that encompasses all. Now according to Śaṅkara, what can be an object or what can be denied cannot be ultimately real. Hence

distinction or no distinction between dreamlessness and the 'Fourth,' consciousness of self is forced to give up its claim to the status of ultimate reality. Refusing to accept consciousness of self as ultimate is virtually to deny ultimate reality to all individualities and particularities. What is left is the 'Fourth', which is the universal consciousness, pure and simple, homogeneous, undifferentiated, non-relational, the one eternal. This is 'The Reality' ('That') of Śaṅkara. "It is this supreme Oneness which alone is real, since there is nothing else but the self (pure self). Verily, there remains no other independent entity in the state of realization of the highest Truth."¹

The four dimensions of reality are divided by Śaṅkara into halves. Only one half of it is real and the other unreal. From the consciousness of self down to the sensible world, from the third to the first dimension, all is unreal. Only the supra-consciousness or rather the pure consciousness, which is the 'Fourth' is real. Self-consciousness has reality to Śaṅkara only in the sense in which it is identical with the pure consciousness. This identity, again, is not something which is to be accomplished. It is an eternally accomplished ultimate fact of existence. In the 'Fourth'—the universal consciousness—that identity is fully discovered (not accomplished). It is there; it is only found. This means that absolute pure consciousness is the only reality and all the individuals or self-conscious units are identical with it. Their apparent individuality and separability from the absolute are phenomenal and merely apparent.

The Reality, which is the 'Fourth' level, is absolute and non-dual (*advaita*). It is devoid of all individualities and attributes. "On account of the negation of all attributes *Brahman* (*Reality*) really is eternal and changeless."²

But in spite of the fact that all attributes are denied the reality is said to be existence, consciousness and bliss. "Brahman is Existence, knowledge, the Absolute, pure, supreme, self-existent, eternal and indivisible Bliss, not different (in reality) from the individual soul and devoid of interior or exterior—there it reigns triumphant."³ We are, however, warned that existence, consciousness and bliss are not to be supposed to be attributes

¹ Śaṅkara, *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi*, vs. 226, trans. Swamī Mādhavānanda (Māyāvati : Advaita Āśram, 1932).

² Śaṅkara, *Bhāṣya*, op. cit., XXXIV, 327.

³ Śaṅkara, *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi*, vs. 225, op. cit.

of reality but the very essence of it. Even the fact that they are essences and not attributes does not mean that reality has any positive characteristic. By 'existence' is simply indicated that reality is opposed to non-existence. Likewise the terms *consciousness* and *bliss* in relation to ultimate reality are used to mean that it is other than unconscious and free from suffering and misery.

This is all then that exists and has true reality. What about the unrealities? Do they exist? Śaṅkara answers in the negative. Are they then utterly non-existent? This also our philosopher answers in the negative. What then is the status, we ask, of this vast universe of suns and milky ways, from self-conscious individuals down to blades of grass, things which are so real, so tangible to us! They are, replies Śaṅkara, simply false knowledge of the reality. They are not real since they are the *mis-reading* of reality. They are not utterly unreal, since they are the mis-reading of *the reality*. This is the famous conception of '*māyā*' although this word does not occur in Śaṅkara's commentary upon the aphorisms of the Vedānta. This empirical world as it appears to us is not unreal, because the underlying substratum of it is the reality itself. This is, again, not real since when we should recognize the underlying reality correctly all this manifoldness including our self-hood would disappear even as the illusory snake vanishes when the real rope is recognized. This conception of '*māyā*' as neither real nor unreal, is not sophistry, but due to the fact that we are gradually led to it, it should be regarded as the result of the exclusive application of the very strict logic of Śaṅkara. One point of great importance should not be lost sight of. '*Māyā*' is not a subjective principle of illusoriness; it is not anyone's fancy or whim or illusion. The whole empirical reality is said to be '*māyā*'. It is, therefore, something objective. It is not psychological but metaphysical and in a very peculiar sense existent. The word *māyā* has no exact correspondence in the English language. 'Illusion' is a very poor translation of it.

Śaṅkara writes :

All this universe which appears as of diverse forms through ignorance, is nothing else but *Brahman*, which is absolutely free from all the limitations of human thought. Hence whatever is manifested, *viz.* this universe, is the Supreme *Brahman* Itself, the Real, the One without a second,

pure, the Essence of knowledge, the Taintless pacified, devoid of beginning and end, beyond activity, the Essence of Bliss Absolute. Transcending all the diversities created by *Māyā* or Nescience, eternal, ever beyond the reach of pain, indivisible, immeasurable, formless, undifferentiated, nameless, immutable, self-luminous.¹

Like Plotinus' 'here' and 'yonder' Śaṅkara divides the entire realm of experience into two, *avidyā* and *vidyā*. *Vidyā* is the 'truth', *avidyā* is 'false'. The truth is pure consciousness. The phenomenal world of thought and extension is false. "As the place, time, objects, knower, etc. called up in dreams are unreal, so is also the world experienced here in the waking state, for it is all an effect of one's own ignorance".² All this is the false reading of the truth. Śaṅkara presses his logic further than Plotinus. Śaṅkara would not accept such terms as 'here' and 'yonder' to designate the two realms. Since to him they would imply relation. Less real and more real, higher level and lower level, are obviously relational concepts. Hence Śaṅkara's unreal cannot be lower or less real as is the 'here' of Plotinus in comparison to his 'yonder'. As we observed before, if there is duality of any sort some relation or other becomes unavoidable. Śaṅkara's 'unreal' therefore does not co-exist with his real. Neither is Śaṅkara's 'unreal' somehow 'transmuted' in the real as it is in Bradley's Absolute;³ since according to Śaṅkara this would mean differentiation even in the Absolute, which is undesirable. Śaṅkara's 'Monism' or Non-dualism as it is called, stands out un-paralleled in the history of thought. The only relation Śaṅkara would allow between his 'reality' and appearance is that appearance, in order to be what it is, needs the presence of the reality as its substratum. But this is only a *one-way* relation, and hence cannot touch the reality and make it relational on that account. By *one-way* relation is meant that in order to be misread there must be something that is misread, but that which is misread *does not have to be* misread. The untruth needs the truth for its sustenance, but the truth is free and independent. A liar can tell lies only because when he lies his statements are believed to be true by others. The very possibility of falsehood

¹ *Ibid.*, vs. 227, 237-38.

² *Ibid.*, vs. 252.

³ F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1906), pp. 487-88.

depends on truth but not *vice versa*. As Mahatma Gandhi says, "Denial of God we have known. Denial of Truth we have not known."¹

So far as the experience of the ultimate Truth is concerned Śaṅkara and Plotinus are very close to each other. For both, ultimate reality is presented not as an object but in an immediate contact which transcends all duality of subject and object and discursive thinking. Professor Rādhākṛishnan draws a parallel between Śaṅkara and Plato in the following lines :

Śaṅkara reminds us most among European thinkers of Plato. Both were great spiritual realists who synthesized the main tendencies of the past in their own thoughts. Both distinguished knowledge into two kinds, higher and lower, the former referring to the ultimate truth or the ideal good, the latter to the world of shadows. Admitting that reality lies far behind the surface appearances both tell us that it can be grasped by a complete withdrawal of the soul into its own self. Both believe in intuition which gives us the transcendent vision of reality.²

¹ M. K. Gandhi, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. J. A. Muirhead
New York : The Macmillan Co., 1935), p. 21.

² *Op. cit.*, note, p. 520.

CHAPTER III

RĀMĀNUJA (1017-1137)

The Approach of Rāmānuja

Let us now see how Rāmānuja approaches the subject. As we have pointed out in the case of Śaṅkara that his philosophy is the result of the exclusive emphasis on one single principle. So it is with Rāmānuja. From the same Upaniṣadic tradition he inherits his fundamental thesis namely consciousness is real. He accepts the truth of this statement wholeheartedly and his philosophy follows from this truth.

If consciousness is real, argues Rāmānuja, then all that is revealed by consciousness and within consciousness is just as real and true as consciousness itself. All that the nature of consciousness would tell us would be true about the nature of reality.

Consciousness informs us that in order that there should be an experience at all, there must be something of which one is conscious and someone in whom the consciousness inheres. In other words, consciousness invariably signifies a conscious subject and a known object.

Experience is that which solely by means of its own existence, possess the quality of making a thing fit to be realized in relation to what constitutes the basis of that experience itself ; it has other names, such as knowledge, comprehension, consciousness and the like ; it always relates to an object and is a particular of the experiencing self.¹

A subjectless or objectless consciousness is never warranted by experience. Pure consciousness, that is subject without an object, is therefore meaningless jargon. Even in consciousness of self we must not say that there is no object, since the subject itself plays the role of its own object. A pure self without any internal differentiation is nowhere found in experience.

If consciousness is real, then both subject and object are just as real. There is no such curse on objectivity that a thing would cease to be real as soon as it becomes an object. If that

¹ Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya* i. 1. 1., Eng. trans. M. Rangachārya (Madras: Brahmavādin Press, 1899), I, 75-76.

be so, consciousness itself becomes unreal, since our own consciousness and that of our fellow beings do become the object of our consciousness. Objectivity is just as real as subjectivity. It cannot be otherwise, since one is meaningful simply through the other. "The character of an experience does not disappear in relation to any experience, even though it becomes the object of another experience".¹

Subject and object as they coexist in all cases of experience must involve some relation. That is to say reality allows relation. Not only does it allow relations but in order to be what it is, namely reality, it needs relation. Relatedness, therefore, is intrinsic to reality.

Consciousness also reveals to us that every real thing, subject or object, has attributes. Reality is therefore always qualified. "All experience relates to objects which are qualified by some attribute or other."²

Reality is essentially a knowable reality. If reality were not the object of knowledge how could we assert anything about it? The simple fact that we philosophers are philosophizing about reality should be justification enough to convince us that reality is essentially knowable. "There exists something which is not the object of knowledge" is a meaningless expression.

Those who maintain the view that there is a thing which is devoid of attributes, cannot say what criterion there is to prove that thing which is so devoid of attributes, because all the criteria of truth that form the means of logical proof deal only with such objects as possess attributes. . . . Therefore it has to be stated that that thing (reality) is certainly qualified by such attributes as accord with the accepted criteria of truth.³

But the fact that reality is essentially knowable does not mean for Rāmānuja that an object in order to be real should be always known. To say so would be claiming omniscience for all of us. Reality is not enhanced by our knowing it. Neither does it possess any inherent disrespect for our knowledge. A jar may exist in a room without being ever known by me, but if I happen to go to that room I perceive the jar. The jar carries no anta-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

gonism toward my knowledge. It does not hinder my knowing it. Neither does it receive anything from me.

Moreover, perceptual knowledge, which during the time that it exists proves the existence of its objects, such as jars, etc., is not seen to give rise to the knowledge of their existence at all times. Therefore, the existence of jars and such other objects during periods antecedent and subsequent to their perception is not made out by means of perception.¹ A jar is real not because it is an object of knowledge, but because it is an *object*. It can, as such be known, felt, and touched. All objects that can be known are real. If an object cannot be experienced it cannot be real, as for instance a centaur or a hare's horn. Even the reality of a subject is based on the fact that it can be an object of experience.

Consciousness itself is real because it can be experienced, and not because it cannot be denied or sublated. There is no reason in the world why it cannot be denied. One can easily think of a time when one was not existent or will be non-existent. That is to say, either in the past or in the future.

If it be asked how experience (consciousness) at the same time that it exists can give us the contradictory knowledge of its non-existence, it is replied that there is no rule which binds experience to deal only with such objects as are existent at the same time with itself; for then there would result, to past and future occurrences, the quality of being no objects of experience at all.²

Rāmānuja means to say that the argument that consciousness cannot be denied is based on an assumption which is not warranted by experience—an assumption, namely, that consciousness can know only contemporary objects. This assumption, says Rāmānuja, is obviously fallacious since we find that we do have the knowledge of past and future happenings.

Moreover, the simple fact that we can deny an object or that it is sometimes sublated, cannot make that object unreal.³ I say that there is no jar here. Jars can very well be in another place and in another time. This cannot make 'jars' unreal. What makes a thing unreal is not its possibility of denial but its being contradictory.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³ Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya* i. 1. 1. See Appendix, Note 10.

In fact, the relation of the stultified and the stultifier arises only when there is a contradiction between two cognitions ; and then when it arises there is certainly the exclusion of that which is stultified. Now, in regard to perceptions which relate to jars, clothes, etc., there is no mutual contradiction at all between them ; because they are different from one another in point of time and place. If when the existence of a thing is perceived in relation to any particular place and any particular time, its non-existence also be perceived in relation to the same place and the same time, then there is contradiction. And in such a case that which is the stronger of the two becomes the stultifier and there arises the negation of the stultified. If a thing, which is experienced as existing in relation to a certain time and a certain place, is perceived to be non-existent in relation to a different time and a different place, then there is no contradiction On the other hand, in the case of the rope-snake or other illusory perceived things, there is the perception of their non-existence in that very place and that very time wherein they are also perceived to exist ; therefore there arise contradiction, stultification and logical exclusion. . . . Therefore merely to possess the quality of being logically excluded so as not to persist before consciousness in perception does not constitute the cause of unreality.¹

From the above rather lengthy quotation from Rāmānuja and from what has been stated previously we learn that according to him there are only *two* criteria by which we are justified in judging a thing to be unreal : (1) contradictoriness in experience, (2) the impossibility of being experienced.

The criterion of reality is only one, namely that which can be experienced. Pure subject or pure consciousness, which by their very definitions never could be objects of knowledge and hence lack the possibility of being experienced, are therefore unreal. Pure consciousness is nothing more than a logical abstraction, according to the contention of Rāmānuja.

All the objects of experience are characterized by their generic and specific properties since that is the way they are known. When we perceive a thing we may not know all its properties at one time. We may be aware of some of the pro-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

perties at one time and some at another. But we can never be conscious of a thing which has no property at all. There cannot be any experience in which at least some distinctive properties of the object do not become manifest. So pure existence, like pure consciousness, which has no property, is a figment of the imagination.

Manifold existences are real because experience reveals reality to be manifold. All objects and individual souls are real. Consciousness is both the essence and quality of the self. That which does not have that quality of consciousness is not-self. But both self and not-self are equally real. The essential nature of consciousness lies in the fact of making its object known to a knower. Consciousness must have a locus and an object.

The subject, object, and consciousness always form a unity. This unity is not an abstract unity. It is a concrete and synthetic one. Reality as a whole is the synthetic unity of manifoldness. The universe is one interrelated system of reals. Its unity is an organic unity.

To divide the reality into halves, one half metaphysical and essential and the other half empirical and illusory, is a wholly unsubstantiated and absolutely fallacious procedure, upheld by the people, says Rāmānuja, "who are ignorant of the essential nature of words and sentences and their correct meanings (the reference is to the text of the Upaniṣads) and are ignorant also of such sound logical processes as enable us to proceed rightly in our reasonings".¹ It is preposterous, says Rāmānuja, to hold that the empirical world is unreal and illusory. There cannot be anything unreal in the universe. Even an illusion is not wholly unreal, says Rāmānuja. When I see a rope in the dark and call it a snake, what I say is not utterly false. What has happened is that I have seen the rope imperfectly. Owing to insufficient light a part of the rope was visible to me. And hence, that this is a snake, is a statement which is partially true. Nothing that knowledge reveals to us can be utterly unreal. Parts are as much real as the whole. Parts live in the whole, the whole lives in the part. Reality is an organic unity. It has infinite attributes and modifications. Manifoldness constitutes the richness of reality. Manifoldness is therefore adjectival to reality. "Brahman (Reality) is possessed of attributes and the world which is the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

manifestation of his glory is undoubtedly real.”¹ The empirical therefore is not unreal or the false reading of the so-called meta-physical reality that underlies it.

Reality (*Brahman*) is a whole. It is a living whole ; and hence it changes. There is no reason why change should be condemned to be unreal. Change simply shows that the thing which is changing is living and not dead. This does not, however, mean that the whole of reality always undergoes changes. Neither change nor permanence should be deified. Experience reveals to us both the aspects of reality, permanence as well as change. Certain phases of reality do not undergo change, whereas others do. But they do not fall apart. Permanence only does not make a thing real any more than change alone makes it unreal. It is their integration and co-ordination that constitute the essential character of reality.

THE WORLD VIEW OF RĀMĀNUJA

We shall now see what happens to the reality of the four dimensions when these principles of Rāmānuja are applied to it.

Śaṅkara divides the four-dimensional reality into two, noumena and phenomena, the latter being the false knowledge of the former. Rāmānuja divides the reality into three, but they do not fall apart, they constitute one organic whole. All these divisions of Rāmānuja are in terms of intelligence, such as intelligent (*chit*), non-intelligent (*achit*), and supra-intelligent (*Īśvara*). By intelligent is meant the self-conscious level, the third dimension of reality. Supra-intelligent is, of course, the fourth dimension, the highest level of existence. The other two lower levels are hyphenated as psycho-physical and termed non-intelligent. The non-intelligent realm of Rāmānuja, therefore, virtually corresponds to what we ordinarily call the empirical world (*jagat*). ‘Intelligent’ is the self-conscious substance in every unit of individuals (*jīva*). Supra-intelligent is God. Thus these three, God, self and the world (*Īśvara*, *jīva* and *jagat*) are the fundamental *tattvas*, i.e., truths, values or realities of the philosophy of Rāmānuja. These three are, it may be remarked, the three Ideas of Reason of Kant, in the narrow sense of the term *reason* ; with this distinction, that in the *Critique of Pure Reason* these Ideas are ‘regulative’ ; in the *Critique of Practical Reason* some of them

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

are postulates of moral faith, whereas in the philosophy of Rāmānuja they are all existential, operative and regulative, and objects of both knowledge and faith.

Reality, for Rāmānuja, has internal differences. 'Intelligent' beings and 'non-intelligent' nature are the two 'modes' (*viśeṣa*) of the supra-intelligence, who is a Person and who sustains this synthetic unity as the ultimate ground and support of it. Rāmānuja conceives of the reality as a

synthetic personal whole, wherein intelligent beings and matter are moments even as in a proposition the substratum is one, though subject and predicate are differentiated from each other. As the genus and the individual or a substance and its attributes are unified so the soul and the non-soul are comprehended in the unity of the Lord's Essence.¹

The Supra-intelligent or God, as Rāmānuja conceives of him, is "a person and not a mere totality of other persons, and so he cannot be confused with the thinking individuals and the objects of their thought".² God is identical with what we have termed the 'Fourth' level of reality whereas 'intelligent' being and 'non-intelligent' matter are respectively the third and first-second dimensions, as has been already observed. God may denote

the central unity when souls and matter are regarded as the attributes, or the combined whole when the real is said to be *Brahman* and *Brahman* alone. *Brahman* is the supreme reality of which the world with all its 'intelligent' beings constitutes the body or attribute.³

In the words of Rāmānuja himself,

The Highest *Brahman* is declared (by the Upaniṣads) to be by nature free from even the smallest taint of all that is evil, and to possess that nature which is characterized by all the auspicious qualities, and to be engaged, out of free sportiveness, in the creation, destruction, inter-penetration and control of the world; and then all the intelligent and non-intelligent existences in the universe which exist in all conditions and are undoubtedly real, are stated (by the Upaniṣads)

¹ B. N. Seal, *Comparative Studies in Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity* (Calcutta : Hare Press, 1899), p. 91.

² S. Rādhākrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1922), II, p. 686.

³ *Ibid.*

to be of the same form as the *Brahman* owing to their constituting His body.¹

Rāmānuja has rejected all conceptions of division and has instituted modified monism. He maintains only one integral Being who has a concrete character. His system may be better styled as a concrete monism, for the Reality to him is not an abstraction or homogeneity of Being, but a highly concrete synthesis, which gives support to innumerable finite conscious existences and unconscious matter as parts of his own being.²

Rāmānuja conceives one substantive Reality to be the whole comprehending different moments, in other words, God is differenced by soul and non-soul. God, so differenced in Himself originated the material world and the embodied beings. Hence the relation between God and the individual is that of a whole to its parts, of an organism to its organs, or of the soul to its body. It is also a relation of cause and effect. Rāmānuja expresses all these by saying that the individual soul is a determining mode of the one Substantive Reality.³

This is the *Weltanschauung* of Rāmānuja in its barest outlines.

The difference between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja is crystal clear. Their antagonism is palpable. Almost all the features that are condemned by Śaṅkara as unreal, such as change, relation, attribute, predication, variation, objectivity, plurality, etc., are wholeheartedly embraced by Rāmānuja in order to make reality meaningful. All the aspects that are accepted by Śaṅkara, such as pure consciousness, pure subjectivity, unchanging permanency, non-relational absolute, undifferentiated reality, etc., are condemned by Rāmānuja as purely logical abstractions, meaningless fictions which are utterly unjustified by the evidence of experience. But curiously enough both accept the truth of the Upaniṣads, and seek to substantiate their respective philosophical positions by hundreds of quotations from the Upaniṣads.

Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja were great exponents of the Vedānta. Their minds were driven to the same problems, their texts were practically the same, their methods were

¹ Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya*, op. cit., p. 129.

² M. N. Sircar, *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism* (Calcutta : Humphrey Milford, 1927), p. 56.

³ Seal, op. cit., p. 91.

based on the same assumptions and yet their results show striking differences. Their conclusions reveal their visions, their respective apprehensions of the truth.¹

As it has become almost a commonplace in the West to identify Indian thought with pantheism, it may be worthwhile to point out that the philosophy of Rāmānuja, which is the philosophy of life of millions of Hindus even in these days 'gives us the best type of monotheism conceivable, inset with touches of immanen-tism'.²

Now we shall turn our attention to Śrī Jīva Goswāmī, and see how he approaches the subject and seeks reconciliation between these two antagonistic positions of a mystic and a realistic theist. We must respect the difficulty before we can appreciate the solution of it. One thing, however, is true, that the immediate interest of Śrī Jīva is not to reconcile Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. To Śrī Jīva, the philosophies of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, are not two philosophies of two philosophers but two antagonistic interpretations of one and the same tradition. Śrī Jīva attempts to read his Upaniṣadic tradition correctly. His reconciliation, therefore, is a by-product. One makes fire to warm oneself ; one gets light as well. Like Hegelian 'synthesis', the philosophy of Śrī Jīva, we shall see, absorbs both the thesis and the antithesis.

¹ Rādhākṛishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 667.

² *Ibid.*, p. 721.

PART II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚRĪ JĪVA GOSWĀMĪ
AND HIS SCHOOL

CHAPTER I

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ŚRĪ JĪVA GOSWĀMĪ

Śrī Jīva Goswāmī, the greatest of the expounders of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, flourished from the end of the 16th to the beginning of the 17th century of the Christian era. Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, or Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism as it usually is called, is a religious movement inaugurated by the Lord Chaitanya (1485—1533), who is a great prophet of Hindu religion and who is worshipped today by millions as an incarnation of God Himself on earth. The message of the Lord Chaitanya was propagated by six illustrious disciples. They are well-known as the *Ṣaḍ Goswāmī* or six apostles. The names of these apostles are Śrī Rūpa, Sanātana, Raghunath Dās, Raghunath Bhaṭṭa, Gopāl Bhaṭṭa and Śrī Jīva Goswāmī.

Śrī Jīva was born in Rāmkeli (or Fateyavad), Bengal, most probably between 1530 and 1540 A.D., and died at Śrī Vrindāvana in his eighties. He joined the order of the Lord Chaitanya when he was very young and lived a saintly life of contemplation, passing most of his time in Śrī Vrindāvana, the holy land of the Vaiṣṇavas.

Śrī Jīva studied at Benaras, which had been for ages the greatest centre of Sanskrit culture in India. Within a very short time he acquired a great proficiency in all the schools of philosophic thought known at that time in his country. He was well versed in the vast lore of the sacred literatures and thus developed what is typical of all great thinkers of India, a profound respect for his philosophical tradition.

Śrī Jīva was not only a Vedāntist but a Bhāgavata too, which means a follower of the Śrīmad-Bhāgavata school of thought. Śrīmad-Bhāgavata stands to the Upaniṣads as the New Testament does to the Old. It is a monumental work of twelve cantos attributed to the great sage Vyāsadeva. In it one finds an attempt at a thorough synthesis of all the major systems of Indian philosophy, such as Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta. Vedānta, however, has been regarded as the summit of them all. Śrīmad Bhāgavata, though it is concerned with philosophical issues, deals with them in a half-philosophical and half-poetical

way. Śrī Jīva tried to systematize the truths of the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* on the speculative basis and wrote a commentary upon it. In his writings we find a very balanced synthesis of the different systems of thought that went before him.

The two uncles of Śrī Jīva, Śrī Rūpa and Sanātana—the first two of the six apostles—were great seers and deep thinkers of celebrated fame. Their influences on him were considerable. As a token of his deep respect for his uncles Śrī Jīva wrote commentaries on their works. In fact, Śrī Jīva being the last in order and youngest in age of the six apostles, was greatly benefitted by the labors of the others. Śrī Jīva acknowledges his debt to all his predecessors with great veneration. In the beginning of almost all his treatises Śrī Jīva says that he is simply completing the work which the six apostles and particularly Gopāl Bhaṭṭa started. He was also greatly influenced by the philosophy of Mādhvācārya. In fact, it is from Mādhva that Śrī Jīva inherited the main tenets of his theology. But above all, the fact that made him what he was, a jewel of his country, was his coming in touch with the Christ-like personality of the Lord Chaitanya, who to him as to millions was the living Deity in flesh and blood.

Śrī Jīva possessed a very keen mind and a supremely devout heart. His works speak to posterity of the kind of person he was. His writing exhibits his uncommon capacity of searching analysis and his penetrating insight on the one hand, and his profoundly religious mood, coupled with complete self-commitment to the will of the Lord on the other. He was not a professional philosopher in the modern sense of the term. But in the old Indian sense he was a philosopher whose highest objective of life was to attain beatitude of self, to see the Lord face to face and to serve Him with ardent devotion and love. He was one who considered philosophic contemplation a part of his daily worship and service. Like the true philosopher mystic which he actually was, he had a thoroughly co-ordinated outlook towards life and philosophy. On the banks of the sacred river, Jamuna, he dwelt with man and nature. Green grass was his bed, the blue firmament his canopy and the whole world his home. His philosophy is as wide as the canopy under which he wrote and it is as fresh and inspiring as the green meadow which was his study.

Śrī Jīva is usually called the founder of the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta of the Bengal school, although he was rather an expounder of

it. The school has a long history extending, as we mentioned, from the Lord Chaitanya to the present day. The later thinkers of this school, such as Kriṣṇadas Kaviraj (who was a contemporary of Śrī Jīva), Baladeva (17th century), Viśvanāth Chakravorty (18th century), Śyāmlal Goswāmī, Śrī Bhakti Benod (19th century), Bābā Bhāratī, Praṇ Gopāl Goswāmī, Rādhā Benod Goswāmī, Satyānanda Goswāmī, Bhāgavata Kumar Śāstri, Bhākti Siddhānta Sarasvatī, Śiśurāja Mahendraji (contemporary) and others have followed Śrī Jīva closely. By their works and commentaries they have both thrown light on the works of Śrī Jīva and accelerated the influence of his thought. In the following pages I have tried to do as much justice as possible to the most modern trends of the speculation of this school, such as those of the Gauḍīya and Mahānāma Sampradāya.

Most of the works of the philosophers of this school are in Sanskrit or Bengali. Some of the works of Baladeva are available in English translation. The works of both Baladeva and Kriṣṇadās consisted in systematizing the writings of their master, Śrī Jīva. The major work of Śrī Jīva is known as *Sat Sandarbha*, which means six treatises on philosophy. They are as follows :

1. Discourses on Truth (*Tattva Sandarbha*)
2. Discourses on God (*Bhāgavata Sandarbha*)
3. Discourses on the Absolute (*Paramātmā Sandarbha*)
4. Discourses on Devotion (*Bhakti Sandarbha*)
5. Discourses on Love (*Prīti Sandarbha*)
6. Discourses on the Lord Kriṣṇa (*Kriṣṇa Sandarbha*)

Later on Śrī Jīva himself summarized these six discourses into one treatise called by him 'Summation of All Messages' (*sarva saṁvādinī*).

Besides these writings, he has left about a dozen minor works, most of which are commentaries. They are all philosophical works in the Indian sense. In Indian thought philosophy and theology are not distinguishable ; they constitute one and the same discipline in Hindu culture. However, since in European thought, especially in modern philosophy, they are so sharply separated, we shall try to bring out the philosophical aspects of the speculations, sifting them out of the theological context as much as possible except when we are deliberately discussing theology itself.

As an interesting item we may add that Śrī Jīva was a great linguist and grammarian of his time. He wrote a very unique book on Sanskrit grammar named *Harināmāmṛita Vyākaraṇa*.

This book was written for students of theology. He found that students of mediocre ability had to spend long years in mastering the Sanskrit language and then had very little time left for the study of sacred theology. So he composed the Sanskrit grammar with such ingenuity and art that when a student had finished that book of grammar he had almost unconsciously learned a good deal of his theology. This artistic intermingling of such a dry subject as grammar and such a sublime subject as theology is perhaps a unique enterprise in the history of human thought.

CHAPTER II

ŚRĪ JĪVA

The Approach of Śrī Jīva

Śrī Jīva in common with all other Vedāntists, accepts the fundamental principle of the Upaniṣads, namely, that essential reality can be equated with consciousness (*chaitanya*). Consciousness is real and the truly real. But why is consciousness real, is the question Śrī Jīva asks himself. Śaṅkara says¹ that consciousness is real because it cannot be denied, because it is never sublated. The contention of Śaṅkara is true since the denial of consciousness involves its existence. But it is a question whether this is the reason why consciousness is fundamental. Śrī Jīva does not think so. He accepts the truth of the fact that consciousness is undeniable and is never sublated, but he hesitates to uphold this fact as an adequate reason for the essential reality of consciousness. To him, the fact that an entity cannot be denied seems to be something which is extraneous to that entity. *X* is undeniable means that when somebody tries to deny *X* he cannot do it significantly. There must, therefore, be some factor intrinsic to consciousness that makes it undeniable. Undeniability is rather a negative way of describing the nature of a thing. The fact that makes the negative description possible must be something positive which constitutes the very nature of the thing of which negative description is made. Śrī Jīva seeks to find out what that positive something is which makes consciousness undeniable.

Rāmānuja says² that consciousness can be denied, and he can deny his own very easily. Rāmānuja's argument for this contention is that objects of consciousness need not necessarily be contemporary to the consciousness that knows them. Rāmānuja seems to miss the real point of the argument. The question is not whether Mr. *X* can deny his individual existence but whether consciousness can be an object of denial by anything except con-

¹ *Supra*, ch. ii, sec. 1.

■ *Ibid.*

sciousness. Furthermore, denial of *X* does not simply mean that one can say *X* does not exist. What is meant by the denial of *X* is that one has to be conscious of the non-existence of *X*. Whether *X* is contemporary to consciousness or not is irrelevant to the argument. Since denial means to be conscious of the fact of non-existence, the only thing that can never be denied would be consciousness itself. To Śrī Jīva, this fact of undeniability of consciousness is due to something inherent in it. The essential nature of consciousness must be such as makes its denial impossible.

Rāmānuja maintains that all that is revealed by consciousness is real, since consciousness itself is real. Śrī Jīva accepts the truth of the fact that all that is revealed or illumined by consciousness is real, but he considers the reason given by Rāmānuja as inadequate. Consciousness is real but it may very well reveal something which is unreal. As a matter of fact, it does reveal unreal phenomena, otherwise how do we speak about unreal things at all? There must be some factor intrinsic to consciousness that makes what it reveals also real. In other words, unless consciousness and what it reveals have some internal relationship, the reality of one cannot make the other real, and this relation must be due to the essential nature of consciousness.

Rāmānuja has also told us that not only what is revealed *by* consciousness, but also what is revealed *within* consciousness itself, is real, and this is true since consciousness itself is real. On this point also Śrī Jīva accepts the fact but considers the reason incomplete. That which is revealed within consciousness can be real only if something very essential in consciousness is responsible for making it so.

What is this essence of consciousness? Śrī Jīva approaches it in terms of three positions. *Firstly*, that consciousness is undeniable; *secondly*, that what is revealed *by* it is real; and *thirdly*, that what is revealed *within* it is real. From every point he returns back with the same message that there should be something intrinsic in consciousness that accounts for all these facts. No sensible person doubts the facts of his consciousness, but what is the reason for this lack of doubt? This inquiry of Śrī Jīva amounts to admitting that consciousness with all its data is real but asks why this is so. He seeks for the answer to his question in the Upaniṣads and finds it suggested in the *Śvetāśvatara*

Upaniṣad,¹ and in the *Vaiṣṇupurāṇa*.² The answer of Śrī Jīva to this question consists of one word, on which hangs his whole system : 'Power' (*śakti*).

POWER OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS ANALYSIS³

The supreme principle and ultimate substance is consciousness, and this consciousness has 'Power'. Śrī Jīva sets himself to the task of finding out the nature of this Power.

The Power of consciousness is said to be 'Will' (*icchā*). Three kinds of will are recognized : the will-to-do, will-to-know, and will-to-enjoy (*kriyā*, *jñāna* and *ānanda*). They find expressions in action, knowledge, and joy of life. In every mode of expression of our life one of these predominates while the other two are subservient.

One mode stands for active sense life, another for intellectual life, and another for emotional life, accordingly as one or the other is viewed as dominant with the two other as subservient. Knowledge (for example) that is subservient to active sense life is merely receptive and passive, it is assertive or reflective in its dominant phase, it is practically submerged in the emotion of love when that element overflows life completely.⁴

Two points are to be noticed here : (1) These three modes are inseparable ; (2) in different moments of our life one of them finds predominant expression. Their inseparability is proven by the fact that none of them could be understood to stand by itself.

The soul works to know, works to feel the pleasures of life, works to express itself in actions of life. To know is to exist and feel happy, to exist is to know and be happy and to be happy is to possess knowledge and feel existence.⁵ This shows that will-power itself constitutes a unity. It is neither to *do*, nor to *know*, nor to *enjoy* alone, but all of them in one

¹ vi. S, quoted by Śrī Jīva in *Sarvasamvādinī*, ed., R. M. Vidyabhūṣaṇ (Calcutta : Sāhitya Paṇḍit, 1921), p. 35.

² *Vaiṣṇupurāṇa*, vi. 7, 61, quoted by Śrī Jīva, *ibid.*, p. 36.

³ 'Power' is not a good word for the technical term *śakti*. I intend to capitalize the word 'Power' in order to indicate, at least to Sanskrit students, that I mean by it *śakti*.

⁴ B. K. Shāstrī, *The Bhakti Cult in Ancient India* (Calcutta : Banerjee & Co., 1922), p. 342.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

and the same moment. This unity of will-power is the essential 'Power' of consciousness and it is technically called by Śrī Jīva *antarāṅgā* or *svarūpā śakti*, Innermost or Primary Power.

Consciousness is a unity. But it is also true that one or the other of these modes seeks manifestation in different situations of life. From this fact Śrī Jīva comes to the conclusion that consciousness has another power. By one power it is what it is in itself—a unity; by another power it manifests itself variously, each manifestation being partial. This latter power he calls the Intermediary or Radiating Power (*tatasthā śakti*) of consciousness. It is so named since another third power of consciousness is also recognized, which is designated 'Secondary or Outermost Power (*bahiraṅgā śakti*) of consciousness'. What this is we shall see presently.

When the 'Intermediary Power' of consciousness expresses itself, it does it in a definite way, and when that particular way is repeated a number of times a sort of habit pattern is formed. Thus when any mode of life becomes habitual it acquires a new status. Deliberate choices and decisions become less and less necessary in the exercise of those habit patterns. We eat and drink and walk and talk and even think almost unknowingly. These activities have become comparatively independent of the Primary and Intermediary Powers of consciousness. This is the function of the Outermost or Secondary Power of consciousness. The relationships between these three powers are peculiar. The 'Intermediary Power' cannot function at all without the initiative of the 'Primary Power', since in the latter the former is rooted. But the habitual or 'Secondary Power' can move on indefinitely without the help of the others. To be sure, Secondary Power cannot act unless the unity of consciousness is back of it, but the latter does not play any active role in the functioning of the Secondary Power. It seems to take care of itself by developing a definite course of action in an individual's life. We may say in a sense that Secondary Power does work more or less automatically. It acts neither with mathematical precision nor at random. It is a semi-regular automatic machine. It is called 'outermost' since it is remote or farther from the centre of consciousness, which is the seat of Primary or Innermost Power. The Secondary Power depends on the Primary Power in that the former would cease to function if the latter was not there. Primary Power is, therefore, a sort of superintendent, onlooker,

or 'witness' in the language of Vedānta. The Secondary Power depends on the Intermediary Power in that the former initially owes its origin directly to the latter. But when once it has acquired its existence and power it is free from both the other functions. All the aggregated instincts and impulses that we possess are the expressions of the Secondary Power of consciousness. All our conscious thinking, acting, and feeling are due to the Intermediary Power. Behind these two Powers stands the Primary Power of consciousness which is a unity.

To make this more clear let us consider an illustration. In the unity of consciousness, for instance, there exists the will-to-see. There it is one with the whole. Its oneness is attributed to the Primary Power. Due to the Intermediary Power it becomes a conscious desire to see. This Power begins to function and in course of time forms a habit, because of the Secondary Power. All the functions that our visual organ possesses today are the outcome of years and years of activity of the Secondary Power. Now it can work without the help of the Intermediary Power. It only requires the sanction of the Primary Power, that is to say, the Primary Power should be there as a superintendent. A visual organ does not see when a man dies. When one sees, one does not always require conscious attention, but it requires a conscious organism to see. In all acts of seeing that one does almost habitually, the visual organ functions more or less independently. When a deliberate attempt is made to see something, the operation is said to owe its initiative to the Primary Power and it comes through the Intermediary Power of consciousness. (I am aware of the fact that this analysis is not at all in accord with present-day theories. The ancient Hindus had a theory of evolution very different from the modern one. We shall have occasion to discuss it in detail later on.)

Now the important question is whether the Primary Power of consciousness can ever be experienced, or whether its existence is merely an hypothesis. When we try to study a conscious individual, be it others or ourselves, what is it with which we first come in contact? It is the expressions of one's Intermediary Power. At different times, in different situations and varied environments, we know an individual as a doer or knower or enjoyer. Within particular and finite surroundings, the Intermediary Power of consciousness finds different ways of manifesting a part of the whole of the unit-self. Except for the 'Intermediary Power' we could

never know a person, but it is also true that the Intermediary Power conceals the whole individual from our view. The whole is a unity and it always stands at the back of every phase of activity, but by virtue of the fact that Intermediary Power is partial, it can never adequately manifest the whole of the unity. The intimate individuality of a person is always hidden from our view. As Tagore says, "We are hidden in ourselves like a truth hidden in isolated facts."¹ Is there any way of knowing the whole ? This is important, because unless the nature of that unity is known the true character of consciousness cannot be revealed. The expressions of the Intermediary Power of consciousness that we come across seem to constitute what we usually call an empirical ego. If this were all that exists, then there would not be anything hidden which we would need to look for. In that case the whole and the part would be on the same level, such as a forest and the trees. The trees go to make a forest and the forest is the collection of trees. But because it is held that consciousness is a unity and not an aggregate of various modes, the question is very legitimately asked whether there is any way of realizing or experiencing the so-called Primary Power of consciousness which makes the self a unity.

The answer of Śrī Jīva to this question is in the affirmative. The reason would be something like the following : What conceals the unity of consciousness from our view is nothing but its own Intermediary Power. The Intermediary Power, however, does not possess any inherent intention to hide the nature of its original source. It does it nevertheless in spite of itself. The concealment is really due to the fact that the Intermediary Power is usually directed towards something finite and particular. It is only when our conscious cognition or our volition is directed towards any definite particularized goal that the Intermediary Power finds its expression. Because the end is a finite one it necessarily manifests the Primary Power, but only partially. When the will-to-do, will-to-know, and will-to-enjoy are directed towards something finite, the whole, which is infinite, remains concealed from our view. The nature of the Primary Power of consciousness is to embrace the infinite. It may be asked how this is known to be so. We know it by studying our consciousness deeply.

In the pursuit of knowledge we seek to grasp infinite Reason ; in our emotional activity we strive to realize fullest

¹ *Personality*, op. cit., p. 88.

joy ; in our will-to-live we wish to secure fullness of existence.

We have a glimpse of the infinite through these functions.¹ The Primary Power of our consciousness therefore finds its manifestation only when we act for the infinite, know the infinite and enjoy the infinite, when we are 'drawn towards the unbounded'. To take all these functions back to the plane of infinity is to Śrī Jīva the same as loving the whole, loving the infinite, which is again indential with loving God. Hence, the unity of consciousness finds its genuine manifestation in the love of 'all', that is, in the love of God. The essence of consciousness, therefore, is 'Love'. Consciousness is what it is because it is 'Love'. (In the Sanskrit language there is more than one word for 'love'. Of these, two words *kāma* and *preman*, are somewhat like the Greek words *eros* and *agapi*. When the attachment is for something finite it is called *kāma* in Sanskrit. When it is for the infinite, for God, it is called *preman*. Since this distinction is extremely important in the philosophy of Śrī Jīva, and since there is no way to express this difference of meaning in the English language by one word, we capitalize the word 'Love' to indicate that it is a translation of *preman* ; for *kāma* we use love with a small letter.)

This Love has been defined as 'the unbroken feeling',² It is described as 'consciousness of consciousness, feeling of feeling and volition of volition'.³

Consciousness is the fundamental reality and that is because it is a unity. The Innermost or Primary Power of consciousness consists in the fact that it is a unity. "It is the state anterior to the division between intellect, feeling, and will, where consciousness forms a unity which cannot be analyzed."⁴ Herein Śrī Jīva finds the positive factor which is intrinsic to consciousness and makes it what it is. That consciousness cannot be denied is due to the fact that it has this Primary Power, which makes it a unity. Denial means exclusion from knowledge. Since knowledge is an effect of the Intermediary Power of consciousness it can never exclude the Primary unity from its jurisdiction. Knowledge can exclude all that is dependent on it. It can even exclude itself.

¹ M. Brahmachārī, 'A New World Saviour's Message', *World Fellowship*, ed. C. F. Weller (New York : Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1935), p. 723.

² Nārada, *Bhaktisūtra*, trans. E. T. Sturdy (London : John Watkins, 1904), p. 32.

³ Brahmachārī, *op. cit.*, p. 736.

⁴ Rādhākṛishnan, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

But it can never deny that in which it has its being. Knowledge cannot deny the unity of all knowledge, which constitutes the Primary Power of consciousness, since knowledge itself disappears if there is no unity at the base of it. Even the first principles of knowledge, such as the law of identity or contradiction, can be denied but not the unity of consciousness, since those laws are true and have sense only so far as consciousness is a unity. Pure knowledge without any objectivity may be possible, but a state of knowledge without any *unity* is an impossibility. So undeniability of consciousness is due to this unity or Primary Power.

All that is revealed within consciousness is real because of the Intermediary Power, and all that is revealed by consciousness is real due to the Secondary Power of consciousness. This point will be made clear later on.

Śrī Jīva has unearthed the three Powers of consciousness and has also discovered that the essential nature of consciousness is 'Love'. He has now to apply these principles to the universe at large. In other words, we are now ready to view the universe of four-dimensions with the concept of Power applied to it.

The above analyses of the Powers of consciousness, however, are not so clearly stated anywhere in the writing of Śrī Jīva. But they seem to be the presuppositions and inner arguments of his mind. In the light of innumerable suggestions scattered throughout his works, I have ventured to explore the depths of his mind as far as possible in order to grasp him fully. The above analysis of the individual consciousness is by no means final. We shall have to come back to discuss the nature of the individual's consciousness when we have discovered the nature of reality in its entirety. We start from the individual consciousness and by analogy learn about the universal consciousness, and then again turn back to the individual in order to explain it in the light of the greater Being. The reason that justifies Śrī Jīva in utilizing this analogy from man to the universe is the fact that reality is a unity and man is a part of it. To this effect Śrī Jīva himself writes :¹ Suppose a man has never seen the sun. Now he wants to know about the nature of the sun. All we can do in the first instance is to point out to him a tiny ray of the sun that has entered through some hole into the dark cave where

¹ Śrī Jīva, *Tattvasandarbhā*, ed. N. Brahmachārī (Calcutta Devakīnandan Press, 1918), p. 191. See Appendix, note 11.

he has been living all this time. We then say to him that this is the sun, though we know that this is only a small particle of the sun. The real nature of the particle he will know when he has seen the real sun. From the rays to the sun and from the sun to the rays—this is the character of this procedure.

This procedure is simply a special case of what we have called the 'psychological approach' of the Upaniṣads. It is said that,

Just as an acorn has the whole oak tree in potency dwelling within it, man has the whole universe within himself. So if we dive deep into ourselves and explore our own consciousness we can find out the mysteries of the universe.¹

This procedure, of course, will be condemned by many as anthropomorphic. Without intending to make a special plea for this procedure, I would inquire whether anthropomorphism of all sorts deserves condemnation. Are not certain kinds of anthropomorphism legitimate in metaphysical investigation? The answers to this question would involve the entire history of human thought. It is enough to point out that the *analogia entis* is of ancient lineage in the East as well as in the West and has had its champions down to the present time. Typical of this view is that of scholasticism, as expressed by the eminent Roman Catholic scholar, Etienne Gilson :

Now if a man is a part of nature there seems to be no reason why a philosopher should not consider man in order the better to understand nature. There is nothing to prove *a priori* that what is true of human beings is false of other beings ; especially when what we are considering in either is precisely their being itself and its immediate properties as being. Here, then, and in this sense this much decried anthropomorphism, so much in evidence in mediaeval times, may prove perhaps an indispensable element in method. Since I am a part of nature and my experience of self, in virtue of its very immediacy, is a privileged case, why should I not interpret what I know only from without in function of the sole reality that I know from within? In man and in man alone nature attains to consciousness of itself. That is the foundation of all legitimate anthropomorphism.²

Apart from the fact that man is a part of the universe, another

¹ Brahmachārī, *op. cit.*, p. 723.

² E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 88.

justification may also be given for this procedure. "The like grasps the like especially when both are essentially the same."¹ "Unless we are like Him we cannot see Him as He is."² This means that man who is to realize the world must possess every element of it in a minature form. This is an ancient Hindu doctrine. The Sāṅkhya philosophy teaches that the organ of seeing and light particles or the organ of hearing and sound waves are of the same nature. Therefore it is held that the ultimate essence of the universe must be the same as the ultimate essence of man. Śrī Jīva, along with all Vedāntists, conceives of this essence to be consciousness. But it is to one's own self, he says, that one has easy access, and therefore one should start there.³ In the consummation of his inquiry, which culminates in the actual realization of the universal Being, he would again verify his earlier assumptions and starting points. The procedure is a circular one and involves a process of endless refinement. The practical and the theoretical task of a philosopher thus go hand in hand with his procedure.

So much for the approach and methodology ; we must now turn our attention to reality itself, and view it with Śrī Jīva.

REALITY

We have noted that in Vedāntic ontology reality has four dimensions. The first dimension is the world of waking consciousness, the world of which the senses inform us, the sensible or corporeal world. Underlying this is the second dimension, the world of thought—the mental world. Behind it is the third, which is the world of pure consciousness or soul. And lastly, beyond all and enveloping and sustaining them all is absolute supra-consciousness. This has been established by the Upaniṣads. All Vedāntists have accepted it, and their task has consisted in systematically pointing out the consistent relationships among these different levels of reality, an undertaking which virtually amounts to bringing out the relation between God, soul, and nature. We have discussed the ways in which Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja sought to explain these relations. We have now to consider the way in which Śrī Jīva conceives of them.

¹ Shāstrī, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

² W. P. Inge, *Studies in the English Mystics* (London : John Murray, 1905), p. 6.

³ Śrī Jīva, *Tattvasandarbhā*, *op. cit.*, p. 196. See Appendix, note 12.

Consciousness (*chaitanya*) is the fundamental reality and that because it is a unity, a fact which also indicates that its essential nature is 'Love'. The entire universe, to Śrī Jīva, is 'Love' and the expression of Love. "The Parent Cause of the universe is made up of concentrated absolute Love."¹

The inner core or centre of reality is 'the Fourth'—the supra-consciousness. It has three Powers, the Primary, the Intermediary and the Secondary. Primary Power makes the central reality just what it is in itself, namely the unity and embodiment of Love.

The Infinite Soul—*Hari-Purusha* or *Purushottama* as we call it—is All-existence, All-knowledge, All-joy. He is 'Sat'—the principle of Eternal Life; 'Chit'—the principle of Real Knowledge; and 'Ānada'—the principle of True Bliss.²

The supra-conscious Being is the unity of all three and this unity is due to his Primary Power. His Intermediary Power, which depends on the Primary Power and is an emanation from it, constitutes the third dimension of reality, namely the self-conscious individual souls of the universe. The Secondary Power of his consciousness, which depends on the Primary Power for its initial start but then functions independently, constitutes the first and the second dimensions of the reality, that is to say, the mental and physical world.³ This psycho-physical world is called *prakṛti*, which is a technical term and literally means 'nature'. The individual souls are called *jīvas* which may be translated as spiritual monads or entelechies. The supra-consciousness is God, who is the fundamental reality of the universe. Due to His Primary Power of consciousness, He is the unity and embodiment of Love. All the individual beings of the universe or rather their essences, which is atomic consciousness, are emanations of Him. They constitute the Intermediary Power of His consciousness. His Secondary Power accounts for the 'nature' which is two-fold, that is to say mental as well as physical. 'Nature' depends directly on the monads and indirectly or remotely on God, who is a sort of spectator in relation to both. In a sense, 'Nature' is self-sufficient for all its functionings. In spite of the fact that it is a power of consciousness and emana-

¹ Bābā Bhārati, *Śrī Krishna* (New York: S. L. Parsons & Co., 1904), p. 39.

² Brahmachārī, *op. cit.*

³ Śrī Jīva, *Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 61. See Appendix, note 13.

tion from the Supreme source, it is called non-intelligent (*a-chit*) or even un-conscious (*jadā*), owing to its relative independence of the other two more intimate Powers of consciousness. Its functions are not due to any conscious deliberation, but due to a sort of habit, which it has acquired throughout the beginningless ages. Its procession is beginningless, in the sense that it is cyclic. The habitual power that makes it go is also called 'Creative Power' (*kriyā śakti* or *karma śakti*), since it creates itself as it proceeds. Analogous to our habitual activities, it appears to be working intelligently, though not truly so. It owes its original impetus to intelligent direction. Such is 'nature'. Its laws are non-intelligent and semi-regular. The actual motive power at the back of 'nature' is the habitual tendencies (*karma*) of the monads. The number of the monads are said to be actually infinite and innumerable (*asaṅkheya*). Every one of them is atomic and has emanated from the supra-conscious source, even as a ray from the sun (*raśmi-sihāniya*). They are sometimes called 'Intelligent Power' or 'Radiating Power'.

Every minute definite part of the world is thus fundamentally a '*jīva*' or an integral centre of life, knowledge and joy—the three different phases of one as we explained before. A '*jīva*' is therefore a small individual unit that embodies the essential world-power for realization through itself. But throughout the world there are organisms within organisms.¹

All these units of being, which are organic in themselves, also constitute one huge organism which is called 'World-man' (*hiraṇyagarbha*). This World-man and the World-nature, the intelligent and creative power of God constitute the *natura-naturata* of Spinoza, whereas the Primary Power corresponds to the *natura-naturans*. The intelligent and creative powers appear very similar to Spinoza's 'thought' and 'extension' also. But unlike Spinoza's these powers are, to Śrī Jīva, comparatively free in their activities, although ultimately, just as with Spinoza, God is the sustaining power and the only one source of all. So far as God is in His Primary Power He transcends them and leaves them alone. They are emanations rather than 'modes'. The 'Intermediary Power', however, has two faces, one towards the Primary, and another towards the Secondary Power. This is precisely why it is called Intermediary. Due to this double-facedness it

¹ Shāstrī, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

always feels a tension between lower and higher. The bearing of this we shall recognize in Ethics.

Let us describe again the world-view we have sketched above, in the language of Kriṣṇadās Kavirāja, the celebrated poet and author of *Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*. He was a contemporary follower of Śrī Jīva and very ably popularized in the vernacular what his master was writing in Sanskrit. Kriṣṇadās writes :

One who knows the essential nature of the Lord and His three Powers, has gone beyond darkness. All his ignorance about reality has disappeared.

One Power, which is variously named (for various reasons) as the power of pure consciousness or eternal power or innermost power, is the Power, due to the efficacy of which the Lord has his effulgent home in the Vaikuntha, that is to say, it is the source of manifestation within his own self.

The Secondary Power (*Bahirangā*) the power of creativity (*Māyā Śakti*) is the root cause or source of the world of nature. Due to this Power, there exist an infinite number of universes with egos and non-egos.

The Intermediary Power or the radiating Power constitutes the pure essence of the atomic monads, which are innumerable in number.

These are the most important Powers of the Lord whose variations are many. All of them have but one Lord for their ultimate abode. He is the First Principle, the source and sustainer of all.¹

This is the outline of the world-view of Śrī Jīva. Now we shall turn our attention to the nature and character of these three Powers in detail.

¹ Kavirāja Kriṣṇadās, *Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, ed. N. Brahmachārī (Calcutta : Devakīnandan Press, 1928).

CHAPTER III

METAPHYSICS

The Absolute

The Absolute, writes Śrī Jīva, is the supreme truth, supreme value and supreme existence (*tattva*). It is non-dual (*advaita*) supra-consciousness (*jñānatattva*). In order to clarify precisely what is meant by consciousness, Śrī Jīva brings an argument against his own views. How, he asks, can consciousness be absolute. All the instances of consciousness are momentary happenings. Now one is conscious of a patch of blue, then one is conscious of a patch of yellow. What is it then that is meant by saying that consciousness is absolute and non-dual ?

He then answers his own question. It is not the momentary instances of knowledge that is meant by consciousness. Consciousness (*chaitanya*) is a substance. It is pure sentiency (*upalabdhi-mātram*). It is that which the Upaniṣads speak of as the primal source from which all things come. It has its root and ground of existence in itself. It is truth and infinity (*satyam* and *anantam*). It being known, everything else is known. It is the ultimate essence of everything, the first cause. It is that of which all individual monads are partial manifestations.¹

Śrī Jīva makes a clear distinction between consciousness which is *kāraka-sādhana* and that which is *bhāva-sādhana*.² The former means that which is the result of a process of transactions between subject and object, which constitutes the temporary instances of awareness. The latter *bhāva-sādhana* is the consciousness which is the essence of being, which is always existent (*sarvadā anuvartamānam*) as an accomplished fact and not the outcome of any accidental configuration. The second kind always underlies the first kind and makes the temporal instances of knowledge possible. The knowledge of a patch of yellow comes and goes, the awareness of a patch of blue appears and disappears, but pure consciousness never fails. It is due to this never-failing

¹ Śrī Jīva, *Tattvasandarbhā* (Calcutta : Devakinandan Press, 1918), pp. 187-91.

² Śrī Jīva, *Sarvasaṁvādinī* (Calcutta : Sāhitya Pariṣad, 1918), p. 28.

substance that all these momentary phenomena are known to be so.¹ Pure consciousness shines its own light like the sun.² This is self-shining, self-sufficient, absolute existence.³

The Absolute is non-dual. Instead of saying it is one, the Vedāntist says it is non-dual, in order to indicate specifically that it has no second. By secondness is meant otherness. Want of otherness means want of distinction. Distinction (*bheda*) is understood in *three* different ways : (1) Distinction within the same type (*sajātiya* or *tādṛśa*) ; (2) distinction that subsists between two dissimilar types of things (*vijātiya* or *atādṛśa*) ; (3) internal distinction (*svagata-inter se*). The distinction, for example, between an oak tree and a pine tree illustrates the first kind. The distinction between an oak tree and a cow, for instance, exemplifies the second kind. The internal differentiation between the branches, leaves and the trunk of an oak tree is a specimen of the third kind of otherness.

The Absolute is one without a second, says Śrī Jīva, and he substantiates his statement by the Upaniṣad (*ekamevādviṭīyam*). It has no 'other' of any kind, neither of different kind, nor of similar kind, nor even within itself.⁴ In this respect Śrī Jīva is in perfect agreement with Śaṅkara, since Śaṅkara also maintains that the absolute is pure homogeneous consciousness without any self-differentiation. There is nothing other than Brahman, either of the same kind or of different kind. It is Rāmānuja who holds that the Absolute has self-differentiation.

So far as the first two kinds of 'distinctions' (*bheda*) are concerned, Śrī Jīva, Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara—as a matter of fact, all Vedāntists—are in perfect agreement. This agreement means that they all believe that there is one and only one primal existence and that is consciousness (*chaitanya*). In this sense they are all monists. But the differences of opinion arise when the third kind of distinction is in question, *i.e.*, whether or not the absolute has any internal differentiation. Rāmānuja answers this question in the affirmative, Śaṅkara in the negative. Śrī Jīva

¹ Śrī Jīva, *Tattvasandarbhā*, op. cit., p. 196. See Appendix, n. 14.

² *Ibid*, p. 199. See Appendix, note 15.

³ This distinction is worth while remembering so that due to the word 'consciousness' we do not confuse this idealism with idealism of the Berkeleyan type.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 187. See Appendix, note 16.

sides with Śaṅkara. For Rāmānuja the self-differentiation of the absolute consists in the two modes : intelligent individual monads and non-intelligent nature.¹ But for Śaṅkara these two so-called modes of Rāmānuja are mere false readings of the one underlying absolute consciousness. Now Śrī Jīva, accepting as he does with Śaṅkara the view that the absolute has no internal differentiation, is not at all ready to relegate all individual monads and the world order to the realm of illusion. There he sides with Rāmānuja and says that they are also as much real as the absolute. Śrī Jīva thus accepts all the positive contributions of his two predecessors. But how he can do it consistently is the question. If the absolute is non-dual in the strict sense of the term then Śaṅkara is right and then the objective world with all its individualities must be the false appearance of that one reality. But if the objective world with all its manifold particularities is real, then Rāmānuja is right and then the Absolute reality is not non-dual in the strictest sense, *i.e.*, it has self-differentiation. Śrī Jīva seems to uphold two apparently inconsistent doctrines : that the world order with all its manifoldness is real, and at the same time that the Absolute reality is non-dual in the strictest sense. Śrī Jīva believes that he is consistent, owing to what he calls the 'Power' of consciousness. He denies that the Absolute has any self-differentiation but upholds very strongly the view that it has Primary Power (*svaruṇa śakti*). The Śaṅkarites urge against him that if the Absolute has power then it has self-differentiation. But Śrī Jīva answers that this does not necessarily follow. Now, what this mysterious agency called Power (*śakti*) is we shall let Śrī Jīva himself bring out with as much clarity as he commands.

Śrī Jīva takes upon himself the charge of proving *two* propositions : (1) that Absolute Consciousness *has* 'Power' ; (2) that the Absolute is strictly non-dual in spite of the fact that it has 'Power'. The merit and success of the philosophy of Śrī Jīva depend on establishing these two theses.

In order to prove that absolute reality has 'Power' Śrī Jīva appeals first to common sense and then to the law of causality.

It does not require a philosopher, he says, to decide this question. Anybody, and not merely a philosopher, would vouch

¹ *Supra*, Part II, ch. ii, sec. 2.

for it that a thing cannot exist unless there is some power in it. If the ultimate reality exists, it must have power.¹

Then Śrī Jīva makes the appeal, that of the law of causality. A thing, he says, is said to exist when it *does* something. Doing something means to be the cause of it. Nothing in the world can become a cause unless it has some power. Nowhere in the world can one exhibit a cause without any power whatsoever. That absolute consciousness is the first cause of the universe is a truth accepted by all Vedāntists. It must therefore have power.²

Śrī Jīva then refutes his own arguments by taking the position of his opponent. The appeal to common sense, he says, is of no value, because common sense knowledge is considered to be false knowledge of the ultimate truth. So a majority vote cannot prove any truth of metaphysics. Neither is the second argument of any weight. Certainly Absolute consciousness would have power if it were the cause of the universe in the ordinary sense of the term cause. We say clay is the cause of the pot, that is to say, clay is the material out of which it is made. Or, we say that the potter is the cause of the pot, meaning that he is the operating cause. The clay or the potter would not be the cause of the pot unless they had power to perform what they do. But Absolute consciousness is the cause of the universe in neither of those senses. It is cause, to be sure, but in a very different sense. The Absolute is the underlying substratum. It is neither the efficient nor the material cause. The effect is not any transformation or modification of the cause but simply an illusory appearance of it. The Absolute is said to be the cause only in the sense that it has to *be present* in order that appearance may at all be possible; much as a piece of rope may be said to be the cause of an illusory snake or mother-of-pearl of illusory silver. The rope or the mother-of-pearl does not cause the snake or silver in the usual sense of the term causing. It forms the substratum which must be present in order that an illusory experience could be possible. Hence, the proof that the Absolute has power since it is a Cause, does not hold water.³

These are the arguments Śrī Jīva brings against himself from the standpoint of his opponent. He then in turn answers them.

¹ Śrī Jīva, *Sarvasamvādinī*, op. cit., p. 33. See Appendix, note 17.

² *Ibid*, pp. 29-31. See Appendix, note 18.

³ *Ibid*, p. 29. See Appendix, note 19.

If the appeal to the common sense of mankind is not adequate let us turn to the wise men, the liberated souls. Let us consider the state of liberation itself. What is liberation? It is conceived by all Vedāntists to be a state of infinite joy and bliss. "A liberated soul," in the language of Spinoza, "is one who passes to the summit of human perfection and is therefore affected by the highest pleasure."¹ This joy is said to be due to the fact that one realizes or becomes identical with what one really is. The inner essence of a person and that of the universe is the same and the actualization of that essence brings infinite joy. Joy has no meaning without manifestation or efflux. Infinite joy can only be due to the incessant overflow of the inner essence. The flow or manifestation of joy would not be possible if the ultimate essence had no power. If liberation is not mere nothingness or darkness or extinction of everything, but the overflow of bliss and peace, then the ultimate essence must possess power. If liberation were nothingness no one would pursue it. But, as a matter of fact, everybody seeks liberation knowingly or unknowingly, as genuinely as they seek after enjoyment, since liberation is nothing but the consummation of the will-to-enjoy in its purest and fullest sense.²

This argument is again refuted from the standpoint of the opponent by saying that the joy of self-manifestation of the liberated state would be possible by the self-illuminating nature of the ultimate substance itself and there is no need of assuming an extra entity called 'Power' for that purpose.³

This contention is again answered. Self-illumination or self-expressiveness connotes two things. Negatively it means that it does not depend on anything else to illumine itself.⁴ Positively it means expressiveness. It is precisely this expressiveness of the Absolute which we call 'Power'.⁵

Let us then look at the other argument, the one based on causality. The ultimate essence is not a cause in the ordinary sense and hence it cannot have power on that account, such is the contention of the opponent. Śrī Jīva attacks this position of his

¹ *Ethics*, v. 27., *op. cit.*, p. 268.

² Śrī Jīva, *Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 32. See Appendix, note 20.

³ *Ibid.* See Appendix, note 21.

⁴ *Ibid.* See Appendix, note 22.

⁵ *Ibid.* See Appendix, note 23.

opponent in two ways ; firstly, by accepting the thesis of the opponent and secondly, by showing the defect of the opponent's position.

Let us grant (1) that ultimate reality is not the cause in the ordinary sense. That is to say, it is neither an efficient operating cause such as a potter nor a material cause as clay. But still we cannot do away with power. You say that the Absolute is the cause of the world just as a piece of rope is the cause of an illusory snake. That is to say that it has no causal efficacy. It does not impart anything whatsoever to the effect, but simply underlies it. Now the question is, what is this 'underlying' ? If the underlying substratum has no power at all why may not the illusory principle (*māyā*) itself create the world ? If the underlying essence does not help the situation a bit, why not then eliminate it altogether ? The very fact that you are not ready to throw it out indicates that it has some power, whether you recognize it or not. Moreover, you cannot hold that there is no relationship whatsoever between the illusory object and the substratum that underlies it. Since we find that in order that there may be the possibility of an illusion of a snake there must be a rope or something of that sort and not a mother-of-pearl ; whereas in order that there could be a possible illusion of silver, it is a piece of mother-of-pearl that has to be there and not a piece of charcoal. In order that there should be such false knowledge as this phenomenal universe is, there must be precisely absolute consciousness, as its underlying substratum. This is your contention and this itself proves that the absolute substratum has some power and relationship with the phenomena, whether admitted or not.¹ (2) Śrī Jīva then in turn shows the inadequacy and utter illogicality of the theory of illusion or false knowledge.

In order that there can be any knowledge whatever, there must be a subject and an object of that knowledge. Since false knowledge is a kind of knowledge it must have a subject and an object. Now show us, urges Śrī Jīva, which is the subject and which is the object of this so-called false knowledge. According to your thesis there is but one substance in the universe which you call noumenal reality (*kutastha nitya*) and there is the phenomenal reality which is for you simply a mis-reading or false

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30. See Appendix, note 24.

interpretation of the noumenal. Now let us test all the possibilities.

A. This false knowledge has no subject, since neither the noumenal consciousness nor the phenomenal can be its subject. The noumena cannot be the subject since it is this noumena which are misread or falsely known. It is, therefore, the object of false reading. Furthermore, the noumenal consciousness cannot be the subject of the false knowledge because it is purely luminous truth itself and nothing false or erroneous can ever inhere in truth.¹

Nothing in the phenomenal universe can be the subject of that false knowledge, because phenomena are the result of that false knowledge. In other words, false knowledge is presupposed in the very possibility of phenomena, and hence nothing in phenomena can be the subject of that false knowledge.²

B. This so-called false knowledge has no object. For neither the noumena nor the phenomena can be its object. The noumenal consciousness cannot be the object because all objectivity is said to be phenomenal and therefore unreal. Anything that can be the object cannot be ultimately real according to your thesis. Hence the ultimate consciousness is held to be pure subjectivity, and cannot therefore be the object of false knowledge. Neither can anything in the phenomena be the object of that false knowledge, because the phenomena are the result of false knowledge and therefore presuppose false knowledge for their very possibility.

Your so-called false knowledge is therefore a kind of knowledge which has neither subject nor object. Knowledge, false or real, if it is without any knower and known, must be considered a meaningless fiction. The so-called false knowledge is, therefore, itself a false knowledge. "It is a worse delusion than the delusion of *māyā*."³ The only way that this illusion theory of yours can have any sense is to hold that false knowledge or ignorance is something self-existent; that it can exist without any subject or object. If this is admitted then there arises another serious difficulty of asserting two self-existent entities, one, absolute consciousness, and the other ignorance. This means to give up the philosophy of non-duality. "The theory that it (the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137. See Appendix, note 25.

² *Ibid.*, See Appendix, note 26.

³ Bābā Bhārati, *Śrī Kṛiṣṇa*, op. cit., p. 271.

empirical universe) is born of the illusion of our ignorance is absurd in that it involves accepting that 'ignorance' to be something self-existent, having an independent existence separate from the All-in-all, the One-without-a-second (*advitiyam*)."¹

It is held by the opponent that in the state of liberation all false knowledge disappears and true knowledge flashes in. The content of this true knowledge is said to be something like this : no other thing except absolute universal consciousness is the ultimately real substance. Now, who is the knower of this true knowledge ? asks Śrī Jīva. It (the knower) cannot be anything phenomenal, since all that is phenomenal is, according to the hypothesis, the object of exclusion from the realm of true knowledge. Only one possibility is left. Absolute consciousness itself is the knower of this true knowledge. We then ask whether this fact is true or false. If it is false, then it should again be sublated by another true knowledge and thus you are committed to a *regressus ad infinitum*. If then this fact (absolute knowing itself) be true then it is admitted that Absolute consciousness is the knower of Truth. To be the knower is to have the power of knowing. And if to be the knower be its essential nature, then this power, we should say, is the innermost or eternal Power which we are advocating.² The celebrated theory of illusion (*māyā*) therefore does not, to use a phrase of Rāmānuja, 'stand the grinding in the mill of dialectic'.³

Thus establishing to his satisfaction that the Absolute must have 'Power', Śrī Jīva sets himself to the task of proving that owing to this fact ultimate substance does not give up its character of being non-dual. It is still one without a second in the strictest possible sense of the term.

First of all he argues against himself from the standpoint of his opponent.

What is this mysterious 'Power' ? Is it different from the absolute or non-different ? If the former is accepted, then the ultimate-real becomes dual, which is against your basic position. If the latter alternative is accepted, then we ask, why call it by another name, 'Power' ? It is the same as the absolute substance itself.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

² Śrī Jīva, *Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 32. See Appendix, note 27.

³ In the above arguments Śrī Jīva follows Rāmānuja closely. Vide *Śrībhāṣya*, I, i.

Before we follow Śrī Jīva's answer to this argument let us try to understand clearly, just precisely what it is that he is attempting to tell us by his conception of this Eternal Power (*svarūpā śakti*) of *Brahman* (absolute).

The conception that Śrī Jīva has in his mind is a unique one. We have seen that ultimate substance, according to Śaṅkara, is a perfectly static substance and this is the reason why all the variations, modifications, transformations, attributes and the like are regarded by Śaṅkara as things foreign or alien to ultimate reality. Hence they are all labelled false or illusory. Anything that is alien to truth has to be false. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, denies the static conception of reality. He upholds the position that the ultimate reality is a dynamic being and hence all modifications, transformations, attributes, relations are real for him. What is unreal or fiction for Rāmānuja is the static conception of reality. Now what Śrī Jīva is laboring to bring forth by his conception of eternal Power is that Absolute reality is both static and dynamic. He thinks that these two ideas are not contradictory. Does he then hold, like Bradley, that in reality all contradictions are somehow 'transmuted'?¹ No, Śrī Jīva does not believe that they *are* contradictory in appearance and then somehow 'transmuted' in reality. He, on the other hand, affirms that the two conceptions, static and dynamic are not contradictory at all. This he holds, because by static and dynamic he means something very definite. The Absolute is static to Śrī Jīva insofar as it is an undivided integrity²—a unity. And the same reality is dynamic insofar as expressiveness is its essential nature. The eternal or Primary Power of the Absolute is that which makes these two facts possible.

To Śaṅkara, unchangeableness is a corollary of infinitude, and motion indicates lack of something and hence imperfection. "For," as Bradley says, "nothing perfect, nothing genuinely real, can move."³ Movement, to Śaṅkara, as to Aristotle, reveals lack of actuality, lack of completeness and therefore it is only the finite that can move. The Absolute of Śaṅkara, therefore, is unmoved and static. It is not even the 'mover'. For, as Śaṅkara

¹ F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906), pp. 487 ff.

² Śrī Jīva, *Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 44. See Appendix, note 26.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 500.

sees it, it cannot be the 'mover' unless it ceases to be unmoved. To Rāmānuja, however, dynamism means liveliness and concreteness. Immobility to him indicates deadness and uselessness. Now to Śrī Jīva unchangeability means exactly what it means to Śaṅkara, but being dynamic does not necessarily mean to him lack of perfection. For to him the Absolute is 'Love' and dynamism in Love is indicative of its fullness. Dynamism of the Absolute, therefore, far from being contradictory to unchangeability, is rather necessary to its perfection because it is perfect in Love. When something is truly static in the sense of Śrī Jīva it cannot help being dynamic. These two natures of the Absolute, therefore, are not two different aspects of it, looked at from two different angles, rather, they are true at one and the same time, one being the necessary outcome of the fullness of the other. "This *Svarūpa Śakti* (Primary Power) merely indicates this statico-dynamic nature of *Bhagavān* (God-head) and differentiates it from the static character of the absolute.¹ It is this that Śrī Jīva seeks to express by saying that the Absolute substance has eternal Primary Power and that this 'Power' is the same as Love.

Only love is motion and rest in one. Our heart ever changes its place till it finds love and then it has its rest. But this rest itself is an intense form of activity where utter quiescence and unceasing energy meet at the same point in love.²

Since dynamism is the necessary outcome of the static absolute in this sense, Śrī Jīva cannot see why his admission of 'Power' should involve any dual element in the absolute. So says the seer of the *Īśa Upaniṣad*. "It moves, it moves it."³ This is the reason why Śrī Jīva agrees with Śaṅkara in admitting that the absolute is non-dual in all possible sense and yet he holds that it has 'Power', it is static and dynamic at the same time.

This eternal 'Power' of the absolute is a unity. Now of what is it a unity? It is the unity of will-to-be (*sandhinī*), will-to-know (*saṁvit*), and will-to-enjoy (*hlādinī*), in their fullest consummation. That means that the Absolute is "All-joy, all-knowledge and all-existence."⁴ Reality is not the sum of these things,

¹ Sircar, *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, op. cit., p. 52.

² R. Tagore, *Sādhana* (N. Y. : The Macmillan Co., 1913), p. 114.

³ *Īśa Upaniṣad*, V.

⁴ Shāstrī, *Bhakti Cult in Ancient India*, op. cit., p. 110.

neither is it a unity in the sense of Bradley "in which all things coming together are transmuted, in which they are changed all alike though not changed equally.¹ These three : all-joy, all-knowledge and all-existence are one and identical in the Absolute reality and it is the indivisible integration of them that constitutes the eternal Primary Power of the Absolute.² It is due to this fact that the Absolute is perfect, unchangeable and static. What then again makes it dynamic ? The fullness of existence means that He exists completely and makes other things exist in and through His existence. Completion of all knowledge means that He knows and makes others know in and through His infinite knowledge. All-joy means that He feels the joy of a full life and knowledge and makes others do the same in and through the fullness of His eternal bliss.³ The existence that is in Him is not abstract existence but it expresses itself concretely and fully. His consciousness or reason is not a mere ideal but stands for a knowledge of reality. The joy that is in Him is not self-contained contentment where there is nothing to contribute to joy, but joy in positively joyous conditions of life.⁴ It is this incessant urge for expressiveness that makes the absolute dynamic. There is a need for an 'Other' in the Absolute itself and that accounts for all creativity. But this 'Other' cannot make the Absolute dual in any sense, since this need is not a need of imperfection or anything extraneous. It is the necessity of the fact of fullness of manifestation of all-joy, all-knowledge and all-existence in Him. It is this statico-dynamic indivisible integration which constitutes the eternal Primary Power of the Absolute Love which is also non-dual in the strictest sense of the term. This is the contention of Śrī Jīva.

Now let us turn to the question that was raised, whether or not this 'Power' makes the absolute non-dual. We have seen the argument of the opponent that if this Power is different from the absolute, it ceases to be non-dual, since it involves self-differentiation. If, on the other hand, this Power is not different from the Absolute then there is no need of calling it by a new

¹ Bradley, *op. cit.*, pp. 487-88.

² Baladeva, *Sidhāntaratna*, ed. G. Kavirāja (Benares Govt. Sanskrit Library, 1924), p. 36. See Appendix, note 29.

³ See Appendix, note 30.

⁴ Shāstrī, *Bhakti Cult in Ancient India*, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

name such as 'Power'. Śrī Jīva, however, does not use many words in order to refute the argument which he himself had raised from the standpoint of his opponent. He replies to it as one does to a dilemma. He says : because of the fact that it is quite impossible to conceive of this 'Power' as identical with Absolute Being we call it 'different' (*bheda*) and again because it is just as difficult to conceive of this 'Power' as distinguished from the ultimate Being we call it 'identical' (*abheda*). This identity and difference between the 'Power' and the Powerful is the essential truth, but it is beyond our human comprehension and logical conceptualization. These are Śrī Jīva's own words. With this he closes, announcing that he does not particularly like to be designated as a non-dualist (*advaitist*), but the upholder of 'the inconceivable relation of difference and identity'.¹ However, Baladeva who reveres Śrī Jīva as his master, does not like this answer very well. Although he believes that here is a point where logic cannot help much because the ultimate truth is super-logical, still, to give up logic, he thinks, is to give up philosophizing. He, therefore, seeks shelter under a unique category, called *viśeṣa* by the logicians (*Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*).² The Indian logicians are atomists. Atoms and many other entities in their system are held to be eternal. Now whenever there exists many eternal entities there must be, they thought, some element in each of them that keeps each distinct from the other. This element is known to those thinkers as the category of *viśeṣa*. Prasastapāda writes :

The ultimate specializing factor inhering in eternal substances are the '*viśeṣa*' or individualities. Inasmuch as they serve the purpose of absolute exclusion they are individualities pure and simple.³

When we say, observes Baladeva, that Absolute Being has 'Power' we do not mean that Absolute Being owns something, different from Himself, which is called 'Power'. Neither do we mean that the "Power and the Being are completely identical". We say, writes Baladeva, "Being exists," "the time always exists," "space is everywhere". All these sentences are logically tautologies, but they are in constant use and conventionally approved. Nor can

¹ Śrī Jīva, *Sarvasamvādinī*, pp. 36-37. See Appendix, note 31.

² Prasastapāda, *Bhāṣya* (London : Luzac & Co., 1901). p. 13. See Appendix, note 32.

³ *Padārtha Dharmasaṃgraha*, trans. G. N. Jha (Benares : E. T. Lazarus & Co., 1916), p. 31.

it be said that such usages are erroneous or based upon delusion. For, the phrase "Being exists" conveys as true information as the sentence "the jar exists".¹ There is, therefore, some difference between 'Being' and 'existence', between 'space' and 'everywhere' and so on. This difference is due to what the logicians call the category of *viśeṣa*, which is the specifying or individualizing attribute. 'This category has a 'particular function of its own'.² It is due to this function of the category of *viśeṣa* that we are entitled to say that Absolute Being has 'Power'.³

It should be noted that Baladeva does not make exactly the same use of the category of *viśeṣa* as the logicians from whom he borrows it. The question is whether or not Baladeva has made any advance on his master's position as he intended to do. Professor Sircar, who calls this category of *viśeṣa* 'the doctrine of specific particulars' points out the value of this doctrine.

These specific particulars keep the difference in the Absolute without destroying its absoluteness and at the same time without being involved in the *infinite regress of relational (samavāya) consciousness*. A differentiating element (specific particular) which does not require any relational reference is a necessity according to the author of the *Nyāya Sūdhā*, to keep up the difference in integrity. The absolute is, for example, consciousness and bliss. To say there is no difference between them is to deny their specific nature. To say, 'there is a difference' is to deny the integrity of Being. To avoid these extremes the doctrine of *specific particulars* is necessary.⁴

This author makes a distinction between 'difference in integrity' and 'identity in difference'. And he writes : "*Viśeṣa* : denotes *bheda* (difference) in integrity and not identity in difference."⁵

If this is so, then Baladeva has good reason to feel that he has improved the situation considerably from the point where his master (Śrī Jīva) had left it. Baladeva seems to appreciate the value of his contribution.

¹ Baladeva, 'Govindabhāṣya', *Sacred Books of the Hindus* (Allāhābād : Paṇini Office, 1912), p. 493.

² *Ibid.*

³ Baladeva, *Siddhāntaratna*, op. cit., p. 38. See Appendix, note 33.

⁴ Sircar, *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, op. cit., p. 50.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

This whole discussion, when expressed in theological language simply means that "an attribute of God does not differ in reality from God Himself and yet the predication 'God is omnipotent, all knowing' etc. establishes a kind of distinction".¹

THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE

Thus far we have learned that the Absolute is non-dual in all possible senses. This means that the Absolute (*Brahman*) is One without a second. Now the point to settle is what is the nature of the Absolute ?

The Vedāntists always prefer to offer two definitions of any entity that they have to define. One is called the *svarūpa* or primary definition, and the other *tatastha*, or secondary definition. The former consists in pointing out what the object to be defined is in itself, and the latter consists in describing what it is in relation to other things. Both kinds have been tried even in the case of the absolute itself.

The primary definition of the Absolute is that it is existence (*sat*), consciousness (*chit*) and bliss (*ānanda*). All Vedāntists including Baladeva are in perfect accord in ascribing these three attributes to the Absolute. But differences among them crop up when the precise nature of these attributes is in question. Due to this initial difference, far-reaching and momentous differences arise when the secondary definition of the Absolute is attempted.

First of all let us take up 'Existence'. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says that "In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being (existence) one only without a second."² That Being is the Absolute (*Brahman*). He has existence and only He has it in the truest sense of the term. All existences are ultimately one existence and that is the Being of the Absolute. Existence itself cannot be questioned, cannot be denied. It is the fundamental truth that underlies all that exists. Existence, therefore, is a necessity of thought and the existence of the Absolute therefore is a necessary existence. That is to say, existence is not predicated of the Absolute but identified with it. The existence of the Absolute is said to be complete (*pūrṇa*) and infinite

¹ Seal, *Comparative Studies in Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity*, op. cit., p. 93.

² VI. 2. 1. I use the word Being and Existence synonymously for the Sanskrit term *sat*.

(*ananta*). About the necessity and infinitude of the Being of the Absolute there is no question among the Vedāntists. That all other existences are contingent, that is to say, dependent upon or subject to the one existence is also an unquestionable fact, accepted by all. But when the discussion arises about the precise nature of this dependence, a question which also leads us to the secondary definition of the Absolute, the Vedāntists part company.

For Śaṅkara, the contingent beings have no existence at all. That we think of them to be existent is an illusion. According to Śaṅkara there is no way by which the necessary Being and the contingent beings can dovetail together. The Absolute Being is infinite and, therefore, cannot make any room for the finite. As a matter of fact, from the standpoint of Śaṅkara, secondary definition of the Absolute is itself an impossibility, since secondary definition aims at defining an entity with respect to another, and the Absolute, having no 'other', cannot have a secondary definition.

Rāmānuja, however, does not encounter any difficulty in placing necessary and contingent being together. By contingent existences are meant those that are dependent on the necessary Being. And this meaning explains the whole situation for Rāmānuja. Their relation is one of dependence. The absolute is that which is the ultimate ground and the sustaining power of all the dependent existences. Their ultimate source and eternal abode is that one existence. In Him they live and have their being. By virtue of this fact they in turn qualify the Absolute Being. They constitute the modes of the necessary Being. The fact that the finite beings have their existence in the necessary Being does not make the latter any less infinite. Rather, they constitute in a sense the wealth of the ultimate being. Instead of impoverishing, manifold existences make for the enrichment of the one Absolute Being. Rāmānuja is never tired of repeating a long phrase such as 'Absolute Being who is eternally qualified by the intelligent and non-intelligent beings'.

For Śrī Jīva the Absolute is the only Being and His existence is a necessity. He is called *svarāt*, that is to say, He exists as the perfectly free being like a supreme sovereign. All existences, actual or possible, are ultimately His Existence.¹

According to Baladeva contingent beings are neither illusory

¹ Śrī Jīva, *Karmasandarbha* (Baharampur : Hari Bhakti Pradāyini Sabhā, 1897), p. 6.

nor adjectival. They are *expressions*. Due to the fullness of the essential and eternal Power, the necessary Being overflows, and this constitutes the contingent existences. They represent His radiating and creative power. They do not modify or qualify the Absolute. If the whole panorama of the phenomenal existence disappears, that does not impoverish Him in the least. Although they come out of the one necessary Being, they do not subtract an iota from Him. Therefore they cannot diminish His infinitude. The contingent existences are the *līlā*, that is to say, free and spontaneous expressions of the infinitude of the necessary existence. Here Baladeva agrees with Madhva.

Śrī Jīva is willing to call these dependent existences illusory only on one condition. If, due to ignorance, we ourselves arbitrarily divorce these beings from the One Being, then they are nothing more than mere shadows. From the side of the absolute they are not shadows or illusions. Neither is there any shadowy existence from our side when we see correctly. There is the possibility of a psychological error on the part of dependent beings themselves, but the Absolute is not responsible for it. There is unreality in our power of comprehension, but not in the system of the universe. There cannot be any illusion which is metaphysical, that can stand by itself or act freely, as the '*Māyā*' of Śaṅkara seems to do.¹

Let us then turn our attention to 'consciousness'. Being and consciousness are identical to a Vedāntist. Or rather they are the two faces of one integral reality. As Tagore says,

There is an eternal connection between myself and the world, because this world has its other side in my consciousness. If there were no conscious being and no supreme consciousness at its source and centre there could not be a world.²

"My consciousness and the vast world outside me are one."³ The Absolute Being is absolute consciousness. So far there is agreement among the Vedāntists. Now, Śaṅkara holds that absolute consciousness is pure consciousness. Its purity consists in the fact that it transcends all objectivity, and consequently its correlative, all subjectivity. It is neither subject nor object. It

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

² *Personality*, op. cit., p. 186.

³ *Ibid.*

transcends them. It is supra relational consciousness. To Rāmānuja the correlativity of the subject and object is an eternal fact. Pure consciousness is a meaningless term. Absolute consciousness, for Rāmānuja, is a synthetic unity of the subject and object. Baladeva agrees with Rāmānuja, but he does not oppose Śaṅkara. According to Baladeva :

Consciousness cannot be separated from self-consciousness, and luminosity cannot but reveal its own form. So there is no conflict in the proposition that God is pure consciousness and at the same time self-conscious.¹

Rāmānuja and Baladeva agree that the Absolute is self-conscious Being. But Rāmānuja denies pure consciousness while Baladeva does not. The reason why Rāmānuja denies it is that to him the two concepts, pure consciousness which transcends the subject-object relation and self-consciousness, which synthesizes the subject-object relation, seem to be irreconcilable. Now we have to find the reason why Śrī Jīva does not consider them irreconcilable.

Pure consciousness, is an expression of self-consciousness. It is the luminosity of the light, as Baladeva puts it. It is the 'aura' of the Supreme Being who is Self-conscious, in the language of Krishnadas.² The expressions such as 'luminosity' or 'aura' of course seem to us simply metaphors. Let us try to bring out what the real point is by comparing the positions of Śaṅkara and Śrī Jīva more closely.

Let us ask : Does Śaṅkara deny self-consciousness of the Absolute Being altogether ? The answer is in the negative. Śaṅkara says that self-consciousness is a limitation of pure consciousness. If you say, as does Rāmānuja, that the absolute is a self-conscious Being, Śaṅkara would tell you that your description or definition of the Absolute is a secondary one. It is how the Absolute appears to you. When you try to comprehend the Absolute it first appears to you as the self-conscious Being (*Īśvara*). The self-conscious state of the Absolute therefore is an appearance. It belongs to phenomena. When you transcend this self-conscious level and lose yourself by becoming identical with the absolute then you really know what the Absolute is in Itself. It is pure consciousness.

¹ *Govindabhāṣya*, op. cit., p. 4.

² *Kṛṣṇadās, Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, Adililā. See Appendix, note 3.

Śrī Jīva accepts in a sense all that Śaṅkara says, but he urges Śaṅkara to go further. He maintains that if he goes deeper into what has been declared to be pure consciousness by Śaṅkara, he finds self-consciousness reappearing again. For Śrī Jīva there are three moments. First is self-consciousness, which, though not phenomenal as Śaṅkara holds, yet in some sense faces towards the phenomena. The second moment, which lies deeper, is pure consciousness, the level at which Śaṅkara stops. Śrī Jīva wants to carry him further and show that there is another deepest moment where the Absolute is again self-conscious. The first moment of self-consciousness, which Śaṅkara declares phenomenal, is possible only because there is another deepest stratum of self-consciousness of the ultimate Being. These three moments will be clearer when we consider the trinity of Śrī Jīva in his theology. For the present let us clarify the point somewhat more by an analogy.

The question is, what is the deepest nature of consciousness : pure consciousness or self-consciousness ? Is personality or impersonality the highest category ? Śaṅkara upholds the latter and Baladeva the former. If we remember what has been said about the psychological procedure or method of analogy, we shall understand that for the solution of this question the deepest nature of an individual's consciousness must be studied, for what would be true about an individual would be regarded as most probable, at any rate, if not true, about the universal. Śaṅkara would say that as long as a man is personal he is limited. It is the limitation of ignorance that accounts for one's personality. When the barriers begin to break down and one raises one's self to impersonality, it is then only that he demonstrates the true nature of his conscious existence. The ultimately genuine nature of the self is, therefore, impersonality and what is called personality is a narrowed and fettered state of the pure and free consciousness. What Śaṅkara says appears reasonable, but does not wholly convince Baladeva. He thinks that when by breaking down all barriers of ignorance and limitations one becomes completely impersonal, it is then only that he begins to be truly personal. The lower personality disappears when impersonality dawns. But then another higher personality begins to emerge which has impersonality as its base. This higher personality transcends the impersonal state but it continues to express itself on the impersonal level. This is how impersonality constitutes

the 'aura' or luminosity of personality. The light that shoots forth from personality looks impersonal or is really so only if considered apart from the inner core which is the Primary Power of the unitary consciousness.

Man's way to liberation and perfection lies through an increasing impersonality. It is his ancient and constant experience that the more he opens himself to the impersonal and infinite, to that which is pure and high and one and common in all things and beings, the impersonal and infinite in nature, the impersonal and infinite in life, the impersonal and infinite in his own subjectivity, the less he is bound by his ego and by the circle of the finite, the more he feels a sense of largeness, peace, pure happiness. . . . The liberation given by this perfect impersonality is real, is complete, is indispensable ; but is it the last word, the end of the whole matter ? . . . The impersonal Brahman is not the very last word, not the utterly highest secret of our being, for impersonal and personal, finite and infinite turn out to be only two opposite and yet concomitant aspects of a divine Being unlimited by these distinctions who is both these things at once. God is an ever unmanifest Infinite ever self-impelled to manifest himself in the finite ; he is the great impersonal Person of whom all personalities are partial appearances. . . . Losing our lower individual personality in the Impersonal we arrive finally at union with that supreme Personality.¹

The Absolute, according to Baladeva, is therefore the self-conscious Being, and pure consciousness is—to use again his favorite metaphor—the 'halo' around the self-conscious Personality. As a poet is surrounded as it were by his poetic inspirations and exaltations and beatific visions, so is the self-conscious Absolute surrounded by his pure consciousness. "Reality is the expression of personality like a poem, like a work of art."² The universe is real only in its relation to a central Personality who is the Absolute Being. This is the position of Śrī Jīva.³

Let us pass on to *ānanda*. This Sanskrit word has been translated as 'bliss' or 'joy'. To say that the nature of absolute

¹ Aurobindo Ghosh, *Essays on the Gītā* (Calcutta : Ārya Publishing House, 1926), pp. 185-94.

² Tagore, *Personality*, op. cit., p. 90.

³ Śrī Jīva, *Kramasandarbha* (Baharampur : Hari Bhakti Pradāyini Sabhā, 1898), p. 5. See Appendix, note 35.

Being is joy, may be a very great stumbling block to us. By joy we are taught to mean simply pleasurable experience. Our psychology teaches us that pleasure and pain are due to certain stimuli. But the Vedāntists consider the stimulus theory of pleasure and pain very inadequate. It explains nothing they say. The real issue is veiled under words. The issue that is raised by them is this : Why are certain stimuli pleasurable and others otherwise ? If the rationale of pleasure and pain be altogether in external stimuli, then so far as externality and the nature of stimuli are concerned, all stimuli are alike. Why then do not they all produce pleasure or pain ? What is the distinguishing factor ? For the Vedāntist, however, the real factor lies within the person. The fact is, they say, that the inner essence of our being, which is consciousness, is joy. Joy is not a momentary state of mind but it is an already accomplished fact of our being. It is the essential nature of the essence of our soul. A stimulus, when considered by itself, is different to pleasure or pain. It becomes pleasurable only when it is in harmony with our inner being. It is painful when it is in discord with our inner being. It causes pain because, being in discord, it (the stimulus) becomes a retarding factor in the way of the expansion of our being. Spinoza says :

By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection.¹

The pleasurable nature of a stimulus, therefore, according to the Vedāntists, is an acquired virtue. It is derived from the source which is our consciousness. It may be urged, why is not then painfulness also the essence of our consciousness ? It is not so because pleasure is said to be felt when a stimulus is in harmony with our soul—a fact which shows that the nature of our soul is joyful. Pain is felt when a stimulus is in discord with our inner self indicating that the nature of our inner being is opposed to pain. Professor Sircar, a Vedāntist, writes :

Harmony is the soul of bliss. It is because (if we see clearly) harmony helps us to feel the expanse of existence and to fathom the immensity of being. It is an indication of our fitness and capacity for feeling the vastness of

¹ *Ethics*, op. cit., iii, xi, p. 138.

existence. The more it grows within us, the more we feel the pulse of infinite existence. The deeper the harmonious vibration, the wider the knowledge, the loftier the feeling, until the vibration is lost in sublimity itself.¹

Pleasure and pain therefore simply indicate whether our consciousness is expanding or contracting.

Absolute Being who is absolute consciousness is therefore absolute 'Bliss'. Thus far all Vedāntists agree, and the disagreement starts from here. The Absolute of Śaṅkara is lost in its own blessedness. But that of Baladeva is eternally joyous, and the nature of joy is to communicate, is to burst forth. It is particularly due to this fact that there is creation at all. As it is said in the *Timaens* of Plato :

Let me tell you, then, why the creator of the world generated and created this universe. He was good and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy he desired that all things should be as like himself as possible. This is the true beginning of creation and of the world which we shall do well in receiving on the testimony of wise men : God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad as far as this could be accomplished.²

As the Bible has it, "For every creature of God is good."³ So declare the seers of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad perhaps more emphatically than anyone else. "For truly, from joy these beings are born, by joy when born they live and into joy they enter—that joy is *Brahman*."⁴

This is exactly what Śrī Jīva says. He is never tired of quoting and referring to passages of similar intent from the Upaniṣads. The Absolute Consciousness is the final cause of the universe precisely because He is Blissful. If you ask why there is a creation at all, Śaṅkara would evade your question. Speaking phenomenally, he would say, there is a creation, but metaphysically speaking all that you see is the falsification of the Absolute Blessedness. There is no creation, and there never will be one. Rāmānuja would say that it is due to the will of the Lord. Even

¹ *Systems of Vedāntic Thought and Culture*, op. cit., p. 20.

² *Op. cit.*, 30a, 524.

³ 1. *Tim.* 4 : 4.

⁴ III. 1. 6.

this answer of Rāmānuja would not satisfy Śrī Jīva. Simply to say 'Will' is not enough. It is because that Will is Blissful, because it is identical with joy itself, that there is creation.

Will-to-be, will-to-know and will-to-enjoy are one and identical and realized in their fullest sense in the Absolute Being. Joy is dynamic. Joy is communicative. His joy wants to communicate itself and hence creation flows forth from within Him. That is why everything in the universe is joyful. For joy it is created and in joy again lies its consummation. In perfect Love it is realized. In joy and Love the universe has its origin, towards joy and Love it is tending. The efficient, the material, and the final cause is the Absolute Self-conscious Being, who is all-joy. He is the First Cause in all possible senses.

We have shown how a Vedāntist conceives of absolute existence as well as absolute consciousness as the necessity of thought. It may be asked whether joy or bliss is also a necessity or is it an addition? From our common sense standpoint we understand that joy cannot be a necessity of thought. It is a poetic or aesthetic addition. But is not the case similar to the idea of good in Plato? Why is it then that Plato maintains that good is the 'source of truth and reason'?

In the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all and is seen only with an effort; and when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and the lord of light in this world and the *source of truth and reason* in the other; this is the first great cause which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must behold.¹

In the above lines Plato has perhaps given us the clue to solve the issue. Good is not a necessity of pure rationality but it is a necessity when one, as he says, 'acts rationally'. Not of pure abstract thought, but of thoughtful life and concrete living, is Good the light and source. And so it is with joy. Dr. Shāstrī seeks to prove why joy is a necessity of significant living:

The whole struggle for existence centers upon a quest of joy. The requirements of human life from the barest necessities to the most elaborate luxuries suited to respective ranks and ideals, are but materials for the realization of a happy life. A particular course of life may be wrongly

¹ *The Republic*, op. cit., 517c., p. 344.

chosen against all the canons of sound reason, it may ultimately lead not to joy, but to grief, not to true life, but to death in disguise of life, still the ideal is life and happiness. All the instincts, all the inducements that prompt us to action mask one single aim—how to live and grow and be happy. Life and joy must stand and fall together. Happiness is another aspect of life and life is another aspect of happiness. When the smallest ant picks up the smallest particle of grain to satisfy its hunger and feels joy in the process, it then really feels life against no-life or death. When it gets plenty to store up, it shows signs of greater happiness and greater life. What is true here is true everywhere. To live is to be happy, to grow is to be happier. . . . Complete realization unbounded and unchecked, of life can take place only where it is eternal and infinite. Fullest happiness follows such a life as a matter of course.¹

Hence Absolute Being is Absolute Joy. Joyfulness and perfection of Being is thus one and the same. He is Bliss. He enjoys blessedness not as though it is something different from his essence or an addition to it which he can do without. It is the very content of His existence. The full realization of existence is consciousness. The full realization of consciousness is joy. Joy is therefore as much a necessity as Being and Consciousness. So sings the Poet :

The earth is His joy ; His joy is the sky ;
 His joy is the flashing of the sun and the moon ;
 His joy is the beginning, the middle and the end ;
 His joy is eyes, darkness and light.
 Oceans and waves, are His joy ;
 His joy the *Sarasvatī*, the *Jamuna* and the *Ganges*,
 The master is One : and life and death
 Union and separation are all His plays of joy.²

One important point regarding the conception of joy which we should not fail to notice is that not only is the creation conceived of as an expression of divine joy, but when created, the beings are also said to be living *for* joy (*yena jātāni jīvanti*). In short, what Aristotle calls 'final cause' Śrī Jīva recognizes in joy. In joy the world has its origin and towards joy it is tending ; such

¹ *Bhakti Cult in Ancient India*, op. cit., p. 145.

² Tagore, *Personality*, op. cit., p. 96.

is the fundamental teaching of the Upaniṣads, which no Vedāntist, not even Śaṅkara, questioned at heart.

The teleology of the universe is also substantiated in the idea of 'all-knowledge'. On the ground that the Absolute Being is all-knowledge, Śrī Jīva seeks to refute the systems of philosophy, such as *Sāṅkhya*, which hold that the universe is a mechanical system. Knowledge involves purposiveness and the Absolute Being is said to be the 'knower of all meanings'¹ and hence purposeful.

When later on we come to discuss 'nature' (*prakṛti*) as such, which is considered to be the Secondary Power of absolute consciousness, we shall see that Śrī Jīva follows *Sāṅkhya* closely and conceives of the world order as a sort of mechanical affair. But the point to notice is that mechanism and teleology are considered to be supplementary and no contradictory. One need not and cannot take the place of the other.

To sum up. The Absolute is the purposive, blissful self-conscious Being, one without a second, whose essence and actuality consist in the simplicity and unity of the will-to-be, will-to-know, and will-to-enjoy, realized in their fullness (*hlādinī*, *saṁdhinī* and *saṁvit*). The Absolute Being is called 'supreme' (*param*) or 'Maximum' since there is nothing equal or greater than Him. He is called 'Truth' (*satyam*) and the giver of truth to every being. All truths are dependent on this one truth. An interesting point is made. It is said that all errors, illusions, misapprehensions and falsities of the world require not only an abstract standard of truth but also an actually concrete self-existent Truth. The reason why Truth is self-evident and self-explanatory is because, it is held, at the heart of the universe lies this absolute Truth. All the attributes of the absolute are repeatedly said to be identical with his essence, they are neither additions nor accidents.²

This highest reality is held to be an object of immediate apprehension. The introduction of the concept of 'immediacy' leads to the consideration of the epistemological question which its introduction raises. The issue of immediacy had been one of long controversy in the Vedāntic philosophy. Let us glance at the problem before passing on to Śrī Jīva's theology.

¹ *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* 1. 1. 1. See Appendix, note 36.

² *Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad*, vi. 4. See Appendix, note 37.

CHAPTER IV

SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES

Immediacy

Epistemology is considered in Vedānta philosophy as a sort of projection of ontology. We have spoken about the four dimensions and their ordered character in the ontology of Vedānta.¹ In order to explain what is meant by the projection of ontology we may say, using a spatial metaphor, that the four levels are not only considered to be vertically true but believed to be so even horizontally.

It remains to recognize the fact that each stage is not only present in its isolation but also unconsciously informs the lower stage. In fact on the waking plane we can trace the projection of all the other planes.²

This seems to be the reason why a thorough analysis of knowledge throws a good deal of light on metaphysical problems and vice versa. To analyze metaphysical reality on the perceptual plane is virtually to analyze knowledge, from the Vedāntic point of view.

There is a difference no doubt between the timeless knowledge of the absolute (*Brahman*) and the abrupt emergence of perceptual knowledge, but even in the latter, the knowledge by itself is timeless and quiescent, its manifestation only being in time.³ The self in its transcendent aspect of self-shining absolute consciousness (*chaitanya*) or *śakti* is responsible for the immediacy that we experience in perception.⁴

In order to understand Śrī Jīva's position in respect to this particular aspect of the epistemological issue, namely 'immediacy' of experience, we have to consider him, as we are doing all along, in relationship to the positions of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. I can-

¹ *Supra*, ch. ii, secs. 2, 4.

² Bhaṭṭācāryya, *Studies in, Vedāntism*, op. cit., p. 17.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴ Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, op. cit., p. 89.

not do any better on this point than to reproduce the summary of the excellent analysis of Professor Sircar.¹

Śaṅkara, consistently with his view of the changeless Absolute, holds that immediacy or pure cognition is processless and immutable. "Śaṅkara makes a distinction between the changing character of thought and the immutable character of the pure cognition."² The immediacy is a 'homogeneity of absolute existence which transcends the operation of thought'.³ This immediacy is said to be processless. And no "neither the activity of the self nor the activity of the object can be said to be a means to it, as Śaṅkara characteristically declares there is no claim to knowledge."⁴ This immediate knowledge is indeterminate. "All determinate knowledge is a self-abnegation involving as it does a stratification of the pure consciousness, into three forms ; determinate self-consciousness (*pramātri chaitanya*), modes of consciousness (*vritti chaitanya*) and empirical object (*viṣaya chaitanya*)."⁵ This stratification of the pure processless immediacy is due, according to Śaṅkara, to the principle of illusion or nescience (*māyā*).

Rāmānuja characteristically and consistently with his metaphysical position denies this sort of indeterminate cognition, which is said to be processless. He rejects it as pure abstraction. He believes that all knowledge is determinate and relational. In the immediacy of knowledge the relations are potential. We call it indeterminate in the sense that it is not seen 'in its complete connotation and fullness of relation'.⁶ "Knowledge in order to be knowledge must unfold and develop the system of relations through which it asserts its own existence."⁷ "There is an immanent necessity in the very nature of knowledge to establish the determinate relation involved in recognition. This makes knowledge a dynamic stress which goads it to transcend its indeterminate existence and to develop fully its determinate character."⁸ Thus we see that the static and dynamic absolute of

¹ *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, op. cit., pp. 3-9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Bhaṭṭāchāryya, *Studies in Vedāntism*, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁶ Sircar, *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, op. cit., p. 5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja have their exact counterpart in their respective theories of knowledge.

We could almost guess what would be the position of the reconciler, Śrī Jīva. He steers across the middle course and seeks to accept the positive values of both the masters. For Śaṅkara, indeterminate processless immediacy is the knowledge of truth, and the determinate thought processes are the falsification of it. For Rāmānuja, knowledge cannot be knowledge at all without a system of relations, and indeterminate pure cognition, he regards as a fictitious creation of imagination. But Śrī Jīva maintains that the indeterminate pure immediacy is just as much a psychological reality as the relational domain of the thought processes.

“Jīva Goswāmī seems to have seen through this hazy conception of Rāmānuja and insists upon the simple apprehension as the absolute psychological fact in perception, which any subsequent development through judgment must presuppose as the basic reality in cognition.”¹ “Śrī Jīva appears to have attempted a synthesis between the theories of knowledge as held by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara denies all qualifications; Rāmānuja denies homogeneity of cognition; Śrī Jīva accepts both of them as stages involved in the development of synthetic unity of apperception.”²

But the acceptance of *nirvikalpa prajñā*—indeterminate cognition—does not commit Śrī Jīva to the position of a Śaṅkarite, for he unlike Śaṅkara denies the abstract universal to be a negation of all differences and modifications. He accepts two stages in apperception (1) the cognition of the universal itself without any differentiation, the generic concept of being as consciousness and (2) the cognition of the universal with specific qualifications—a state when the knowledge is quite determinate.³

In the above analysis and synthesis there seems to be involved an element of confusion; although I am not sure whether that confusion is due to Professor Sircar or to Rāmānuja himself.

The confusion is between the logicians' (*naiyāyikas*) conception of immediacy and the Vedāntists' conception of immediacy. They are two quite different ideas and should be so recognized. Let us first of all see what they are and then we shall easily detect the confusion involved.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

According to the logicians (*naiyāyikas*) the indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) perception is the immediate perception of the very first moment, in which we do not clearly cognize the attributes, relations, and universals. We come to recognize them in the subsequent moments. This immediacy of the logicians is nothing more than what modern psychology calls 'sensation'. There had been a controversy among the different schools of the Indian thinkers regarding the nature and condition of such pure sensation. Now, the immediacy in which Vedāntists are interested is very different from this. To a Vedāntist all knowledge as knowledge is immediate. Even an inferential knowledge as such is immediate. When one says he infers 'fire' on the yonder mountain from the 'smoke' that is visible, the content of his inferential knowledge, namely 'fire on the mountain' is mediate, since it is mediated by the 'smoke'. But the knowledge *as such* as a mental fact is known immediately. It is true that Vedāntists attach more importance to the immediacy of the perceptual knowledge than to inferential and other types of knowledge. This is due to the fact that according to Vedāntists, a unique phenomenon takes place in perception. Not only the knowledge but also the content of perception is immediately given, not simply because the object of perception is before our eyes, but mainly because in perception, according to Vedāntic theory, our mind (*antahkaraṇa*) actually goes out, takes the form of the object and in a sense becomes identical with it *out* there in space. Thus knowledge and its content become identified in perception and both are immediately cognized by consciousness. The logician's immediacy therefore is a temporal immediacy whereas the Vedāntist's is a logical one. Whether what the logicians call immediate or indeterminate sensation is a fact or fiction is a question upon which the Vedāntist may have some difference of opinion, but the question is not vital to his system. According to the Vedāntists, immediate knowledge is superior, that is to say, truer and more real than mediate knowledge. Immediate knowledge is the life and light, so to say, of the mediate and relational knowledge. Whereas according to the logicians both immediate and mediate knowledge are equally real. Neither has any supremacy over the other. Unlike the logicians, the Vedāntist would speak just as Locke does regarding the immediate knowledge :

For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement

or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other, and this I think we may call 'intuitive knowledge'. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining but perceives the truth as the eyes doth light only by being directed towards it.¹

This immediate knowing of the Vedāntists seems to be almost the same as the 'intuitive reason' of Aristotle, "that grasps the first principles."² Knowledge, according to the Vedāntist, is a sort of mechanical affair, it is the light of the self-evident consciousness that makes it what it is, that is a part and parcel of ourself. By this act of illuminating, the conscious self becomes immediately aware of its knowledge. This is the immediacy of the Vedāntist.

We can now see clearly that in the foregoing discussion about the nature of knowledge and its immediacy confusion has been made between these two kinds of immediacy. The confusion may be due to the English word 'immediacy' itself which has reference both to time and to directness. Or as I have suggested, the confusion may be due to Rāmānuja himself. In his *Śrībhāṣya*³ Rāmānuja attributes a theory of indeterminate perception to his opponent Śāṅkarites and then refutes it. The theory attributed to Śāṅkara is to be found nowhere in Śāṅkara, although Śāṅkara would not object to it, neither would he fight for it since it is not vital to his system. In *Śrībhāṣya*, the root of confusion seems to lie in the word 'indeterminate' (*nirvikalpa*). In order perhaps to distinguish between the logicians' immediacy and the Vedāntists' immediacy⁴ the Vedāntist often uses the term non-mediate (*aparokṣa*) instead of immediate, but when describing their natures the expressions such as indeterminate and non-relational are used by both the schools, because, in spite of great differences in their essential natures, indeterminateness and non-rational characters are common to both the logicians' immediate sensation and the Vedāntists' non-mediate intuition.

¹ J. Lock, *An Essay on Human Understanding* (London : Ward, Lock & Co., 1899), Bk. iv, ch. ii, sec. 1, p. 433.

² *Ethics*, vi. 6. 1141a, *op. cit.*

³ Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 21ff.

⁴ For an excellent analysis of the logicians' (*naiyāyikas*) conception of determinate and indeterminate perception and the Vedāntist position in relation to it, see Dattā, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, *op. cit.*, ch. v. For the Vedāntist theory of perception see *ibid.*, ch. iii ; also Bhaṭṭāchāryya, *Studies in Vedāntism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-57.

To be sure, I repeat that unlike the logicians' immediacy, the Vedāntists' immediacy has nothing to do with temporal sequence. It is non-mediate because it is a fact of internal illumination, which is held to be self-existent. It is non-relational because we know it by being identical with it. It is also called integral (*samyak*) because it is a function of the unity of the self, that is to say of the whole self functioning in its innermost or Primary Power and not fragmented due to the intermediary Power of the self. In Śaṅkara, this non-mediate integral intuition is process-less and there yawns a gulf of *māyā* between it and the thought processes. Śrī Jīva, however, tried to bridge this gulf by denying *māyā* and by making the self an active agent. To Śrī Jīva also, non-mediate intuition does transcend thought but it is also immanent in the very nature and process of our thinking. It is static in one sense and also dynamically continuous with the movement of thought in another sense. And herein lies the contribution and reconciliation of Śrī Jīva.

VARIOUS WAYS OF KNOWING

In his *Sarvasamvādinī* Śrī Jīva recognizes ten ways of knowing.¹ They are perception, inference, word, comparison, authority, postulation, non-cognition, probability, tradition and gesture. Perception is of *two* kinds : internal and external. The external perception is of five kinds due to five sense organs. The logicians' distinction between determinate and indeterminate is here accepted. That doubles the six kinds of perception and makes them twelve.² All these aforesaid ways of knowing are again said to be of two kinds. One is called 'philosophical' or divine (*vaiduṣya*) and the other 'non-philosophical' or human (*avaiduṣya*). The former is the integral knowing which gives us the genuine knowledge of the reality, the latter is commonplace, useful for mortal creatures but in almost every case vitiated by some kind of fallacy or other. The contrast between these two ways of knowing seems to be much the same as Diotima makes while speaking to Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*.³ This philosophical knowing is, in the language of Professor Rādhākṛishnan, 'the response of the whole man to the reality'.⁴ It is "an apprehen-

¹ Calcutta : Sāhitya Pariṣad, 1921, p. 5.

■ *Ibid.*

³ I. 211 ll., 502-3.

⁴ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 269.

sion of an object which is no longer 'knowing about' it, knowing propositions which can be predicated of it but an actual possession of and being possessed by it."¹ The revelations of the Upaniṣads and of the Śrīmad Bhāgavata are considered to be the outcome of this kind of integral knowing of the seers and therefore accepted with great veneration and respect by Śrī Jīva.² Being pre-eminently interested in this 'philosophic' knowing, Śrī Jīva does not treat with any particular care the other avenues of knowledge which he sketches.³ He simply enumerates them and tells us a good deal about their incapacity to lead us to ultimate truth. The metaphysical truth has to be known by the *vaiduṣya pratyakṣa*. This way of knowing and the spirit in which it is discussed by Śrī Jīva reminds one of Spinoza and his *scientia intuitiva* or the 'third kind of knowledge'. Spinoza writes :

Besides these two kinds of knowledge (opinion and reason) there is a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.⁴

The highest endeavor of the mind and the highest virtue is to understand things by this 'third kind of knowledge'.⁵

Almost in the same language Śrī Jīva tells us that all other ways of knowing are simply sources of fallacies. The most faultless knowledge is the intuitive non-mediate perception.

We have seen that while classifying the various kinds of perception Śrī Jīva has accepted the indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) perception in the logicians' sense. He makes a unique use of this kind of perception in his theology, which we shall see in connection with the experience of the absolute (*Brahman*). To him the indeterminate perception (in the logician's sense) is a sort of æsthetic feeling of a very complex and rich situation as a whole.

¹ A. E. Taylor, *Plato the Man and His Works* (New York : The Dial Press, 1929), p. 231.

² Śrī Jīva, *Sarvasamvādinī*, op. cit., p. 36. See Appendix, note 38.

³ For a critical exposition of the six of the ten ways of knowing see Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, op. cit. The six ways discussed by this author are those accepted by the *Vedānta Paribhaṣa*.

⁴ *Ethics*, ii. 40.2, op. cit.

⁵ *Ibid.*, v. 25.

THEOLOGY

CHAPTER V

THEOLOGY

God

From what has already been said it is evident, I believe, that the philosophy of Śrī Jīva is theocentric like that of Spinoza or of Thomas Aquinas. Theology is the substantial part of philosophy. It is the crown of philosophy. Or, perhaps it would be more correct to say that Śrī Jīva has no idea that theology and philosophy could be two separate domains of thought. Although it is true for all Vedāntists that theology and philosophy are the part and parcel of one and the same discipline, still in Śaṅkara one can recognize some distinction between them. For Śaṅkara there is only one truth and that is absolute. You may call it God if you wish, but to Śaṅkara it is neither creator, nor preserver, nor saviour, nor providence. For all these expressions presuppose relation and the absolute is beyond all relations. The realm of relation is the realm of phenomena for Śaṅkara and hence theology belongs to the phenomenal world. Within the phenomena Śaṅkara recognizes degrees of reality and there God (*Īśvara*) stands the highest. But God is not the Absolute. He is less than the Absolute. He is one step lower. When the Absolute limits itself, It becomes God. "Limitation of the unlimited is personality. God is personal where he creates."¹ Therefore, in order to realize the unlimited absolute, one has to pass even beyond God. Śaṅkara sacrifices theology to his ontology. Echoing Śaṅkara after a thousand years Bradley writes :

We may say that God is not God till He has become all in all and that a God who is all in all is not the God of religion. God is but an aspect and that must mean but an *appearance* of the Absolute.²

Different, however, is the view of Rāmānuja and very different that of Śrī Jīva. For Rāmānuja, the Absolute itself is

¹ R. Tagore, 'The Religion of an Artist', *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. S. Rādhākṛishnan (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1936), p. 37.

² *Appearance and Reality*, op. cit., p. 448.

a Personality. The Absolute is a determinate Being of infinite attributes. He is the material cause, the efficient cause and the *causa sui* (svayambhū). He is the Providence and the Lord. Hence for Rāmānuja, theology and philosophy are identical. It should be noted here that unlike the Christian theologians of the Middle Ages Rāmānuja observes no antagonism whatsoever between reason and faith. Objects of faith to him are things not only to believe intellectually but to experience genuinely. There cannot be any quarrel between reason and perception. Faith is the name for accepting something which is an object of a higher kind of perception.

All these statements are equally true of Śrī Jīva. But the place of God in his system is still different from that of both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Here again we shall notice the attitude of reconciliation.

Śaṅkara places God below the Absolute and prefers to call Him the lower *Brahman* (Absolute). Rāmānuja makes them identical and puts them on the same throne. But Śrī Jīva places God above and beyond the Absolute and calls Him the highest Absolute. This perhaps appears illogical. How can there be anything beyond the Absolute? The expression itself does not mean anything to us. But we shall see that this signifies something very meaningful to Śrī Jīva and that again it is in perfect consistency with the spirit of his system.

We have seen that the ultimate substance for Śrī Jīva is Absolute consciousness. It is unity of the three principles, will-to-be, will-to-know and will-to-enjoy, in their fullness. This means that the Absolute Being is all-existence, all-knowledge and all-joy. Śrī Jīva can express it in one word. Absolute reality is 'love'. It is this nature of the Absolute that accounts for its unceasing expressiveness. The nature of perfect 'Love' is to overflow. So far as the Absolute is perfect being it is steady, calm, and immutable, but so far as the outburst of Love is concerned it is a mobile, flexible, and dynamic substance. "He is seated in immobility but he manifests himself in movement."¹ Owing to perfect integrity the Absolute is a 'Being' and due to indomitable impetus for expressiveness it is a 'Becoming'. Since it is a becoming it has a 'Life' and a 'history'. The creation is an expression of supreme delight of the Love absolute. The

¹ Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gītā* (Calcutta : Arya Publishing House, 1926), p. 192.

Absolute becomes creator not because of any limitation, as Śaṅkara would have us believe ; but because of the exuberance of fullness the permanent being becomes fluent. As Professor Whitehead expresses it, "It is as true to say that God is permanent and the world fluent as that the world is permanent and God is fluent."¹ Neither as an architect nor as a magician does the creator create, but as a poet. He is called the *ādi-kavi*—the First Poet. As a poet composes his poems not to limit himself but to give expression to his inner joy, so does the creator create out of the fullness of his Being.

The Absolute, then, has a history. But this is not all. Śrī Jīva tells us that the Absolute not only has a life-history but it has two lives and two life-histories. Before we try to understand just what is meant by holding that one and the same reality can have two lives, we should discuss the Trinity or the Three Stadia in the life of the Absolute Being.

THE TRINITY

The Absolute Being is all-existence, all-knowledge and all-joy. Though these three phases are indivisible, still, due to the eternal will-to-manifest, three moments are distinguishable in the life of the Absolute : (1) All-existence, (2) All-existence and All-consciousness, and (3) All-existence, All-consciousness and All-joy. In fact, every phase involves the other but nevertheless a difference in degree is recognized due to the following considerations.

There can be existence without knowledge and joy. That is to say, such existence is logically possible. In order to exist, a thing need not be conscious of itself and joyous. Consciousness and joy may be potential in it but they need not be actual in order that there can be an actuality of existence. But this is not so when 'consciousness' is in question. An entity in order to be conscious must exist. Existence cannot be potential in consciousness. If consciousness is actual then it must be actually existent. There can be an unconscious existent, but not a non-existent consciousness. But again a conscious existence need not necessarily be joyful. Joy may be in it potentially but it need not be actual. But the case is altogether different when 'joy' itself is in question. In order to be joyous, an entity must exist and must be conscious of its existence. There may be a joyless conscious-

¹ *Process and Reality*, op. cit., p. 528.

ness but never an unconscious joy. So if joy be actual then consciousness and existence must be actual. Thus it is obvious that there is a difference in degree of depth and fullness in these three moments of the life of the absolute.¹

One moment is the pure existence, the root and sustainer of all existence. This is called *Paramātmā*, who is the ground of all existence. The next higher moment is all-consciousness which involves all-existence. It is an existence conscious of itself. This stadium is called *Brahman* or the Absolute *par excellence*. Throughout the Vedāntic ontology it has been held that the Absolute is pure consciousness which is existent. But now according to our present analysis we find that there is another moment beyond the Absolute *par excellence*. This is All-joy. This stadium comprehends the Absolute but still goes beyond it. This is called *Bhagavān-Kriṣṇa*. Lacking adequate English equivalents, we shall keep the original Sanskrit terms for these three stages. As nearly as possible we may translate *Paramātmā* as World-Spirit and *Brahman* as the Absolute and *Bhagavān-Kriṣṇa* as the Supreme God-head.

Śrī Jīva starts with the *Bhagavān* (Supreme God-head) and then derives the other two from Him, and then again shows the consummation of all in Him, He is the eternally perfect Absolute Person, infinite in excellence, power, and sweetness.

Dr. Seal tries to draw a parallel to the Hegelian system. He writes :

Brahman corresponds to Hegel's Absolute Idea, *Paramātmā* to its heterization in nature and spirit and *Bhagavān* (God-head) to the complete cycle of the dialectic process. Only the Vaiṣṇava philosophers, more clearly than Hegel, begin with *Bhagavān*, the eternally Perfected Absolute Person and also end in Him.²

Brahman, the absolute existence and consciousness is comprehend as the second stage and the *Paramātmā* or world soul as the third stage in the Absolute and perfect Person of all joy, who is the First Person and the supreme.³

¹ Baladeva, *Siddhāntaratna* (Benāres : Government Sanskrit Library, 1924), p. 40.

² *Comparative Studies in Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity*, op. cit., p. 80.

³ Śrī Jīva, *Bhāgavata Sandarbha*. (Calcutta : Bhāgavata Dharma-maṇḍal, 1926), p. 2.

As creating and maintaining the world, as inspiring and ruling souls, He manifests himself as *Paramātmā* or world soul. *Paramātmā* is *Bhagavān* manifested in relation to the world and individual souls. At the same time *Paramātmā* is comprehended in *Bhagavān*. *Brahman* (Absolute) again is *Bhagavān* (God-head) taken simply as pure and absolute intelligence without distinction of subject and object.¹

We have then the trinity. The first Being in the Supreme Personality of the God-head, the second Being is the Absolute *par excellence* and the third Being is the World Spirit. The relation of the second and the third to the first is explained in two ways. It is said that they are either real manifestations in the God-head Himself or subjective apprehensions of the devotee.² The point is that Śrī Jīva is not quite sure whether the given description or definition of the second and third stages would be their primary definition or secondary definition,³ that is to say whether they correspond to something actual in the Lord Himself or are true only in relation to the experience of the worshipper. He has a feeling that very likely both are true. About the second stage, *Brahman* or Absolute *par excellence*, Śrī Jīva says that it is God-head taken as pure consciousness without any distinction of subject and object. It is a manifestation of the God-head of the worshipper. When in the state of blissful ecstasy the worshipper loses all sense of ego and non-ego, subject and object merges in pure homogeneity of consciousness.⁴ Herein Śrī Jīva finds room to make use of the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*) in the logician's sense.⁵ He says, "Just as the new born babe perceives a manifold of sense which it cannot yet discriminate or assimilate or reduce to perception through the categories of the understanding so the devotee in his state of trance is unable to appreciate the infinite excellence and perfection of the Lord's Personality and receives a vague distinctionless intuition in his soul."⁶ This is the æsthetic experience of

¹ Seal, *Comparative Studies in Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity*, op. cit., p. 40.

² *Ibid*, p. 4. See appendix.

³ *Supra*, Part ii, ch. iii, sec. 2.

⁴ *Bhāgavata Sandarbha*, op. cit., p. 2.

⁵ *Supra*.

⁶ Seal, *Comparative Studies in Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity*, op. cit., p. 88.

the unification of one's self with the universal whole. This is said to be the first moment of the vision.¹ With the subsequent moments we shall deal in their due place. "The intuition of *Brahman* (Absolute) pure and simple is, for Śrī Jīva, an undoubted fact of consciousness, though it requires to be transcended."² And it is transcended in the experience of the God-head (*Bhagavān*) Himself.

Our previous discussion³ about personality and impersonality now seems to come out in a clearer light. It was said that from the personal we grow towards the impersonal and then in culmination we transcend that impersonality and arrive at the greater Personality. These three stages in the individual's life of the absolute, namely *Paramātmā*, *Brahman* and *Bhagavān*.

These three stages of the Absolute Life are sometimes pictured by the help of an analogy of the ocean. The ocean has three strata. One of them is the deepest layer, which is calm and restful. Perfect stillness reigns there. Another is the surface which is incessantly tossed by the ripples and waves. In between these two sides there is a layer which is in the middle wherefrom upwards all waves spring and wherefrom downward all is serene. This middle strata corresponds to the Absolute *par excellence* (*Brahman*), and the one on the surface corresponds to the World-Spirit (*Paramātmā*). And the deepest level corresponds to the transcendental Supreme Person, with this difference that unlike the ocean it is bottomless and has very different kinds of motions of its own. The middle layer is static and both sides of it are dynamic. This is precisely what is meant by saying that the Absolute has two life-histories. One of them is towards the *Paramātmā*—the World-Spirit and the other towards the *Bhagavān*—the Supreme Person. The former is lower and the latter is higher. The former is 'here' and the latter is 'yonder', to use the language of Plotinus. The former accounts for the entire cosmic order and the latter another supra-cosmic plane of uninterrupted Love and joy.

The *Paramātmā* (World-Spirit) satisfies Rāmānuja, the *Brahman* or Absolute *par excellence* of pure consciousness satisfies the demand of Śaṅkara, and Śrī Jīva has his *Bhagavān*, the

¹ *Bhāgavata Sandarbha*, op. cit., p. 18.

² Rādhākṛishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, op. cit., II, 761.

³ Rādhākṛishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 97-99.

supreme God-head beyond them all. It should be noted that this was not made to satisfy anyone's demand. It is the necessary outcome of the systematic thinking of the philosopher.

The World-Spirit (*Paramātmā*) may be called the descending Absolute who accounts for all in the cosmic order, and the transcending supreme Person (*Bhagavān*) may be called the ascending Absolute who accounts for a surpa-cosmic sphere. It is He who is the subject-matter of theology as such.

The supra cosmic life of the God-head is called *nityalīlā* or 'eternal play', and his cosmic life is called *śṛṣṭilīlā* or the 'creative play'. Before we pass on to describe the eternal play, we should say one word more about the word 'World-Spirit' which we have used for *Paramātmā*. It should not be forgotten that the *Paramātmā* or World soul is as much transcendent as it is immanent in the world order. Śrī Jīva says¹ that *Paramātmā* dwells in every object, in every living being as the internal controller. He is the transcending sustainer and source of the entire cosmic order, which consists of the interaction between His Intermediary and Secondary Power. It is only in this sense that *Paramātmā* satisfies, as we have said, the demand of the Rāmānujists' system. We shall speak further of this in the chapter on Cosmology.

LILA OR THE DIVINE SPORT

What has been called the life-histories of the absolute is termed *līlā*—meaning play or sport of the Deity. Baladeva writes :

Though all full and desiring nothing, yet the motive which prompts the Lord towards the creation of this wonderful world is mere sport only and has no object beneficial to Him in view. As in ordinary life, men full of cheerfulness when awakening from sound sleep, begin to dance about without any object, but from mere exuberance of spirit, such is the case with the Lord. This *Līlā* or the Sport of the Lord is natural to Him, because He is full of Self-bliss.²

The Neo-Vaiṣṇavas often draw the analogy with the play of children.³ The playing of children is said to be the expression of fullness. Not due to any want or definite purpose, but out

¹ *Karmasandarbhā*, op. cit., p. 30.

² *Govindabhāṣya* ii. 1. 33, op. cit., V. 266.

³ S. Chakravarty, *Bandhukathā* (Faridpur : Bandhu Kutir, 1919), p. 299.

of exuberance of energy does a child play. A child is considered to be a type of full personality, because the individuality of the child has not yet been fragmented like that of an adult by a number of chaotic desires and uncontrolled passions. Although one can explain the different activities of a child from the standpoint of biological drives and responses, yet the point of analogy here should not be overlooked. It appears to be an undoubted fact that the state of a completely integral personality has in some sense great similarity with that of a child.¹ This is the reason the sport of the Lord is not only compared with, but also expressed as 'child's play'.² The divine sport is almost invariably described by such terms as singing, dancing, or playing on the eternal flute. These are considered to be the expressions of the exuberance of joy. "The voice that is just enough can speak and cry to the extent needed for everyday use, but that which is abundant sings and in it we find our joy."³

In order to illustrate how this divine sport is expressed by the writers of this school in the language of singing and dancing we quote a passage as a specimen.

Nature is the materialized Will-force of God. The Will-force of God is a reflection of God Himself—the objectified phases of the semblance of manifoldness of the absolute one. God is the husband and the Energy of His Will, Nature is His wife. God is the Lover and the Nature is His loving Lady-love. By His all-pervading essence, the only support and sustenance of nature, He clasps His lady-love to His bosom and dances with her to the intricate steps of the music of her laws. This is His *Rasa* dance in the aggregate, the *Rasa* dance that is being performed every moment within nature though hidden from our out-looking physical vision.⁴

The absolute, we have said, has two lives or sportive activities. One of them is associated with the *Paramātmā* (World-Spirit) who is descending and the result of whose activity is this cosmos. The other is connected with the God-head (*Bhagavān*) who is ascending, and whose expression is called 'Goloka'—the supramundane plane of eternal delight. The difference between

¹ Cf. Natt. 19 : 14, "For of such (children) is the kingdom of God."

² Jagad Bandhu Prabhu, *Chandrapāta* (Faridpur : Bandhu Kutir, 1925), p. 4.

³ Rādhākṛishnan (ed.), *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 36.

⁴ Bābā Bhārati, *Śrī Kṛiṣṇa*, op. cit., p. 307.

these two realms of divine sport is variously expressed and explained. One of the most important points of difference lies in the fact that the lower order is cyclic, and the higher order is rectilinear, that is to say the former has evolution and involution whereas the latter moves on and on, ever increasing throughout eternity. This difference between the two spheres is due to the fact that the higher order is the expression of the Primary Power of God and the lower order is that of His Intermediary and Secondary Powers. Now, it is believed (the reason for this we shall see when we discuss cosmology) that the potentialities of the Intermediary and the Secondary Power reside in the World-Spirit (*Paramātmā*) as seeds. In creation they unfold and become actual. It is considered as a fundamental principle in nature that when something becomes actual from its seed-like potentiality, it has always a tendency to go back to that potential state again. The analogy is taken from the tree and seed and their seasonal germination. This principle explains the evolution and involution in the cyclic movement of cosmic order.

Now the God-head in His Primary Power is perfectly actualized Person. All-existence, All-knowledge, All-joy reside in Him in their fullest actuality. The expression of this Primary Power cannot be one of potentiality. It is a manifestation without any complete freedom and joy. It is a manifestation without any potentiality, and it goes on increasing uninterruptedly for eternity. Kṛiṣṇadās writes : "The embodiment of infinite Love is Full in the fullest sense, and has no more room to grow but behold the mystery ! it is still increasing every moment throughout never-ending time."¹

In this process of never-ending augmentation all the values of joyful delight that are realized remain conserved with Him for all time. It grows and grows and never ceases. Śrī Jīva shows that even the derivative meaning of the word *Brahman* supports his views, since *Brahman* means one who grows and makes everything else grow.²

It is also important to notice that both orders are considered to be beginningless and endless. Only one of them moves like a wheel in time and is subject to time, and the other order moves like an arrow or snowball and transcends time in the sense that

¹ Kṛiṣṇadās, *Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, op. cit., 1. A.

² *Sarvasamvādin*, op. cit., p 13.

it carries along the whole past with it. The movement of the latter has a dialectical nature which we shall discuss presently.

THE PERSONALITY OF THE GOD-HEAD

The Supreme God-head (*Bhagavān*) is a concrete Person (*Puruṣa*). He is called the *Uttama Puruṣa* or *Hari Puruṣa*, that is, most exalted Person. We noted before that Śrī Jīva conceives of the Absolute as both self-conscious and pure consciousness. The three Beings that constitute the three moments in the life of the Absolute are all self-conscious principles. But *Bhagavān*, who is the highest of the three, is not only self-conscious being, but He is said to be a concrete Person having a perfect form also. The world-spirit and the Absolute par excellence (*Paramātmā* and *Brahman*) are formless but the Supreme God-head has a beautiful Form. By form is meant 'body'. The highest Lord has a 'body' and His body is like that of a man, or more correctly, the human being looks like Him rather than He like us. The human body is said to be a very imperfect copy of the most perfect 'body' of the Lord.¹ The beauty and sweetness of the 'body' of the Lord surpass all description and intellectual comprehension. But having a body does not make Him any the less absolute, at least to Śrī Jīva and his followers. Unlimitedness and limitation, he tells us, are not contradictory. They together represent the fullest import of the Joy Absolute. The 'body' of the Lord is made of pure consciousness (*chit*). As water becomes ice due to excessive cold so does the absolute consciousness assume a form due to the exuberance of joy and delight.

The Vaiṣṇava teachers deny a physical form to the divine. They maintain that the divine has a shining form, not a material cast but a self-effulgent spiritual figure. The Vaiṣṇavas lay emphatic stress upon *rūpa* (form) consciousness. The *arūpa* (formless) consciousness has its being and locus in *rūpa* (form) consciousness. This form consciousness is not to be conceived as an occasional or temporary expression. Baladeva in his *Siddhāntaratna* affirms the co-reality of *Bhagavān* (God-head) and its form. Both are non-different or identical.²

So His body is not made of any other component stuff, it is identi-

¹ Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta, op. cit., ii 21.

² Sircar, *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, op. cit., pp. 109-10.

cal with the spirit.¹ As ice is nothing but water so is His body nothing but pure consciousness and joy condensed. "The Absolute has got no limbs like ours which are made up of the five sensuous elements, but really possesses supersensuous limbs of which the sole ingredient is bliss and consciousness."²

That the Supreme God-head has a blissful form Śrī Jīva proves by quoting authoritative statements from the Upaniṣads and *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, which are regarded as revealed. Professor Mallik seeks to prove that even the devotees of other historic religions, though they apparently speak of the formless God, do tacitly assume, perhaps in the depths of their heart, some form or other of the Lord. He speaks of Christianity, Judaism and Islam and points out passages from their respective scriptures which seem to corroborate this view.³

To this inquiry why the body of the Lord looks like that of a human being Bābā Bhārati tells us :

Kṛiṣṇa (God-head) in Form and in Love-effulgence is present as much in a grain of earth, in a blade of grass, in a beast, as in man. Only that Form is more or less covered in the lower life-forms, on account of many of the composing principles being unopened, while in the man all the principles being opened, the man-form looks more like the form of God. Some people refuse to believe that the Supreme Deity has a form like that of a man, because God, with a human form, would be lowered in their estimation. These devout people forget that the human form is but an imperfect picture of God's form, instead of God's form being a copy of the human form. So God need not take the trouble of assuming an imperfect reflection of His own perfect form.⁴

Lest this conception of the God-head having a body like the human body appears simply grotesque to the reader, I may quote here a few lines from the writings of a Christian theologian and philosopher of the 18th century, Immanuel Swedenborg. Our histories of philosophy spare no space for him, although he was

¹ Kṛiṣṇadas, *Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, op. cit., iii. 5.

² Mallik, *The Philosophy of Vaiṣṇava Religion* (Punjab : Oriental Book Department, 1927), p. 52.

³ Mallik, *The Philosophy of Vaiṣṇava Religion*, p. 62.

⁴ Bābā Bhārati, *Śrī Kṛiṣṇa*, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

great enough to attract the attention of Kant. Swedenborg writes in his master work :

In all the heavens there is no other idea of God than that He is a Man It is known from Genesis that men were created after the image and likeness of God. God also appeared as a man to Abraham and to others. The ancients from the wise even to the simple thought of God no other-wise than as being a Man. That in God there are infinite things anyone may convince himself who believes that God is a Man, for in this idea and in no other is the idea of the Lord. That in God there are infinite things anyone may convince himself who believes that God is a Man, for being a Man He has a body and everything pertaining to it, that is a face, breast, abdomen, loins and feet, for without these He would not be a Man. And having these He also has eyes, ears, nose, mouth and tongue ; also the parts within man as the heart and lungs, and their dependencies, all of which, taken together make man to be a man. In a created man parts are many and regarded in their details of structure are numberless ; and in God-Man they are infinite, nothing whatever is lacking and from this He has infinite perfection. This comparison holds between the uncreated Man who is God and created man because God is Man, and He Himself says that the man of this world was created after His image and into His likeness (Gen. 1 : 26-27).¹

To be sure, I must repeat that though the highest Being is said to have a body like human mortals, Śrī Jīva, Baladeva and the rest of the Vaiṣṇava teachers before and after them, never tire of repeating the fact that the similarity between the body of the Lord and that of a man is only in shape and structure and never in ingredients. The human body is made up of gross matter whereas the Lord's body is supremely spiritual and super sensuous. Its elements are pure consciousness, joy and bliss. The very definite nature of that component stuff is called *rasa*, the character of which we shall see shortly. We must also not forget that when a Vedāntist speaks of consciousness he conceives of it as the most spiritual substance which constitutes the ultimate stuff of the universe. The Lord is called 'embodied joy', or 'solidified

¹ *Divine Love and Divine Wisdom*, sec. 11-27 (New York : Swedenborg Foundation, 1933), pp. 12-27.

bliss' (*ānanda-vigraha*, *ānanda-ghana*). His body is said to be 'charmingly graceful' (*madana mohana*). "The beauty of the body of Kṛiṣṇa (God-head) changes like the shifting colours in a kaleidoscope, into more and more soul-entrancing loveliness at every second, for it reflects the concentrated beauty and sweetness of the whole universe, charms warring with charms for supremacy—bubbling foam and froth of the sweetness of the Nectar of Love."¹

THE ETERNAL ABODE OF THE GOD-HEAD

The Supreme Lord has not only a charming body but also a delightful abode in which to dwell. He is said to be everywhere in every space and beyond all space, but still a very definite home has been attributed to Him. The eternal 'Home' (*dhāma*) of the Lord is name 'Goloka'. That is the spot where the whole reality is said to be centred—the centre of the universe. But where is it?

Where is the centre of the material world? Unquestionably in the region of the sun. The life that animates the world is therefore the life that lies behind the sun. But as this world of ours has a sun of its own, so also have the other worlds. The great principle of Life in its fundamental unity must therefore be supposed to be behind all the suns. Every sun has its life centre there.... The '*Goloka*' literally the region of the sun (light) where the most High lives is thus to be comprehended in and through the sun and the suns. The firmament where He actually lives is not the firmament of the cosmos but the eternal firmament, the *Paravyoma*, which alone can hold eternal Life. Cosmic life touches only its fringes.²

The Upaniṣad say that He is present eternally in His own supreme heaven like a tree, but simultaneously the whole world is pervaded by Him.³ This is possible due to His incomprehensible power and glory. Śrī Jīva clarifies the situation much when he says that this Home (*dhāma*) of the Lord is but a mode of the essential Primary Power of the God-head. The undifferentiated luminosity of the impersonal Absolute (*Brahman*) which has been

¹ Bābā Bhārati, *Śrī Kṛiṣṇa*, op. cit., p. 40.

² Shāstri, *The Bhakti Cult in Ancient India*, op. cit., pp. 143-44.

³ *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, iii. 9.

said to constitute the 'aura' of the supreme Personality of the Lord is the same as this eternal abode.¹

In spite of the attribution of a body and a home it should however never be supposed that the God-head is ever thought to be finite. A simile with the Sun that has been used by Śrī Jīva himself and his disciples, expresses their position quite clearly.

The body of the Supreme Deity, Kṛiṣṇa's Body, is concrete-looking like man's but infinite in the expansion of its Radiance or Real Self, just as the orb of the sun is the concrete-looking centre of its abstract self in the manifestation of its light and heat. The orb, its radiance and its heat must altogether be called the sun and not the orb alone. *Kṛiṣṇa* (God-head), the spiritual Soul of the sun as well as of the universe has likewise a Form-Centre from which radiates to limitless infinity His effulgence called Absolute Love, which pervades all creation and space.²

THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE GOD-HEAD

Infinite auspicious qualities are attributed to the Lord. It is, however, always insisted that all attributes are identical with his essence and not accidental. Another very interesting and important point is made about the Lord's attributes. All the auspicious qualities are divided into two classes, one class is called *aiśvarya*—majestic, and the other class called *mādhurya* meaning charming. To the highest God-head, the First Person of the Trinity the former class of attributes is denied and simply the latter class is ascribed. In order to understand the reason for this we need to enter into the very heart of the theology of Baladeva. The simple literal meaning of the two terms *aiśvarya* and *mādhurya* as majestic and charming, respectively, do not help us much unless we realize just what is meant and why.

All the divine qualities such as omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, etc., are included in the majestic category by virtue of the fact that they are too great for human beings to comprehend, and hence they make the God-head unapproachable. The attributes, on the other hand, which we may call supremely human such as friendliness, sympathy, kindliness, attractiveness, deep affection, eagerness to love and to be loved, etc., are included in

¹ Śrī Jīva, *Śrīkṛiṣṇa Sandarbha* (ed. P. G. Goswāmī : Navadvīp, 1626), p. 339.

² Bābā Bhāratī, *Śrī Kṛiṣṇa*, op. cit., p. 39.

the 'sweet' category. These are the qualities that we appreciate and praise every day as we come in contact with our fellowmen in society and particularly with our most dear ones in the family circle. We may call them ideal domestic virtues. These domestic virtues are pre-eminently attributed to the highest Lord. If we can conceive—and perhaps this is not very difficult—one single person who is the best father to his children, the kindest master to his attendants, the sweetest child to his own parents, the most amiable friend to his associates and the most loving husband to his wife, *the*, when this is conceived, we shall have some idea as to what kind of personality the supreme God-head is supposed to be like by Śrī Jīva and his school. The Lord is at one and the same time father, master, son, friend and husband in their most ideal sense. He is called *madhura* as He exhibits in Himself all ideal virtues. The term *madhura* literally means 'sweet', but it is also a technical word. As we have entered into the subject we would better do justice to this technical phrase by bringing out its significance more fully. As was just observed, the 'majestic' qualities which seem to place God and man very far from each other, have not been much importance to the highest God-head. The question arises whether the Lord does at all possess those qualities or whether he altogether lacks them. It seems obvious to us that the Supreme Lord cannot lack such qualities as omnipresence. Could we say then that He possesses them but does not make use of them? This also seems illogical. If one is omniscient and knows everything, how can he possibly help using that power. Can he then forget about it? This appears to be impracticable. It seems utterly impossible for a person to have the power of omniscience and to be forgetful of having it at the same time. But this is precisely what Śrī Jīva asserts to be the case with the God-head. The Lord creates, says Śrī Jīva, a new 'Principle' which covers Himself. He does it in order that He may be more sweet and consequently more sociable and approachable to human beings. His love is incomplete until he can communicate. In order to make the communication possible He creates out of Himself a novel 'Principle' which is called *yogamāyā*. Creating this 'Principle' out of Himself, the Lord has given it freedom so that it can lord it over Himself. The principle of *yogamāyā*, therefore, is the principle which conceals the so-called 'majestic' or ultra-human qualities of the God-head and lets the supremely human qualities shine forth more charmingly and beautifully. What

shines out in this way is considered to be more real and graceful than what is veiled. By virtue of this principle of *yogamāyā* the Lord does and does not possess omniscience, omnipotence, and the like at the same time. He behaves as if he is not omniscient. This behavior of His is not pretense but is genuine, because the principle of *yogamāyā* has been given the power to function free of the Lord's will. To illustrate the point, supposing Śrī Jīva knew of Jesus Christ and saw Him suckling the breast of the Virgin Mary. Śrī Jīva would say that this is 'sweet' or *madhura* because the Son of God does not need a mother's breast to live on, but still as Christ He does it. This is due to *yogamāyā* that has made Him forget that He is the Son of God.

Now we are in a position to understand the technical phrase *madhura* (sweet). 'Sweetness' of the God-head consists in the exhibition of His supremely human qualities when the ultra-human qualities of His are concealed by the function of *yogamāyā*.

Indeed in the Bengal school (in the school of Śrī Jīva) *Bhagavān* (God-head) is all sportive delight in love and joy. The grandeur and sublimity of the Infinite Life has been thrown into the background ; it is still there, but in the height of love the self-revelation on a deeper basis in delight requires the temporary withdrawal from vision of the Infinite in its majesty.¹

This withdrawal is effected by the agency of *yogamāyā*.

We should do well to remember this principle of *yogamāyā*. She plays a very important role and we have to meet her again (the word *yogamāyā* is in the feminine gender and it is always mentioned as She). She is made of the Primary Power of the Lord and is called 'Divine creativity', which is sharply distinguished from 'Cosmic creativity', the latter being the Secondary Power of the Lord. Let us remember that there are two histories in the life of the Absolute and we are at present concerned with the higher one.

THE CONCEPT OF *Rasa* OR THE ULTIMATE ESSENCE

Besides the 'sweet' qualities another very unique attribute is ascribed to the Lord. That attribute is *rasa*. This is an untranslatable word. Although it has a long history in Hindu thought, being in use since the days of the Upaniṣads, yet in the Vaiṣṇava

¹ Sircar, *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, op. cit., p. 116.

literature its use is peculiar and there it has become a technical term of great importance. We shall try to elucidate its significance as much as practicable.

The word *rasa* means 'relishable flavour'. When a thing is pleasurable or enjoyable it is said to possess *rasa*. That which accounts for the pleasurable nature of an object is called *rasa*. The rhetoricians use this term in connection with poetry and music. Poetry is defined as the aggregate of 'sentences whose soul is *rasa*'. Music is rhythmical sounds having *rasa*. The Hindu chemistry and medical sciences make striking use of this concept. As early as the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*¹ we find *rasa* used as substance and equated with God. (It however makes no difference whether *rasa* is attribute or substance in the case of God since in Him they are identical).

All *rasas* are said to be the *rasa* of God. It is God in an object that makes that object pleasurable.

As life implies joy, and joy implies life, Hindu philosophy has very appropriately hit upon a single expression '*rasa*' to denote both the phases of the same thing. '*Rasa*' is the vital essence of everything that lives and grows. It is the principle of joy that stands for the life and the expansion of the soul. When the Upaniṣads speak of the Highest Principle as '*rasa*' they speak of the one embodiment of all-life and all-joy. Trace the essence of existence from the lowest to the highest and you come to the fountainhead as *rasa*. Trace the essence of joy from the grossest to the finest, you grasp the eternal source of *rasa*.²

Śrī Jīva calls the God-head *Prema-maya Rasa-rāja*—the embodiment of Love and the Prince of *rasa*. Love and joy are said to be two aspects of one essence which is *rasa*. *Rasa* is called the quintessence of consciousness and the Lord is 'solidified *rasa*' (*rasaghana*). It has been said that the supreme God-head has a body and its structure and shape is like the human body but its component stuff is different. Now we have the component stuff. *Rasa* is the content of His body. It is all *rasa*, nothing but *rasa*. Every part of His body is made of '*rasa*' (*akhīla rasāmṛta mūrti*). If *rasa* is taken as the quintessence of consciousness a new light is thrown on the idea of the Lord having a body. In spite of all

¹ II. 7.

² Shāstrī, *Bhakti Cult in Ancient India*, op. cit., p. 146.

that has been said about the supreme-being having a body, we cannot help thinking that the notion is unphilosophical, and perhaps a reminiscence of primitive idolatry. But now by the concept of *rasa* as the essence of consciousness that notion of divine body is rendered more intelligible and the attempt can be made to place it on a philosophical basis. We have seen all along that for a Vedāntist it is consciousness which is the fundamental substance of the universe. Now *rasa* is said to be the *essence of consciousness*. From the spirit in which the concept of *rasa* is interpreted and described by Śrī Jīva and his followers, I venture to suggest that *rasa* is the same as what Professor Alexander vaguely calls 'deity'.

Within the all-embracing stuff of space-time the universe exhibits an emergence in Time of successive levels of finite existences each with its characteristic empirical quality. The highest of these empirical qualities known to us is mind or consciousness. Deity is the next higher empirical quality to the highest we know.¹

If it is one and the same substance that is pointed at by the terms *rasa* and 'deity', then the following remarks of the same author on the nature of 'deity' may throw some distant light on the idea of Śrī Jīva of the God-head being both finite and infinite at the same time.

God includes the whole universe but his deity though infinite belongs to or is lodged in only a portion of the universe.² Deity is an empirical quality but though it is located in a portion only of the universe, which universe of Space-Time with all its finites of lower order is God's body, yet that portion is itself infinite in extent and duration. Not only is God infinite in extent and duration but his deity is also infinite in both respects. God's body being the whole of Space-Time is omnipresent and eternal but his deity though not everywhere is yet infinite in its extension and though his time is a portion only of infinite time, his deity is in virtue of what corresponds in deity to memory and expectation in ourselves, infinite in both directions. Thus empirical as deity is, the infinity of his distinctive character separates him

¹ Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity* (London : The Macmillan Co., 1920), p. 345.

² Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity* (London : The Macmillan Co., 1920), p. 359.

from all finites. It is his deity which makes him continuous with the series of empirical characters of finites but neither is his body nor his mind finite.¹

We quote Alexander deliberately, being well aware of the fact that the approaches of Professor Alexander and of Śrī Jīva are poles asunder. One starts with consciousness and deduces mind and matter from it while the other begins with space-time and climbs up to consciousness. Alexander's deity is emerging, Śrī Jīva's is already there perfectly actual (although he would not deny that it is also emerging or growing in his sense of the terms). Alexander does not know, he only surmises the nature of the deity, Śrī Jīva thinks he *knows* it because he himself has sprung from that same sweet abode of *rasa*. Alexander's 'emerging' is Śrī Jīva's returning homeward. But particularly because of these great differences between the idealistic and realistic approaches of the two thinkers a certain agreement, however vague, in their findings regarding the essence of the deity seems to be more remarkable and weighty than it would be otherwise. At any rate, the concept of the God-head having a body which is made of *rasa* or essence of consciousness does not, even under realistic examination, seem so bizarre or unphilosophical as it appears to us at the outset.

THE *Sweet* ACTIVITIES OF THE LORD DIALECTIC OF LOVE

We now propose to discuss what the precise character of the eternal sport of the Prince of *rasa* is. The unity and simplicity of the Lord have been established. But the enjoyment of Love in its truest sense seems to require a companion. In order to become Himself in the fullest sense the Lord has to create His associates.

"Unity even at the very root chooses to show itself in variety. That is the essence of the *Sātvata* (Vaiṣṇava) doctrine."²

The Lord and His Primary Power has been spoken of as non-different. Now it is said that He separates Himself from His Primary Power. In other words, He divides Himself into two—the Being-for-self and the Being-for-expression. The former is He Himself and is called *Kṛiṣṇa*, one who draws, and the latter is His Primary Power called *Rādhā*, one who adores.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

² Shāstrī, *Bhakti Cult in Ancient India*, op. cit., p. 396.

“*Rādhā* means adoration or Love-devotion. *Rādhā* is the embodied manifestation of *Kṛiṣṇa*’s Love-principle—the energy of His soul, the principle in *Kṛiṣṇa* which sets His Love into motion.”¹

They are identical in reality though a concrete realization of Love demands a seeming difference between them. The Being-for-self (*Kṛiṣṇa*) is the charming embodiment and agent of the most supreme delight and the Being-for-expression (*Rādhā*) is the inner essence and creator of rhythm of that Love-life.²

In order that the Lord may enjoy Himself, *Rādhā* assumes different stages of the love-relation and appears before Him variously. When the Primary Power (*Rādhā*) serves as a servant the Lord is Master. When this Power loves as friend the Lord is the Friend. When it (*avarūpa śakti*) caresses as mother, the Lord is the child and lastly, when *Rādhā* endears as wife the Lord is the Beloved. The sweetness is said to increase from servanthship through friendship and motherhood and culminates in wifehood. The Being-for-expression (*Rādhā*) thus approaches closer and closer to the Being-for-self (*Kṛiṣṇa*) and ultimately they become unified again.³ By the power of *yogamāyā*⁴—the Divine creativity—all these intermediate stages are conserved throughout eternity. All these constitute the eternal home of the Lord. This is the eternal ideal type of all homes in the world. In this eternal home there exist an eternal mother, an eternal friend, an eternal servant, and an eternal wife, all centred around the Lord who is the most ideal son, friend, master, and husband all at once. All the homes in the universe are imperfect imitations of that Perfect one. They all participate in it. Here is a specimen of the much enriched Platonism of the Orient. Plato’s ideas had no flesh or blood, these are all eternally living beings !

The neo-Vaiṣṇava thinkers march on with this dialectical march of love. They say that the loving sport of the Lord never stops. It moves on uninterruptedly in a dialectical fashion. When the Being-for-expression (*Rādhā*) becomes unified again with the Being-for-self (*Kṛiṣṇa*), the God-head becomes, as it were, more enriched and more sweet. As a synthesis He com-

¹ Bābā Bhārati, *Śrī Kṛiṣṇa*, op. cit., p, 303.

² Śrī Jīva, *Śrīkṛiṣṇa Sandarbha*, op. cit., p. 303.

³ Kṛiṣṇadās, *Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, op. cit., p. 3.

⁴ *Supra*, part II, ch. v., sec. 5.

prehends within Himself all the stages of the love processes that have preceded. He is now called *Gaurāṅga*—the Brilliant one, the Great Lord (*Mahā-Prabhu*).¹ The Brilliant one again separates His Being-for-expression (*Nityānanda*), the Eternal Bliss, from Himself. In this second round of the dialectic a new note is struck. The 'Eternal Bliss' (*Nityānanda*) not only appears as servant, parent, associates and family members before the Lord, but also 'distributes himself' to all human beings so that they may also share, in and through him, in the love of the Lord and thereby heighten the enjoyment of the Lord. 'Eternal Bliss' (*Nityānanda*) gradually approaches the Lord as the phases of love deepen and ultimately becomes unified with Him in the most ecstatic state of joy, thus completing the second round of the dialectical movement of Love.² The synthesis now reached is called *Hari Puruṣa*—the thrice Great and the Holiest Lord. He is the Best and the most supreme Personality (*Puruṣottama*). He is said to be Infinitely Infinite in joy and love (*anantānantamaya*). His Love now overflows not only to have joy in family groups or in social circles but to make the entire universe participate in His joyous sport. He longs and longs for all the created monade (*jīvas*) which, including atoms and molecules (*aṇu-paraṃāṇu*) are innumerable in number. He feels, as it were, that He is incomplete without them. It is this conception that Tagore has in his mind when he says, "In our country the Vaiṣṇavas have realized this truth and boldly asserted it by saying that God has to rely on human souls for the fulfillment of his love."³

Hari Puruṣa is called *Mahā-uddhāraṇa*—the 'Giver of Universal Beatitude'. His unceasing longing results in the need of Incarnation, which we shall discuss shortly. The germ of it we have just seen in the 'Eternal Bliss' (*Nityānanda*). This longing of the Lord to communicate Himself should be carefully distinguished from the first longing, which is for creation. The first overflow of Love is to create and the second outburst is to incarnate and thereby to be reunited with the created. For joy is the creation, for more joy is the Incarnation.

To come back to the love-dialectic. The dialectical movement of love finds its culmination in the *Hari Puruṣa*, who is the

¹ Kṛṣṇadās, *Śrī Chaitanya Charitamṛta*, op. cit., p. 3.

² Mahendrajī, *Mahānāma* (Calcutta : Gaurāṅga Press, 1918), p. 4.

³ Tagore, *Personality*, op. cit., p. 128.

Highest synthesis of all the previous 'moments' of overflowing joy. All the phases of Love that find expression in the process remain in their fullness in the consummatory stage, which is to say that *Hari Puruṣa* comprehends in Himself all the sweetness and charm of *Gaurāṅga-Nityānanda* and *Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa*,¹ i.e., the two stages of synthesis reached by Him in His eternal march of Love. By the neo-Vaiṣṇavites He is called the *Mādhuryatama*—the Sweetest.

In the dialectic expression of love-life difference heightens the truth and reality of unitive consciousness and brings out the infinite phases of love and its promises. The difference sometimes appears to die out in the unitive consciousness only to reappear in a new form and exhibit the rhythm of love-life in a newer strain and sweeter vein.²

The most refined shades of feeling and sentiment that come to play in the foregoing dialectic procession of Divine Love, have been very elaborately analyzed to their almost unbelievable subtlety by the theologian philosophers of this school of thought in hundreds of volumes. Not only is the space limited but my knowledge of the English language is also very sadly inadequate to translate them. The English vocabulary also does not seem to be rich enough to do justice to the innumerable technical terms and the infinitely delicate classification of various shadings of the emotional life, which the able Vaiṣṇava teachers had handled so carefully in the Sanskrit language.

Whatever one may think of this theology, one must confess that this highly refined analysis of our emotional life will undoubtedly continue to be a valuable treasure to mankind.

Critics as usual do not like this attribution of so many feelings and sentiments to the Most High. Bābā Bhārati attempts to answer some of these 'prudish little critics' as he calls them.

According to these little critics of the Supreme Deity, the Supreme Being cannot possess any other sentiments of love than those of a Father and a Saviour, God ought not to feel or show the love of a husband for his wife or of a lover of his beloved. If this be a fact, will they answer the question as to whence man has got these sentiments, if not from his Maker of whom he is but an imperfect image? Whence

¹ Kṛṣṇadās, *Srī Chaitanya Charitamṛta*, op. cit., ii. 25.

² Sircar, *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, op. cit., p. 112.

has he got them if not from the source of creation itself, of which he is such a tiny part and product? This denial to God of the possessions of a lover's sentiment implies an impertinence which God alone out of His infinite affection for His creatures can pardon. It only betrays the dense ignorance of these critics in regard to the origin and laws of creation and of the relation of creation with its Creator.¹

MANIFESTATION OF THE GOD-HEAD : *Avatāra*

We of today are perhaps apt to throw out all these theological ideologies as pure myths. But let us inquire of Śrī Jīva and his followers as to where all these statements about God's sports come from : whether they have any reality, or whether they are mere folk tales, fabricated out of pious fancy. To this their answer would be that these are all real existential facts. They are the truth par excellence. They are known through revelation or divine manifestation. Owing to the eternal will-to-communicate (*milanechhā*) the God-head descends on earth to reunite His joyful self with His created beings. These manifestations are of various kinds. They may be broadly classed under two heads : (1) individual or private manifestation, and (2) manifestation for all, i.e., Incarnation (*avatāra*).

Private manifestation.—Baladeva writes :

Though God is one He has many aspects ; though He is indivisible He becomes the object of knowledge to the wise as having substance and attributes ; and as having a form and the spirit within it and though He is unmanifest He becomes manifest to His seekers through pure devotion.²

Man, it is said, lives in and with God always. His very innermost being is the divine within (*antaryāmī*). He dwells within every soul as the inner controller and illuminator. As the allegory of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*³ has it : Two birds of beautiful plumage resort to the same tree. They are eternal friends. One of them eats the fruit and enjoys while the other is the onlooker and giver of illumination.

Man lives with God and hears Him speak every moment of his life. It is due to the bondage of ignorance (*avidyā*) that he

¹ Śrī Jīva, *Śrīkṛiṣṇa Sandarva*, op. cit., pp. 306-7.

² *Govindabhāṣya*, op. cit., p. 2.

³ IV. 6.

cannot see the Lord clearly. This bondage is of various kinds but it altogether 'falls off when the soul turns his face towards God when there is direct vision of the Supreme'.¹ The point to notice in this connection is that a direct vision of God is believed to be possible, and that it is said to be easy, natural and open to everybody. There is nothing miraculous about it. Those who had this vision give us the facts and truths regarding the reality of the Lord and His eternal play.

The Universal Manifestation (AVATĀRA).—The rationale of the Incarnation of God we have already suggested. Essentially it is more a need of God Himself than of man. It is, as it were, inherent in the very nature of the God-head to reveal Himself. He longs to come in touch with His loving beings and take them in His all-embracing arms. Tagore expresses this as follows : "The Vaiṣṇava religion has boldly declared that God has bound Himself to man and in that consists the greatest glory of human existence."² This is the most important reason of the Incarnation of the Lord.³ All the stages that the God-head (*Bhagavān Kṛiṣṇa*) reaches in the dialectical movement of His Love-life. He manifests again on this mundane plane. The eternal archetypal truths become the facts of history. The two histories of the life of the Absolute cross each other. *Kṛiṣṇa* and *Rādhā* (Being-for-self and Being-for-expression) came down in *Vṛindāvana* and *Gokul*. The 'Brilliant One' and the 'Eternal Bliss' (*Gaurāṅga* and *Nityānanda*) revealed their charming sport in *Nadiā* and *Śāntipur*. The Lord (*Hari Puruṣa*), the Highest and the Best Person (*Puruṣottama*) appeared as Prabhu Jagad Bandhu and manifested Himself in *Murśidāwād* and *Farīdpur*.⁴ These are all historical personalities. They lived and dwelt on earth and walked with man. Again and again does He come down from His eternal abode in order to manifest the charm and beauty of His person. He attracts all beings towards Himself so that they may realize the depth of His infinite mercy and Love and be united with Him in joy and bliss.

Certain interesting features regarding the characteristics of the divine manifestation are very carefully stressed.

1. There is no predicting when He will incarnate himself.

¹ Baladeva, *Govindabhāṣya*, op. cit.

² *Sādhana*, op. cit., p. 115.

³ Kṛiṣṇadās, *Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, op. cit., i. 3.

⁴ Sarasvatī Rādhā Raman, 'Bandhu Tattva Chandrikā' *Mahānāma* op. cit., vs. 6-7.

It depends solely on His own will.¹ Or to be more accurate, even He himself does not know beforehand as to when or where He is going to manifest Himself.² We mentioned before that the highest God-head has given up his omniscience and related traits. In all these affairs it is the *yogamāyā*, the Divine creativity, the principle foreknowledge in this respect. The nature of his future activities is wholly undetermined except in a very general way.

It may be remarked in this connection that even if one does like to take into account the theological side of this conception one may still see how the emergence of values of outstanding importance is conceived of as wholly novel and not predetermined. To a Vaiṣṇava all social and moral values are integrated around religious values. If the latter are indetermined, so are the former to a certain extent. It is true, however, that this concept was not considered beyond its theological context. It is only the possibility of enlargement on this notion that is suggested here. It is said that the fact of indeterminateness regarding the future makes the works of the Lord much more enjoyable and genuine than it would be otherwise.

2. When the Lord incarnates, the two realms of existence cross each other. The two histories, divine and cosmic intermingle. The two arcs eternal and temporal (cyclic) interpenetrate in such a fashion that the demarcation line between them seems to vanish. Only certain features, which are peculiar to the supernal order are believed to preserve their integrity intact in spite of the blending.

(a) The body of the Lord which is not made up of natural ingredients but of the essence of consciousness (*rasa*) remains just what it is even when He walks with man on earth. It continues to be 'concrete bliss' (*rasaghana*) and hence non-natural and incorruptible. That we perceive His body as if it were of gross material aggregates is due to our bondage and veil of ignorance. The birth and the death of the Person of the incarnate Lord are not as they appear. He ascends and descends and His body undergoes no change or transformation whatsoever. It is only the privileged ones who know the secret.

"Never divesting myself of my essential attributes of

¹ Jagad Bandu, *Harikathā* (Calcutta : Mohan Press, 1935), p. 112.

² Kṛṣṇadās, *Śrī Chaitanya Charitamṛta*, op. cit., i. 14.

suzerainty, that of being birthless, of being exhaustless, of being the Lord of all, I go into birth of my own free choice by planting myself in my own native nature.”¹

By the expression ‘my native nature’ in the above quotation is meant what we have called *yogamāyā* the Divine creativity.

(b) The incarnate Lord is both man and God. To believe that He is only God is as much a heresy as to take Him to be only man. By the humanity of the Lord is meant that He assumes and accepts, in order to share with mankind, human acts, volitions, ideals, sorrows, sufferings, love, joy and the like. Śrī Jīva says that the Lord has real humanity without the imperfection of the ordinary man (*aprasiddha manuṣyatvam*).

The essential significance of the point that He is both man and God lies in the fact that an incarnation of the Lord has two aspects : “One is a descent, the birth of God in humanity, the God-head manifesting itself in the human form and nature, the eternal incarnation ; the Other is an ascent, the birth of man into the God-head, man rising into the divine nature and consciousness (*madbāvam āgataḥ*) ; it is the being born anew in a second birth of the soul.”²

That this is no more deification of a legendary superman, is brought out by the fact that the incarnate personality of the God-head stands out as the supreme spiritual ideal of mankind, manifesting as He does the divine aspects in human nature. In and through Him the people of the world may realize the height and depth of their own possibilities and by moulding their thoughts, feelings and actions on the line of the great exemplar, transfigure themselves in the likeness of the Divine. This is the real point in the conception that Lord Gaurāṅga is both a devotee and God (*bhakta* and *Bhagavān*) in one, Prabhu Jagad Bandhu is both a teacher and the Lord (*Guru* and *Prabhu*) as held by the Vaiṣṇava and the neo-Vaiṣṇava disciples of His.

Besides these free and suprising manifestations of the Supreme God-head from time to time, there are other minor incarnations whose advents are more or less regular. They come from age to age (*yuge yuge*). The primary purpose of these epochal visitations is ‘to protect the virtuous and destroy the wicked and

¹ *Śrī Bhagavad Gītā*, iv. 6. trans. Govindāchārya, Rāmānuja, *Gītā-bhāṣya* (Madras : The Vijayanti Press, 1898), p. 138.

² Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gītā*, op. cit., p. 214.

to reinstate righteousness firmly'.¹ The appropriate time and place of such occurrences are indicated by such statements as this : "Whensoever and wheresoever virtue wanes and vice waxes."² The significance of the expression 'to protect the virtuous' is explained by Rāmānuja in the following way : "Lest they (the holy men) in their agony at not seeing Me, pine away, I grant them the privilege to be able to see Me and My doings and hold converse with Me."³

These regular manifestations (*yagāvatāras*) are said to be partial and often very clearly distinguished from the Full manifestations of the Supreme. The greatness of these partial ones is interpreted in the light of the need of the time and occasion for which they descend. They are numerous and variously classified. It is said that it does not make much difference in what name or form He is manifested, the essential thing is to take refuge in Him when He comes. It is held and taught very strongly that "in whatever way man accepts, loves and takes joy in God, in that very way God accepts, loves and takes joy in man."⁴

The *Avatāra* (incarnation) comes to reveal the divine nature in man above his lower nature and to show what are the divine works, free, unegotistic, disinterested, impersonal, universal, full of the divine light, the divine power and the divine love. He comes as the divine personality which shall feel the consciousness of the human being and replace the limited egotistic personality, so that it shall be liberated out of ego into infinity and universality, out of birth into immortality."⁵

A question now arises in our mind : Why it is that the Lord had to come down to reunite Himself with His created beings. The need of reunion presupposes a previous state of separation. Why do the creatures who are expressions of His own joyful spirit ever become divorced from the source ? This inquiry leads us to the consideration of the nature of the individual monads (*jīvas*) and of their bondage (*bandhan*).

¹ *Bhagavad Gītā*, iv. 8.

² Rāmānuja, *Gītābhāṣya*, trans. Govindācharya (Madras : The Vijayanti Press, 1898), p. 141.

³ Cf. Kṛiṣṇadās, *Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, op. cit., i. 3.

⁴ *Bhagavad Gītā*, iv. ii.

⁵ Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gītā*, op. cit., p. 255.

CHAPTER VI

INDIVIDUALS—MONADS (*JIVAS*)

Let us retrace our steps. Starting as we did from the Absolute consciousness, and mounting up and up as it were towards joy and bliss through the dialectical procession of Love and delight, we ultimately reached the One—the Highest Person. We penetrated deep into the ocean of bliss and there we recognized the unity and simplicity of the Primary Power of the Absolute in *Hari*—the Supreme God-head. Now we come back to study what has been called the Intermediary Power of the Absolute Being. We have seen 'the Fourth'; we are going to look at the third dimension of reality.

The word *tatastha*, which we translate as 'Intermediary' means "that which lies on the bank of a river, and if we are to describe such a thing we should say that it is neither included in the river, that is to say, water, nor does it come under the category of the village or town or province situated adjoining to the river near the bank."¹ The river we have already described and now we are receding backward to the shore. The adjoining provinces, which are called 'Nature' (*prakṛti*), will be taken up in the next chapter. The Intermediary Power stands between God and the world of nature. Due to the very fact that it is 'Intermediary' it has two faces, one facing God and the other facing 'Nature'. Like an ellipse it has two life centres, one of which is original and the other is derivative or reflectional. Every individual is thus a double-faced being. In this section we consider the higher face, and the lower face we shall discover automatically when we shall analyze the process of the evolution of 'Nature'.

The Intermediary or Radiating Power of the Absolute consciousness is called *jīva*, which we translate as 'monad', since that seems to be more appropriate than any other word. Intermediary Power therefore is the individual monads. Due to the function of the Primary Power, the Absolute consciousness gradually became one and the only one Personality, but now due to the

¹ Mallik, op. cit., p. 158.

Intermediary Power the Absolute radiates to manifest itself, not as one, but as many. This is the most important point of difference. God is one, we are many. The sun is one, the rays are many. A man is one, his ideas are numerous. A musician is one, his compositions comprise many units. In the musician and in his compositions it is the same consciousness which is active. In the person it is a unity due to the innermost power of consciousness; in the compositions, it is diversity due to the intermediary power of consciousness. But though the compositions are numerous, each of them is one and each and every one of them reflects the same unity which the composer himself possesses or is. Herein lies the peculiarity of the Intermediary Power. It accounts for manifoldness but, curiously enough every member of the manifold is a unity and reflects the simplicity of the Primary Power. This is the key to unlock the secret of what Śrī Jīva calls the Intermediary Power (*tatasthā śakti*).

[The analogy with the musician is not wholly our own invention. God is called the 'First Poet' (*ādi-kavi*) as has been mentioned before. Not an architect, nor an engineer, nor a mathematician, but an artist is responsible for the creation. The Supreme God-head (*Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa*) is portrayed with a flute in his hand.]

The monads are many and each of them is a God in miniature. They are said to be innumerable (*asankhaya*), countless (*sankhyātita*).¹ As regards their size, they are said to extend even to the smallest possible in the world.² They are called atomic (*anu*).³ How small they could be is illustrated in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* in the following way : If the one-hundredth part of the edge of a hair is further divided in imagination into one hundred sub-portions, the minuteness of that subportion may be comparable to that of one of the individual monads which are infinite in number.⁴ The monads are tiny bits of consciousness. Every individuated part of the world is a minute monad. Monad is an integral centre of life. Its integrity consists in the unity of will-to-be, will-to-know and will-to-enjoy. "The phases of life,

¹ Kṛṣṇadās, *Śrī Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, op. cit., ii, 19. See Appendix note 56.

² *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, xi. 16. 11. See Appendix, note 57.

³ *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, iii. i. 9.

⁴ V. 9.

knowledge and joy permeate through all the stages of the interminable series of self-organization of the world-life.”¹

The great world-life strives to express itself in a grand scheme of self-organized life. It ‘surrounds itself with centres of life and each centre again repeats the process and the process is carried on *ad infinitum*’.² Each monad is a small individual unit that embodies the essential world power for realization through itself. But throughout the world there are organisms within organisms; from the great world-life to the apparently smallest type of life this process goes down in an unending series.³ This world-life is the intermediary Power of the *Paramātmā*, the World-soul.

Each monad is a miniature God. God is one and Full, monads are many and partial. God is all-existence, all-knowledge, and all-joy, while a monad is atomic existence, atomic consciousness, and atomic joy. But both God and a monad are integral beings. God’s Being is absolute and completely free, that of a monad is derivative and in that sense dependent. But so far as a monad is a unity it is an individual and possesses a striking similarity to the Individuality of the God-head. Like Him a monad is a self-conscious personality. It is self-illuminating (*svayam-prakāśa*). It reveals itself to itself and also other objects by its presence, since that is the very nature of consciousness. Unity of will-to-be, will-to-know and will-to-enjoy is, as we discovered, nothing but Love according to Śrī Jīva. It is only in Love that unity is revealed. Where there is ‘Love’ there must be freedom. “Beauty is the harmony realized in things which are bounded by law. Love is the harmony realized in wills which are free.”⁴ Since the essential nature of every monad is Love, it must possess freedom of will. It is free in and with God.

Divine Love is the fundamental reality of the universe. You are Love, I am Love, each unit is a drop of Divine Love. This drop we call *Śiśu* (literally child)—meaning that each individual *jīva* (monad) is forever an active, joyous necessary partaker or self-expression of the Divine consciousness or Love.⁵

¹ Shāstri, *Bhakti Cult in Ancient India*, op. cit., pp. 167-71.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Tagore, *Personality*, op. cit., p. 127.

⁵ Brahmachārī, op. cit., p. 736.

Baladeva contends vigorously that a monad is an active free agent. Activity he says is an essential attribute of the monad. He writes :

It is a well-known fact that the essence of soul is consciousness, the feeling of pleasure and pain. The soul is self-luminous and hence intelligence as well as agency must be understood to be the essential qualities of the soul.

He goes on to say :

The agency of the soul (monad) is not perpetual but depends upon its volition. It may or may not be active as it pleases. It is not subject to the law of inertia of matter. A material particle once in motion is always in motion without any power of stoppage unless some external force comes in.¹

As intelligence is essential to the very nature of monad so is existence. This point is important so far as it denies that a monad could be a by-product or aggregate or an emergent from crude materials. Its existence is inherent in the very nature of the universe because its essence is consciousness which is the ultimate substance. From this follows that it cannot disintegrate or disappear. It cannot die. Under whatever circumstances it may be placed it retains its identity (*ekarūpa svarūpavāk*) as does the deity. Be it noted that the immortality of the monad is not a dogma. It follows logically from the metaphysical principles accepted. Since the essence of a monad is the same as the ultimate stuff of the universe, namely consciousness, there can be no means by which it could be destroyed. As an atomist finds it difficult to conceive of the destruction of an atom, so for a similar reason a Vedāntist finds it impossible to think about the dissolution of a monad which is an atomic consciousness. A monad is not created. It is no product and hence it is eternal and so is God.

Baladeva brings arguments against this position of his own. God is all-existence, it has been said, and now how is it (so runs the argument) that innumerable monads are said to be eternal.² If God is the only first cause then monads must be effects and have origins. If they are effects they cannot be eternal and immortal.

The above argument is then answered. 'The word 'effect'

¹ *Govindabhāṣya*, ii. 3. 38, *op. cit.*

² *Ibid.*, ii. 3. 16.

is only another name of the same Absolute consciousness existing in different states of manifestation.”¹ The absolute consciousness has *three* powers : the Primary Power is God, the Intermediary is the monads, and the secondary is ‘nature’. When the Intermediary and the Secondary Powers ‘are latent in Him they are said to be non-existent, when they come out of Him the world is said to originate’.² The monads are another manifestation of the absolute consciousness. Hence the eternity and simplicity of monads can in no sense be in contradiction with the statement that God is all in all.

All monads are identical insofar as they are of identical nature and stuff. But they are also distinct from each other by virtue of the fact that everyone of them comprises a unity and that unity is indivisible.³ An entity is said to be individual (*vyakti*) so far as it is a monad.

Though it is atomic in size it is said to be pervasive also (*vyāpanaśīla*). This pervading nature may be understood in two ways. In a narrow sense it means that it pervades every part of an organism in which it dwells by a sort of sympathy as ‘the smell of a flower extends to a great distance from the flower’⁴ or as ‘the flame pervades the whole room by its rays’.⁵ Baladeva writes, “The soul though atomic pervades the whole body by its attribute of intelligence, namely by its power of sentiency, just as light.”⁶ In a wider sense the pervasiveness means that every monad being a part of the absolute consciousness has the potentiality of all-pervadingness.

A particular unit today may be nothing but a mere fly in its outward form, but the principle of life it has in it may rise by degrees to the life of the world-man even at the top of the world-organization. What is therefore now an insignificant part contained in a scheme of comprehensive life may become in time the whole that contains the lower orders of life. Each life indeed has the potentiality of the whole life. Potentially therefore each eternal unit of life, the individual soul (monad) pervades the eternal whole. At the same time it is an eternal *part* of the eternal whole, each from the

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ Śrī Jīva, *Paramātmā Sandarbha*, op. cit., p. 114. See Appendix, note 58.

⁴ Baladeva, *Govindabhāṣya*, op. cit., 3. 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3. 24.

⁶ *Ibid.*

highest to the lowest. The atomic monad (*jīva*) is absolute monad (*jīva-brahma*) and the Absolute monad is the atomic monad viewed from different standpoints.¹

Regarding the nature of the monads, Śrī Jīva quotes from an earlier authority :

A monad is self-luminating always identical, intelligent, pervading conscious-bliss in essence, ego (true I am) distinct in different individuals, atomic, eternally pure and faintly conscious of its own inner essence. It is an agent, knower and enjoyer. In all these respects it is an epitome of the World-soul (*Paramātmaikaseṣatva*).²

We have touched upon the significance of all the adjuncts mentioned above regarding the nature of the monad save two, namely 'eternally pure' (*nitya nirmala*) and "Faintly conscious of its own essence" (*svarūpvāk*). They will be understood in the sequel when we discuss the nature of the world-order.

We have pointed out many similarities between God and man (monad). There are obviously great differences too. God is great (*mahān*) and a monad is atomic (*aṇu*). But this is not the most important point, since God can become an atom and a monad has the potentiality of being great. The most striking point of difference lies elsewhere. We said that every monad is a double-faced being. These two faces become distinct when a monad develops into manhood. Man has two life centres and God has only one. Man experiences a strong tension between the higher and the lower and is sometimes torn between them, whereas God experiences nothing of the sort. There is not only a feeling of tension but man also often commits an erroneous identification between his two life centres. He then forgets the genuine one and clings to the shadowy one. Herein lies the great difference between God and man (*Īśvar* and *jīva*). What constitutes the lower life centre of a monad we shall discover as we discuss the character of the evolution of *Prakṛti* (Nature). To this we now turn our attention.

¹ Shāstrī, *Bhakti Cult in Ancient India*, op. cit., p. 176.

² Śrī Jīva, *Paramātma Sandarbha*, op. cit., p. 89.

PRAKRITI

CHAPTER VII

Prakṛti : The World Order

In the Vedāntic literature *prakṛti* is a technical term. Its literal meaning is 'nature'. It is a name used to indicate both the primordial existence and the manifestation of the world order as well. I shall occasionally capitalize the word 'nature' to indicate that it is used for the Sanskrit term *prakṛti*.

The term *prakṛti*, its nature, the stages and the processes of its evolution—all seem to have been borrowed by the Vedānta from the classical *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, but no Vedāntist ever acknowledges the debt. On the contrary, holding as they do that they have discovered for themselves everything concerning Nature in the text of the Upaniṣads, the Vedāntists have turned round and called *Sāṅkhya* into question (perhaps very unjustly) for upholding a view which is not corroborated by the revealed scriptures. This curious controversy is as old as the Vedānta aphorisms.¹ As a matter of fact, there is no difference between the view of the Vedānta and that of the *Sāṅkhya* school of thought so far as the *prakṛti* and the processes of its evolution are concerned. The sole difference (although that is one of supreme importance) between them lies in the fact that the *Sāṅkhya* school does not acknowledge a Supreme Being and conceives of Nature as an independent principle by itself, whereas in the Vedānta, the Supreme Being is the Absolute and necessary being and Nature is totally dependent on Him. Although the Vedāntists are divided among themselves as to the precise nature of this dependency, they are unanimous when they declare that Nature is utterly dependent on the Absolute Being. For Śaṅkara, as we have seen nature is the appearance of the Absolute Being and hence dependent on It. For Rāmānuja, Nature is made of the Supreme Being and therefore contingent on Him. For Śrī Jīva, nature is the outermost or Secondary Power of the Absolute Being. In its origination and organization, Nature is completely

¹ Cf. *Vedāntasūtra*, i. i. 4 and ii. i. i and the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and Baladeva on them.

dependent on the Supreme Person, but for its development and process of evolution Nature is comparatively free and spontaneous, somewhat analogous to our habits which are both dependent upon and independent of our conscious self. The Secondary Power is ontologically dependent on the Absolute Being, but when that Power has once come into being it develops its motion and organization which is more or less self-sufficient and free. It is guided by its own law, the law of *karma*, which is, as we shall see, the result of its own tendencies and repeated occurrence of a particular pattern of behaviour.

THE THEORIES OF CAUSALITY

In order to grasp clearly the relation between Nature and God and the manner of the evolution of nature in this philosophy, it is necessary that we discuss in brief the concept of causality as held by the different schools of Indian metaphysics. There are a number of different views regarding the character of the first cause. The following are the most important of them.

1. *Asat-kāraṇavāda*. According to this theory, being comes out of non-being. The upholders of this view say that in order to explain existence it is unnecessary to refer to another previous existence, for one does not get anywhere by such procedure. It is idle, they say, to contend that being always comes out of being. As a matter of fact, being proceeds from non-being. To illustrate the issue they point out that a sprout does not come out of a seed, for, as long as there exists the seed, there exists the seed only and no sprout. It is only when the seed ceases to exist, that the sprout comes into being. We cannot therefore say that one thing is the cause of something else. "For, a thing is what it is and it cannot become something else."¹ This principle is applied to Nature as a whole and it is maintained that looking for a first cause of Nature in the metaphysical sense is meaningless. It comes out of void and non-existence. We need not assume the existence of an original non-phenomenal cause to explain the appearance of the phenomenon. This theory is attributed to the Buddhists. It simply leaves out one of the correlatives and seeks to explain the effect on its own merit. Our modern naturalist may as well shake hands with the early Buddhists. This view

¹ Rādhārkrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, op. cit., I, 371.

which the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* states in one place and then refutes in another¹ is as old as the Upaniṣads themselves.

2. *Vivartavāda*. Another theory, sharply opposed to the former is known as *vivartavāda*, which maintains that it is only the Cause that has real existence, and what we call effect is the mere shadow of the Cause. The first Cause is identical with pure being and the being cannot change, for if it changes it would cease to be being. No cause can be transformed into effect unless it ceases to be cause. The cause is cause and has true being by virtue of the fact that it is unchangeable, and hence it follows that all effects are illusory. For instance, it is pointed out that when a nacre is seen at a distance it appears as a piece of silver. Now what is the cause of this silver? Obviously the nacre. But the nacre has not transformed itself into silver. It has remained just what it is and what is seen as an effect is an illusory one. Applying this concept to the creation as a whole it is said that nature has not come out of non-being. Rather it has proceeded from something genuinely real. But curiously enough the ultimate substance has never undergone any change whatever. All changes are the falsification of the first cause, which is eternally permanent. This theory, which we discussed before, is attributed to the Śaṅkarites. Its germ is found in all the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara writes : "This universe is verily *Brahman*—such is the august pronouncement of the *Atharva Veda*. Therefore this universe is nothing but *Brahman*—for that which is superimposed on something has no separate existence from its substratum."² According to this view, there is, between cause and effect, no such relation in the sense of change or transformation of reality.

According to the first view there can be becoming without being; according to the second there can be being without becoming. The Buddhists deny the first cause, the Śaṅkarites deny the reality of effect. In this sense they are sharply opposed. But strangely enough, Śaṅkara has been suspected by his opponents as a 'disguised Buddhist'. Perhaps it was felt that to say that the world is illusion is just as bad as to say that it is self-sufficient. Although Śaṅkara sides with permanency and the Buddhist with

¹ III. 19. 1 and vi. 2. 1-2.

² *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi* 81. 231, trans. Swāmī Mādhavānanda (Māyāvati Advaita Āśram, 1932), p. 103.

change there is one thing common between them, that both conceive of 'relation' as phenomenal and deny its ultimacy.¹

3. *Sat-kāryavāda*. According to this theory both cause and effect are real. But they are real in somewhat different senses. The cause is ultimately real and the effect is real in the sense that it is the unfoldment of the cause. All effects that ever were or will be exist in the cause. Effectuation is nothing but the externalization or manifestation of what was already existent. A piece of cloth was existent in the cotton. A gigantic tree was potentially existent in its seed. The entire nature was existent in the primal cause. This view is attributed to the Sāṅkhya school.

4. *Ārambhavāda*. According to this theory there cannot be effect without cause, no becoming without being, but it is not necessary that all effects should be existent in the cause as potential. It creates itself as it proceeds. Every effect is new. It is childish to say that a piece of cloth is not anything new but was all along hidden in the cotton. If that is so, why does not one go to the cotton field and pick up his cloth? Wherein lies the efficacy of the spindle, loom and the weaver? Every effect is therefore new. This theory is attributed to the Naiyāyikas who are sometimes called creationists. According to them 'the operative causes combine together to give rise to something that did not exist before'.² The thinkers of the Sāṅkhya school answer the Naiyāyikas by saying that if a piece of cloth was not in the thread and a jar, for instance, in the clay, why then collect thread when a piece of cloth is needed, and clay when a jar is wanted. Why does not one heap up clay and create a piece of cloth out of it? In order that there should be some relation between the cause and the effect both the relation need to be existent. There cannot exist a relation between something existent and another non-existent. If the effect is wholly new and non-existent in the cause, there can be no relation between them. If this relation is denied no order or system in the universe is possible. This controversy between the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya never ended.

It is interesting, however, to note that every one of the above-mentioned theories has been established by the respective schools

¹ The Buddhists deny the permanency of *being* but they accept permanency of 'Law' (*dharma*).

² Sircar, *Vedāntic Thought and Culture*, op. cit., p. 86.

on the basis of thorough consideration of them all. Every school found some grave defects to point out in all the theories save its own. It is also necessary to mention that the Naiyāyikas (the creationists) are not metaphysicians. Although they have a system of metaphysics of their own, no attempt is made there to utilize this theory of causality in relation to the world as a whole. This fruitful theory always remained limited within the empirical realm. By empirical realm here I mean to say that the creationist, being an atomist, always maintained that when the atoms come together they produce things which are novel, but so far as the atoms themselves are concerned they are eternal and uncreated. The thinkers of this school did not press their logic to the farthest extremity to say that even the atoms themselves are the novel creation of one absolute First Cause. It remained for the Vaiṣṇava teachers to declare that truth. As Baladeva wrote, "The Lord of all is alone the direct Cause of all these effects beginning with *Pradhāna* (root matter) and ending with earth."¹

5. *Parīṇāmavāda* is another theory of Causation which is maintained by Śrī Jīva and his school. This therefore we must consider in particular.

THE THEORY OF TRANSFORMATION

Parīṇāmavāda

The Vaiṣṇava philosopher upholds the theory which is known as *Parīṇāmavāda*. Śrī Jīva accepts the Vaiṣṇava tradition. The term *parīṇāma* means transformation. This theory does not coincide with any of those already mentioned, but seeks to reconcile by accepting the truth that underlies them all. I should not say 'all' because the first theory of *Asat-kāraṇavāda*—being from non-being was thrown out as blasphemous. *Parīṇāmavāda* or the theory of transformation attempts to bring about a reconciliation of the different theories, especially the second and the third, *vivarta* and *sat-kārya*, those of Śāṅkara and of Śāṅkhya.

In order to understand the significance of the reconciled theory let us consider more closely the difference between the second and the third views. In the *vivarta* of Śāṅkara the First Cause is one absolute pure being and the effect is its mis-reading. According to the *sat-kārya* of Śāṅkhya the effect is as real as the cause since everything that is in the effect was in the cause. If

¹ *Govindabhāṣya*, op. cit., p. 331.

the cause is real the effect cannot but be real according to Sāṅkhya. Effect is the unfoldment of the cause. But what is this First Cause according to Sāṅkhya ? This is not one Absolute Being. It cannot be. In order to be consistent with their theory of causality Sāṅkhya can never jump to an Absolute Being who is the self-existent creator. Creation is very different from causation in its usual sense. Creation implies the production of the very stuff of the universe. No argument from the theory of causality as held by the Sāṅkhya school (*i.e.*, effect pre-existent in the cause) can help it in reaching a creative source of all things. An egg comes out of a hen and the origin of a hen is a previous egg. One may trace it back as far as one pleases ; one may arrive at the protoplasmic slime or nebula but never to one Being who is the originator. Sāṅkhya, therefore, very consistently says that God is not warranted by logic.¹ It arrives at a sort of nebulous state which is designated unevolved (*avyakta*), and this is the First Cause according to the Sāṅkhya school. This position of the Sāṅkhya reminds one of Kant's refutation of the cosmological argument. But let not the mention of cosmological argument mislead us. Here our problem is not to establish the existence of God but to find out a satisfactory theory of causality. If the *vivarta* theory is assumed, an Absolute Being is found, but the world-order becomes reduced to a mere shadow. If the *sat-kāryavāda* is assumed a genuine world is found but the First Cause becomes reduced to a nebula. *Parīṇāmavāda* or the transformation theory of causality seeks to solve the dilemma. This is a dilemma precisely because the existence of an Absolute Being and the reality of the universe have been already accepted on different grounds. What is now sought is a theory of causality which can do justice to the more fundamental category of being.

Creation, as we said, is not identical with causation. Causation is wider than creation. Creation is a particular kind of Causation. The task is to find out the precise nature of the causation which will do justice to the First Cause and the world-order in the way they are accepted, namely, the latter as the spontaneous expression of the former. The metaphor of spontaneous expression is now to be explained as far as possible by the scientific category of Causality.

¹ *The Sāṅkhya Aphorisms* : i. 92.

Let us quote from the Upaniṣad at least one passage where the *Parīṇāmavāda* is clearly stated.¹

As the spider emits and draws in its threads,
As herbs arise on the earth,
As the hairs of the head and body from a living Person,
So from the Imperishable arises everything here.²

In this quotation three illustrations are given : the spider and its thread, the earth and herb, the hair and the living person. The significances of these three analogies are brought out by the commentators in some such way as this : The analogy of the spider and the web brings out the concept that just as the existence and pattern of the web are utterly dependent on the spider so are the origin and organization of the universe dependent on God. But again, as the web stands by itself apart from and apparently independent of the spider so does the cosmic order stand apart from and apparently independent of God. The significance of the second analogy of the earth and the herb lies in the fact that as the seeds remain latent under ground in the winter and burst forth into herbs and plants in the summer, so the entire cosmos with all its intelligent and non-intelligent beings lies latent in the Lord with their different tendencies as seeds from the previous cycle, and as they come out they assume manifold characters. They all have their roots in the one absolute being and all draw sustenance from that one source. The third analogy shows that as from a conscious living person hairs and nails come out without any exertion or deliberate attention on the part of the person himself, so does the universe come out of the absolute Being without any effort on His part.

Each illustration brings out certain ideas which are apparently contrary in nature. The first one shows both dependency and independency (spider and web). The second one exemplifies the genuineness of both latency and growth. The third one illustrates the interplay of consciousness and unconscious habits (hair grows unconsciously on the person of a conscious being.)

The first one brings out the truth that there exists one and the only one necessary Being even as the spider. The second one shows that the creation is a cyclic process as the herbs grow

¹ *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, i. 1. 7.

² The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads, Trans. E. R. Hume (New York : Milford, 1921), p. 327.

in summer and disappear in winter. The third points out the character of effortlessness of the sportive creativity of the Lord.

This is the nature of creation or first causation of the universe. In the *Parīṇāmavāda* or the theory of transformation—two points are essential and remarkable : (1) The universe is the transformation of the Lord himself. (2) The Lord remains just what He is in His perfect integrity. He transcends the cosmic order even as the spider its web. Everything in the universe is God but strangely enough He is far beyond it. This theory comprises a unique fusion of theism and pantheism. This theism is not Aristotelian deism neither is it pantheism or Spinozistic acosmism. This therefore is the nature of creation in the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta.

The above answers the 'how' of the first causation and the relation between the First Cause and the cosmos so far the *fact* of it is concerned. A question may be asked about the 'why' of it. Why is this creation at all ? What is the meaning of all this ? Is it mere fiat or has it any ulterior end ? This question has been answered sufficiently before. To repeat again with the Vaiṣṇava philosophers : The creation is neither a fiat nor has it any ulterior end. The perfect Being can neither have any whim nor can there be any unrealized end in Him. So says Baladeva as he quotes from the Upaniṣad : "He is *one* without a second. He is full of joy, His essence is joy. He wants to be many. He desired may I be many, may I grow forth." This fact of *growing forth* lies in the very nature of the fullness of joy. The creation is an end in itself. In it the Lord enjoys Himself. It is His amusement, His sport, His *līlā*. An Indian bard expresses the idea in the following way :

This world song is never for a moment separated from its singer. It is not fashioned from any outward material. It is His joy itself taking never-ending form. It is the great heart sending the tremor of its thrill over the sky.¹

This theory of creation may be contrasted with the Hebraic accounts of the Genesis. There is a great deal of difference between the two statements : "God said let there be light and there was light," and God thought "I am one ; may I be many, may I grow forth."

It would seem that the uncompromising transcendence of

¹ Tagore, *Personality*, op. cit., p. 143.

God in the Hebrew-Christian tradition and the overwhelming immanence of God in the Hindu tradition, both are traceable to their respective conception of creation. It would seem also due to this same initial concept of causation, the incarnation of God on earth is a supernatural miracle to a Christian while it is one of the most intimate truths and normal happenings to a Hindu. The world is His body—He can materialize Himself at any time and in any place he wishes. A Hindu sees no miracle in it.

To return to the subject under discussion. "May I grow forth" is the first notion of the creation. In order to become many He transformed Himself but at the same time He preserved His integrity intact. He preserved it through what we have called His primary Power. He became many due to His intermediary and secondary Power. The cosmic order is an interplay between these two powers of the Lord. Intermediate Power, we have seen comprises the infinite number of monads. In the beginning these innumerable monads constitute one organism called *hiranyagarbha* or *jīvaśakti*, i.e., root life. The Secondary Power constitutes something which is called 'Nature'. To the analysis of 'Nature' we now turn our attention. We may mention once again that the following is a Vedāntic adaptation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of creation. I follow Bhāgavata-tradition as accepted by Baladeva and his school.

ANALYSIS OF *Nature*

Baladeva writes in his *Govindabhāṣya*¹ :

Primordial Nature (*Prakṛti*) is the equilibrium state of the three stuffs *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is otherwise known as unconscious creative power. Fertilized by being glanced at by the Lord she is the mother of the universe in all its varieties.

Let us proceed to explain what is meant by the above statements.

All things that we can conceive of as existing are intelligible. Intelligibility therefore is a character of every existent object. This is accounted for by the fact that in the very constitution of every object there is a stuff to that effect. By such an expression as 'a thing exists' we mean that it manifests itself to our intelligence and continues to do so. This manifestation is due to an intelligible stuff, one of the constituents of that thing. This

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

stuff is called *sattva*. Its function is to manifest itself (*prakāśa*) and it possesses a tendency to keep on manifesting. *Sattva* might be translated as intelligible stuff.

A thing not only exists and manifests itself but it also *works*. We can think of no object that does not act and react and accomplish something. Incessantly we experience changes and movements in the world about us. This fact is accounted for by saying that every object is constituted of an energy-stuff. The function of this energy-stuff or *rajas* is to energize power and thus to act.

Besides these two elements another is recognized in things, it is called *tamas* or mass. This is virtually what is known to us as inertia. We say a thing works or acts. That statement is meaningful when there is something to counteract. The action of the energy-stuff consists in overcoming the resistance offered by the inert mass, which is one of the constituents of every object. Thus it is believed that every object in the universe is made up of these *three* constituents : intelligible stuff, energy-stuff and inert stuff. The intelligible stuff has a tendency to manifest itself ; the energy-stuff makes this possible by overcoming the resistance of the inert stuff. *Sattva* brings harmony, *rajas* motion and the *tamas* inertia. They are called three *reals*.

Every object in the world is composed of these three reals. By world we mean both the objective and the subjective world. Not only in the physical world but in the psychical realm also we experience the effects of these three reals. In the mental world inertia corresponds to ignorance, sense-pleasures and appetite. This inertia possesses no positive virtue. It is capable of submission to control and guidance by *rajas* which produces emotional energy and momentum. All our ambitions, affections and impulses to dominate and succeed are due to the energy-stuff. This occupies the middle position between *tamas*, and *sattva* which is capable of full understanding. The function of *sattva* is intelligence and goodness and its real nature is expressed in the stability of character. *Sattva* brings calmness, *rajas* brings restlessness and *tamas* brings darkness, sluggishness and lethargy. These three reals, when considered psychically, bear close resemblance to Plato's *Epithumia* (Ἐπιθυμία), *Thumos* (θυμός), and *Logistikon* (Λογιστικόν). Mr. Urwick draws our attention to this fact.

Epithumia, like *Tamas* represents a blind desire with its

character of complete ignorance and no virtue at all except the capacity of quiet submission to control ; *Thumas* the passionate and ambitious element stands, like *Rajas* midway between ignorance and knowledge, and is capable of the virtue of fortitude and obedience to reason ; the *Logistikon*, or the rational element, is the Sattvic quality or faculty to which belongs not only the special virtue of prudence but also the power to harmonize the whole soul or State into the condition of *Dikaiousune* or righteousness.¹

One important difference, however, should not be overlooked. It is the psychological and ethical qualities of the three reals, that are recognized by Plato. Plato does not conceive of them as actual constituents, neither does he attribute any material quality to them. In other words, in Plato they have no cosmic significance. In the Vedānta, the empirical universe is taken as a whole and the bifurcation between so-called matter and mind, which modern philosophy has inherited from Descartes, has no place here. The Cosmic order is one machine. Its ultimate constituents are three : *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and every one of them had physical, psychical and ethical qualities. We shall now see how from these three primal reals the psycho-physical universe has evolved into existence.

THE EVOLUTION OF NATURE

Although creation is said to be beginningless, every cycle is conceived to have a beginning. In the beginning the three ultimate reals exist in a state of equilibrium. The intelligent stuff has been wholly overpowered by the inert stuff. The action and reaction between the energy and the mass are cancelling each other in such a way that there is no possibility of any change or motion or vibration. In a very peculiar way the three are one and nothing at the same time. They are not fused into one or held together by any integrating force that is external to them. They are one in a very unique way by the cancellation of each other's functions without leaving any residue. It is a state of equipoise in which the manifesting tendency of the intelligible stuff, the power of energizing of the energy-stuff and the inertia of the mass, counterbalance one another in such a way that the process is under arrest. It is in this state that the universe exists in the

¹ Urwick, *The Message of Plato* (London : Methuen & Co., 1920), p. 28.

Lord in the beginning. This is the primordial or germ form of the Secondary Power of the Absolute Being, or to say very accurately, of the *Paramātmā*, the world soul, who is the third Person of the Trinity. Analogous to the biological creation, the creation of the entire cosmos is conceived of as requiring *two* elements : a sperm and a germ, one male and the other female. The Intermediate Power and the Secondary Power of the Lord take the places of these two elements. In the beginning the Secondary Power which is called ovum (*garbha*) exists in the state of equilibrium and the Intermediate Power which is called seed-organism (*vīja*) exists in the Lord in the most subtle form with all the tendencies acquired from the previous cycle so that the next cycle would not be a mere repetition of the former one but would start right where the previous one ended. Both positive and negative values (*dharma* and *adharma*) hitherto attained by the monads are said to be dormant in that seed-organism, which is virtually the sum total of all monads organically related. This seed-organism with all the results of past cycles upon them, and the equilibrium state of the three reals are symbolically called the 'Ocean of Causes' (*kāraṇa samudra*) and the Lord is portrayed as sleeping on the surface of this ocean, at the time when it is said to be the night of creation. The *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* says, concerning the nature of the sleep of the Lord at that time :

He was in fact the one Seer then and the Absolute Lord did not see the universe (as it had no existence) all His Power being asleep (latent). He regarded Himself as if He were not, though His vision was never asleep.¹

Then the Lord awakes. He experiences in the first moment what is an Unknown Feeling. In the second moment there arises an infinite Vibration in his mind ; in the third it develops into an Abstract Idea ; in the fourth it develops into the Thought, "I shall become many."² These four stages are named *Vāsudeva*, *Saṅkarṣaṇa*, *Pradyumna*, and *Aniruddha*. These terms are untranslatable. They are known as the Primal Square (*Chaturvyūha*).

The law which brings forth a tree out of a seed is exactly the same as that which in a finer manifestation operates through the birth of a thought in our mind. The root-

¹ III. 5, 24.

² *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, vi. 2. 3.

ing, the shooting, the growing, the flowering and the fruition of a tree is but a gross reproduction of the process by which a thought awakes, develops, and takes shape and action within us. The stage of a thought birth can be easily perceived when the mind is calm. At the first there is an Unknown Feeling, then an Indefinite Vibration, which develops into Abstract Idea, Idea develops into Thought and Thought becomes action.¹

"I shall become many" is the first thought-current that passed through the Universal Mind. This "will-to-be-many" is destroyed the equilibrium condition of the three reals. With the destruction of the equipoise begins the creation.

Out of *Kriṣṇa* (Love) creation springs into existence like a thought. Thought exists in our mind like a seed in the shape of previous impressions of objects and ideas ; so the seed of creation lies in the bosom of *Kriṣṇa* in the shape of impressions of ideas of previous creations. This seed or germ is made up of three attributes, *Sattva* (illumination), *Rajas* (motion) and *Tamas* (obscuration). So long as these three attributes, forming the essence of the germ, are in equilibrium, that is to say, are of equal degree or force or intensity, creation remains in the germ state in the bosom of the First Cause. But the moment there is the least tendency of any of these attributes, of this germ essence, to fall out of equilibrium with the other two, that is to say when one becomes more powerful than the others, than they start out of the central self.²

Thus by the 'glance' of the Lord the 'ovum' becomes active and He then fertilizes it with the sperm, the seed-monad which is now called *chidābhās* the reflection of His own image or the stamp of His own consciousness. But this even is not enough. The creation cannot start without a driving force. The Lord then imparts to it another power of His called *kāla*, or time. "That glorious power of the Lord is called Time which gives rise to activity in the undifferentiated reals of the *prakṛti* which is at first in a state of equilibrium."³ Just what happens at this first moment of creation has been stated in various places in the

¹ Bābā Bhārati, *Śrī Kriṣṇa*, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

² Bābā Bhārati, *Śrī Kriṣṇa*, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

³ *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, iii. 36. 16.

Vaiṣṇava literature in the way I have indicated above, always poetically or mythically. These myths, nevertheless, seem to me to be immeasurably suggestive and rich in their implications. When logic fails, myths seem to help out Plato as well as these Indian thinkers. What is aimed at appears to be clear. That time constitutes the driving force is clearly stated. The intermingling of the two Powers of the Lord is expressed under the figure of biological germination using all the terms involved such as ovum, semen and so on without reserve. If I am asked to explain more scientifically what this intermingling means I confess I am helpless. But perhaps it would not be too much to say that even a twentieth-century biologist fails to explain with mathematical precision just what happens when two cells come together in the mother's womb. Creation after all seems to be a divine mystery. However, let us proceed and look at the different stages of growth of the foetus. Due to the fact that the evolution of Nature is cyclic it has two primary phases : one is called *visadṛśa pariṇāma* and the other is *sādṛśa pariṇāma*. The former consists in the transformation from homogeneity to heterogeneity and the latter from heterogeneity back to homogeneity. This is analogous to gas becoming water and water becoming ice and then in the reverse direction ice becoming water and water becoming gas. Of these two phases, the former again has two different aspects. They are called *anuloma* and *pratiloma*. The *anuloma* consists in the downward emanation from the beginning to the end, that is, the descent from subtle to gross. The *pratiloma* on the other hand consists in the upward growth from the end to the beginning, that is to say, ascent from gross to subtle. This is analogous to the ascending and descending of the musical scale from *A* to *G* and from *G* to *A*.¹ The first distinction (homogeneity and heterogeneity) is based on the nature of organization, the second (ascent and descent) on the nature of inner essence or quality. Although both the distinctions are qualitative still their difference lies in the fact that in the former the quality is of the organization of the external form, while in the latter the quality is of the inner essence itself. This variation makes the evolution of nature have three different aspects altogether. (1) Homogeneous to Heterogeneous and subtle to gross; (2) homogeneous to heterogeneous and gross to subtle; (3) heterogeneous to homogeneous. The true

¹ I borrow this analogy from D. Tagore, *Gītāpāṭha*, op. cit.

value and the rationale of these differences will be clear as we proceed. The aspect of evolution we are first to follow is the *anuloma-visaḍṛśa pariṇāma*, which is homogeneous to heterogeneous and subtle to gross. We shall notice that in every descending stage the factors involved are becoming more heterogeneous and gross.

Anuloma or the descending order.—The equilibrium state of the three reals is next to nothing. It is unmanifest. The glance of the Lord disturbs the equipoise and He also intermingles the seed and attaches time to it. The first issue that comes forth is called *mahat*. 'Mahat' means the great or the immeasurable. It is also called the first-born or the first-begotten. One may compare the Greco-Christian conception of *logos* with it. Śrīmad Bhāgavata calls this first-born 'Golden' (*hiraṇyamaya*). Śrī Jīva explains the term *golden* by stating that it is called so because it is luminous beyond measure, its expressiveness is immense (*prakāśa bahula*). The Immeasurable is the first moment of the excitation of the immense universe. It is as when one turns the switch of a huge machine and the machine starts going. The equilibrium state is unmanifest and hence unknowable. The Immeasurable becomes the first state towards knowability. Hence it is called the first Son. It is the first cosmic essence of experience. The early state of equilibrium is formless. In the Immeasurable the intelligible essence first begins to emerge. It is the first stage towards form and heterogeneity. This 'Immeasurable' may have some close likeness to what Plato calls the receptacle. "Wherefore, the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way sensible things is not to be termed earth, or air or fire or water or any of their compounds or any of the elements out of which they are composed, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all things and attains in an extraordinary way a portion of the intelligible and is most incomprehensible."¹

The likeness of Plato's incomprehensible and Vedāntic Immeasurable will be more vivid when we shall see the later stages of the evolution, how everything there is come out of it. We would rather call this process emanation instead of evolution, because it is a process which, while it brings forth the product into existence, leaves the source of the product unchanged. Thus this

¹ *Timaeus*, 51a, *op. cit.*, II, 543.

Immeasurable always remains there embracing the whole universe as a receptacle.

In the third stage there develops, due to the predominance of the *sattva* or intelligible stuffs, a very refined stuff, endowed with the function of co-ordination, called *ahamkāra* or egoism (literally I-maker). This develops on the one side while on the other side emanates, due to the predominance of inertia, some material particles very, very subtle and highly charged with energy. This stage of evolution is comparatively individuated but the elements are still indeterminate. The point to note is that in this stage the "Immeasurable" bifurcates itself into two series. They may be called subjective and objective series. I-maker or Unitive principle is the highest on the subjective side and the infra-atomic particles are the ultimate constituents in the objective order. The latter is said to be 'mediated' by the former. This mediation means that two processes, integration and differentiation of both the sides, develop simultaneously. Dr. Seal says that from now on the order of succession is "from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole."¹

The infra-atomic potentials that emanate by the kind of process mentioned above are called vibration-potentials (*śabda tanmātra*). Due to the tremendous action of *rajas* (energy-stuff) these potentials first disintegrate and from them emanates a new kind of more individuated potentials called impact potentials (*sparsa tanmātra*). Under the action of the original energy-stuff these impact potentials again disintegrate and from them emanate still more determinate particles, called heat-light-potential (*rūpa tanmātra*). This process goes on until there are five kinds of infra-atomic units. The last one is highly differentiated because it has the quality of all the previous ones. From these very subtle particles which are highly charged with energy evolve five kinds of atoms due to the accretion of mass. These five kinds of atoms are called the atoms of ether, air, light, water and earth. They are now determinate and highly individuated, so much so that there is no more possibility of further emanation.² These are the atomic constituents of the gross matter. Being more and

¹ *Positive Sciences of the Hindus* (London : Longman Co., 1915), p. 7.

² For a very critical exposition of the foregoing see Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Hindus*, op. cit., pp. 2-56 ; also S. N. Das Gupta, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion* (London : Kegan Paul, 1924).

more coherent and integrated they produce all the individual substances. This is the limit of the objective series. Let us look at the subjective series.

We have mentioned the emanation of a co-ordinating and unitive principle called I-maker. The foregoing objective series also, as we indicated, is the product of this I-maker due to the preponderance of inertia over it. Two other series develop from the I-maker due to the predominance of intelligible stuff and energy-stuff respectively. They belong to the subjective side. One that emanates due to the preponderance of the intelligible stuff is called intellect (*buddhi*) and the other which emanates due to the excess of energy-stuff is called sensory-motor-stuff. When this sensory-motor-stuff becomes highly determinate there evolve from them the organs of sense and the organs of work. Seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and touching are the five organs of sense. Handling, walking, speaking, generating and excreting are said to be the five organs of work. These organs are not gross organs as we see on the surface of our body but are the subtle faculties having the respective functions. (The outer senses are really produced by the gross atoms which belong to the objective series.) These ten are called external organs. An internal organ called *manas* or mind also evolves from the I-maker due to predominance.

Each and every one of the evolutes possesses both generic and specific properties. Everything in the universe is made up of these evolutes. What we call an individual substance is a peculiar collocation and complex of the twenty-four evolutes : Immeasurable I-maker, Intellect, mind, ten organs, five infra-atoms and five gross atoms. No substance is fixed. Everything is constantly evolving due to the transforming power of energy. The evolution is going on constantly. The cosmic energy is never static and its work of bringing transformation is not arrested for a moment. The ultimate totality of the three reals remains constant but so far as the different collocation and combination of them are concerned, multitudes and multitudes of new qualities and states emerge in the on-going process of Nature. This is the process which we have called one from homogeneity to heterogeneity and from subtle to gross. This is the descending order. We shall now see the ascending. This movement also consists in heterozination but it is not from subtle to gross but from gross to

subtle. The precise character and reason of this process we shall consider next.

Pratiloma or the ascending order.—We have seen that in the beginning two ingredients were mixed up by the Lord. One of them consists of the three reals in their equilibrium state and the other consists in the seed organism which is comprised of the infinite number of monads in their most subtle form. The evolution of the three reals we have just traced. Twenty-four evolutes out of them and the process ends in the gross atom of the earth.

Now the question arises as to what has happened with the seed consciousness that was put into it. We have not yet seen any sign of that seed consciousness. It is intermingled and lost as it were in the descending process and has not shown any evidence of itself. When the descending process has run its course, the dormant consciousness begins to exhibit its function by an upward movement. It begins to grow. It has an inherent tendency to go back to the source even to God from whom it sprang. This is the reason why there is an ascending movement. This upward surge manifests itself one after another in four distinct stages of consciousness. They are mineral, vegetable, animal and human forms of life. These four stages are symbolically called four faces of the Cosmic Person.

The description of the Cosmic Person and the nature of this upward striving have been very poetically expressed in the Śrīmad Bhāgavata, the most venerated scripture of the Vaiṣṇava.

First of all, the great Cosmic Person is described in some such way as this : His body is the essence of all things. The heaven and the sun form his eyes and all colours and light are his sense of seeing. His nostril is the vital breath and the sky and sound have their origin in his sense of hearing. All different kinds of tastes are his tongue. His arms are the eight quarters. His hairs are the trees and plants. His bones are the source of mountains. His stomach is the source of food and of the oceans. His veins and arteries are the rivers and tributaries. Cloud lightening, elements, everything that there is form different parts of his body. His mind is the source of sciences, of righteousness and of goodness.

But this Person is said to be still within the shell of the cosmic egg (*brahmāṇḍa*). That is to say, he has not yet been born. He has grown much as a foetus grows within the womb of the mother. Now he is to be born. But who is to perform the delivery ?

Sometimes the question is asked by a different figure. The Cosmic Person is said to be still asleep. He has to awake. Who is to rouse him? Every object in the universe tried to rouse Him—the earth, water, air, fire, sun, moon, stars, planets, rivers, mountains—everything tried to rouse the Cosmic Person but in vain. “The *Virāt* was not roused.”¹ Even the intellect (*buddhi*) and I-maker are reported to have failed. “At last when the conscious monad who is the ‘master of thought’ (*chaitya khetrajña*) entered the heart of the Cosmic Person He at once arose out of water.”² *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* then goes on to explain, “Just as neither the vital breath nor sense organs nor the internal organs with all their ideas can ever by their own force rouse a body that is asleep except in conjunction with consciousness, so was the case with the great Cosmic Person.”³ Śrī Jīva explains the word ‘rousing’ of the Cosmic Person in his commentary, by saying that the consciousness which was all along active internally becomes ‘externally active’⁴ too. That is to say, the Cosmic Person becomes conscious of his own body in man. He became aware of himself when the monads or the spiritual atoms reached manhood through their upward striving. It is said that a monad has to pass through eight million, four hundred thousand stages of gradual development before it can reach manhood. It is hard to say what is the basis of this calculation.

Every individual is a monad or spiritual atom. Its essence is pure consciousness. But it has gathered around it a suitable vehicle which is necessary for it in order to grow. The vehicle is its dwelling place as well as its instrument to deal with the objective Nature. This vehicle or organ is made up of the twenty-four evolutes mentioned before. The external part of this ‘organ’ is made of five gross atoms and the internal part of it is constituted of five centres of sense and five motor organs and mind, intellect, and I-sense. This external part and the internal parts of the organ are like the case and the inner mechanism of a clock. The central point that gives unity to this machine is the I-sense or I-maker. I-maker, we may remember, is the co-ordinating principle that evolved in the second stage due to the

¹ *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, iii. 26, 62-67.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 26. 70.

³ *Ibid.*, iii. 26. 71.

⁴ Śrī Jīva, *Karmasandarbhā*, op. cit., p. 360.

preponderance of the intelligible stuff among the three reals after their equilibrium was disturbed and 'Immeasurable' came into existence. The monad makes use of this I-maker in order to handle his psycho-physical organism. I-maker is the spring of the clock and its essence being intelligible stuff the intelligent monad can manipulate it at ease. But their resemblance is so close that there is always the chance of the monad getting itself caught in the machine instead of making use of it.

Thus we have come to the point where we find that every individual has *two* life centres. One is the monad itself, which is an atom of pure consciousness ; and the other is the I-maker which is the central point or switch of the organ that the monad has to use. The I-maker is the unity of apperception and the monad is the spiritual self that gives life and light to it. The great importance of these two centres we shall find in the Ethics. This I-sense is really the sense of individuality. We said earlier that in Vedānta an individual is said to have two souls, one is the empirical soul or self, and the other is the over soul or metaphysical self. Now we discover how they come into being. The I-sense which grew out of the descending process of the natural order constitutes the empirical self, and the monad which is truly the Intermediate Power of the Lord and has now come up by the ascending movement is the metaphysical self. But more of that in ethics.

We found that in man the Cosmic Person recognized himself. To speak in the language of Śrīmad Bhāgavata is to say that the Cosmic Person awoke from deep slumber, or the outer shell of the egg broke, and the foetus came out into the light when 'man' (*khetrajña*) appeared on the scene.

The relation between the great Cosmic Person and individual beings is said to be very intimate and it is beautifully expressed by the help of *three* categories : *Adhyātma*, *Adhibhūta* and *Adhidaiva*.

"The one powerful Lord intent upon becoming many rose from the state of contemplation as from bed and through his mysterious Power He brought out His golden energy in three-fold-creation—subjective, objective and cosmic (*Adhyātma*, *Adhibhūta* and *Adhidaiva*)."¹

The power and faculties of an individual knower is called

¹ Śrī Bhāgavata, ii. 10. 13.

'subjective' (*Adhyātma*), the objects towards which those powers and faculties are directed are called 'objective' (*Adhibhūta*) and the synthesis of these two is said to inhere in the body of the Cosmic Person and is called Cosmic (*Adhidaiva*, literally godly). The 'subjective' and 'objective' are placed side by side and their synthesis is sought in the cosmic life. "The manifested order is represented as the synthesis of the subjective and objective in the life of the totality."¹ The synthesis in the Cosmic Person is usually expressed by saying 'such and such is the presiding deity'. To illustrate : the power of seeing is the 'subjective', the light is the 'objective' and the sun is the presiding deity. The faculty of speaking is called 'subjective', the speech is called 'objective', while the fire is said to be the presiding deity. It is in this way that all the faculties that a person possesses, *e.g.*, faculties of all the organs of sense, organs of work and the internal faculties such as the faculty of retention, the faculty of clear discrimination, etc., and last of all the sense of individuality (I-sense)—all of them are called 'subjective'. Their corresponding objects are called 'objective' and a presiding deity is named for the synthesis of each and every one of them. All these presiding deities are the result of deification of some aspects of nature. Although at times it is somewhat difficult to discover why a certain aspect of nature is held to be the synthesis of a certain subjective function and its corresponding objects, still the fact remains unfailingly accepted by all Vedāntists that in the functioning of each and every faculty that a man possesses he comes in close touch with the Cosmic Person and lives in and through Him in every second. Such is the intimacy between the individuals and the Cosmic Person. The Cosmic Person, however, is not the Absolute Being (*Brahman*) but the immense organism constituted of all the monads (*Samasti Jīva*) called *Hiraṇyagarbha* or *Virāt*. He is the Begotten.

Back to the equilibrium : sadṛśa pariṇāma—

The three ultimate reals, intelligible, energy and inert stuff, we discovered in a state of equilibrium in the beginning. The process of evolution started when the state of equilibrium was disturbed. All the processes we have mentioned above (homogeneity to heterogeneity) had therefore been towards instability. Due to this fact all the evolutes that come into being have always

¹ Sircar, *Vedāntic Thought and Culture*, op. cit., p. 180.

a tendency to go back to the original equilibrium state of the unmanifest ground, there is a tendency from the heterogeneous state back to the homogeneous. These two processes are the two aspects of the one whole cycle. They go side by side. This reverse change towards equilibrium is called *sadr̥śa pariṇāma* literally transformation to sameness. This process takes exactly the opposite steps to reach back to the original source. The amount of stuff that reaches equilibrium is lost to the universe in the sense that it is no more available or usable. This disintegration, though a slow process, is going on constantly. It is interesting to note that this ancient Hindu concept has a very close resemblance to what is known as 'entropy' or the running-down of energy in modern science. Sir James Jeans says :

The science of Thermodynamics explains how everything in nature passes to its final state by a process which is designated the increase of entropy. Entropy must forever increase and it cannot stand still until it has increased so far that it can increase no further. When this stage is reached further progress will be impossible and the universe will be dead.¹

When this stage is reached it will be the night time of creation. The three reals which constitute the ultimate constituent of the universe will cancel each other's power in such a way that the process will be in arrest. The *Paramātmā* will sleep again on the surface of the 'ocean of causes'.

Sir Arthur Eddington writes :

It should also be noted that according to the second law of Thermodynamics the whole universe will reach Thermodynamical equilibrium at a not infinitely remote date in the future. Time's arrow will then be lost altogether and the whole conception of Progress towards a future fades away.²

Let not anyone suppose that I am here saying that the Hindus had even a distant glimpse of such a highly scientific concept as 'entropy'. That would be an utterly impossible feat on their part. All I mean to state is that the net result of the scientific theory of entropy and the purely speculative concept of a final equilibrium state is more or less the same for a common

¹ *The Mysterious Universe* (New York : The Macmillan Co, 1932), d. 179.

² *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 74.

man so far as his outlook towards the world as a whole is concerned. If that be so I may add that the Hindus were not so pessimistic as Eddington about the idea of Progress. The notion of progress and regress, they thought, can be attributed meaningfully only to the monads, and the monads, according to them, do not dissipate with the dissipation of the energy of Nature. They go back, it is believed, to their sources and in very subtle form merge in the body of the sleeping Lord with all their acquired merits and demerits in order to start with them over again when the day of the next cycle will dawn.

As a matter of fact, therefore, it is not the spiritual monads but their vehicles that move in cyclic order. It is the Secondary Power that moves in a circle but not the Intermediary Power. The monads move in a circle only when they falsely identify themselves with their vehicle. When they preserve their true identity and status they have always a tendency to grow. It is perhaps due to the intermingling of these two kinds of movement that the form of the process of the universe resembles a spiral.

As Bertrand Russel writes : "The movement of human society, viewed throughout the period known to history, is partly cyclic, partly progressive ; it resembles a tune played over and over again, but each time louder and with a fuller orchestration than before."¹ Let us consider somewhat more closely the nature of time and of the cyclic order as held by these ancient thinkers.

TIME AND THE CYCLE

The problem of time had always been one of great fascination and interest to the Hindu thinkers. Although no systematic treatment is available anywhere, still passing remarks of great importance can be discovered in the writings of almost all the foremost thinkers. There are numerous passages that instance their deep insight and penetration into the subject. As early as in the Atharva Veda we read two complete sections on the glorification of time. The following extract I quote from what is known as the hymn of time in that *Veda* :

Time generated yonder sky, time also these earths. What is, what is to be, what stands out is sent forth by time. Time created the earth, in time burns the sun ; in time are all existences, in time the eye looks abroad. In time is mind,

¹ *Selected Papers* (New York : The Modern Library, 1927), p. 242.

in time is breath, in time is name collected, by time when arrived all these creatures are glad. In time is fervor, in time is what is chief, in time is the Brahman collected, time is the Lord of all who was father of *Prajāpati*.¹

The above doctrine of time being the source of everything including the self-existent *Kaśyapa* we find refuted later in the Upaniṣads. We find the seer of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads*² brooding on the problem of the ultimate source of the universe. He considers seven different possibilities that may have the claim to be that source. These alternatives are, he says, time, Nature, Law, Chance, elements, finite selves, and the combination of them all. All of these alternatives he rejects as inadequate. The main reason of his rejection is stated as 'Because of the existence of consciousness'. The implications of this phrase as brought out by the commentator are *two* : (1) consciousness cannot come out of unconsciousness, and time, nature and so on are unconscious ; (2) no unconscious entity is competent to move itself so they (time, nature etc.) cannot initiate the creation without some entity who is conscious and free. The conclusion that the seer reaches at last is that the ultimate being must be a single being who is the governor of time, nature, etc. (*adhitisthati*).

Later in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* we read another chapter on the theory of time. This section is of great value because in it we find the first recognition of the fact that there is more than one kind of time.

From Time flew forth created things.
From Time, too, they advance to growth.
In time too, do they disappear.
Time is a form and formless too.

There are, assuredly, two forms of Brahma : time and Timeless. That which is prior to the Sun is the Timeless (*a-kālā*), without parts (*a-kalā*). But that which begins with the sun is Time, which has parts. Verily, the form of that which has parts is the year.³

The important point is to notice here that two kinds of time, one having parts and the other without parts are recognized and they are related to the two natures of the Supreme Being, tem-

¹ Bk. XIX, 53, 5-10, trans. W. D. Whitney, *Harvard Oriental Series* VIII, 988.

² I, i. 2.

³ VI, 14-15.

poral and timeless. In the next verse the seer goes on to say that "This embodied Time is the great ocean of creatures". This time pursues everything to maturation. But he wonders what matures Time itself. One who knows this, he thinks, has real wisdom.

When we come down from the days of the Upaniṣads to the age of the Purāṇas and Saṁhitās we find that the concept had undergone further refinement. In the *Ahīrbudhna Saṁhitā*¹ we find three instead of two different kinds of Time discussed with keen acumen. They are called the gross time, the subtle time and the highest time. The gross time is that which has *lava* or fraction of a second (*lavādimān*), that is to say, the time that can be subdivided. The subtle time is said to be that which determines the nature of different categories or evolutes that come into being in the course of evolution (*tattva-nirūpaka*), that is to say, that time itself is the transforming power in the process of the evolution or change entering into the very constituents of the evolutes. The highest time is the time that pervades the activities of the Primal Square (*vyūha*). Primal Square, we must recall, is the name given to the first four moments in the mind of the Absolute Being when He first wakes up in the dawn of creation and wills to be many. We observed four moments in the Primal Will. The time that pervades this first 'will-to-create' of the Lord is then the highest time. The *Saṁhitā* goes further to state clearly that of the four moments the three later ones are pervaded by this highest time whereas the first or the earliest one which is the Lord himself in the very first moment of creation is beyond even that highest time. This highest time, it is said, matures not only Nature but also the monads.² These are some of the early speculations. Later on when the free thoughts of the early days came to be systematized by the different schools of philosophers, they accepted or rejected or enlarged on the concept of time to suit their respective metaphysical positions.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school time is one of the nine ultimate substances.³ Time is eternal and all-pervasive. It is said to be the cause of the production, persistence and destruction of all produced things. It is the basis of such conventional

¹ CIII, 10-12.

² *Ibid.*, vii. 6.

³ J. C. Chatterjee, *Hindu Realism*, op. cit.

uses as moment, hour, month, year, etc. Praśastapāda says that "Though due to the uniformity of the distinguishing character of time, Time is in itself one only, it is figuratively spoken of as manifold, on account of the diversity among the conditions, afforded by the production, persistence and cessation of all produced things."¹ Time thus becomes the cause of the notion such as priority, posterity, simultaneity, succession, late and soon.

Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the Sāṅkhya philosophy holds that Time is not a substance but a quality. Sāṅkhya recognizes two kinds of time. One of them is said to be relative and the product of evolution, while the other is eternal and absolute. The former has evolved out of ether (*akāśa*) and the latter is the source of ether and the other evolutes. Time and space are really, says Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his *Sāṅkhya Pravachana Bhāṣya*, 'certain qualities' of Nature (*guṇa-viśeṣa*).² By 'Nature' is meant the state of equilibrium of the three reals.

According to the Śāṅkarites time, space, causality, name and form constitute what is called '*upādhi*' or conditions. Empirically and pragmatically they have some scope but metaphysically they have no efficiency except the fact that they veil the ultimate Reality that underlies them. From the highest standpoint Śaṅkara not only denies time but he does not recognize it at all, because he knows only too well that even denial presupposes prior acceptance. "Śaṅkara takes up the central principles of experience and declares that whatever is bound by space, time and cause cannot be real."³

It is interesting to note that the rejection and acceptance of time on the part of a philosopher go with his conception of causality. Śaṅkara is well aware of it. As a matter of fact, his unwillingness to attribute reality to the temporal order is based on his denial of causality. He repudiates the Naiyāyika conception of causality that effect is something novel and not contained in the cause. For Śaṅkara effect and cause are non-different. Effect exists before its manifestation in the cause. It is easy to see that time becomes utterly useless from such a position as this. Metaphysically speaking, time is unreal and a

¹ See Praśastapāda, *Padārtha Dharmasangraha*, op. cit., the chapter on 'Time'.

² Kapila, *Sāṅkhya Aphorism* ii: 12, trans. J. R. Ballantyne (London: Trubner & Co., 1888), p. 196.

³ Rādhākrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, op. cit., II, 528.

condition of unreality while phenominally also it glides over things and cannot enter into their constituents.

The theistic school, which accepts the 'theory of transformation' (*pariṇāmavāda*), regards time as real and takes it seriously, and tries to view the different kinds of time in a graded scale. To this Bhāgavata school we now turn our attention. Our source is the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* with its commentaries by Śrī Jīva and Viśvanāth.

First of all, the time having parts is admitted as real and not merely conventional. The smallest conceivable part of time is in a peculiar manner related with the smallest part of time is the totality of time is connected with the total amount of cosmic matter.¹ The smallest visible particle (*mote*) which is noticed to soar up in the light of the sunray coming through the window is called a *trasareṇu*. Every atom is again said to be made up of two ultimate minima (*paramāṇu*) which has no extension. The time which is in relation to the atomic state of matter is called atomic time.

The time which is co-extensive with three motes is called *truti*, which is said to be equal to 1/900th of a winking. Three winkings are said to make a moment (*kaṣṇa*). "The Nyāya school assumes that the unit of physical change (or the time occupied any single antecedent step in a causal series before the succeeding step is ushered in) is equal to a *kaṣṇa* (moment) which is 2/15ths of a second."²

Bhāskarāchārya a great astronomer of the 12th century calculates the *truti* of time to be equal to 1/33750 of a second. In computing the instantaneous motion (*tātkālikī gati*) of a planet Bhāskara compares the successive positions of a planet and regards its motion as constant during the interval.³

Not only with the smallest particle of matter but also with the totality of the cosmic matter, time is said to be co-extensive. According to a traditional method of calculation, Śrī Jīva ascertains this totality and tells us in his commentary that it is 800,000,640,000,000 years. This number of years are said to constitute one 'imagination' (*kalpa*) of the Lord. One complete evolution and involution of Nature are believed to take so many

¹ III. 4. 11.

² Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Hindus*, op. cit., p. 77.

³ *Ibid.*

years. This smallest atomic and the largest total time are the two extremities of the first kind of time. Let us call it Time I.

I may say here that these figures of smallest or highest unit of time I mention here only as interesting information. There is no intention to attribute any validity to them whatever. These things were believed by the speculative thinkers in those days when they neither distinguished between philosophical and scientific issues nor invented any instrument to make accurate measurements.

The next higher time, let us say Time II, is held to be different from Time I. The latter is meant for counting but the function of the former is said to be 'cooking' (*pāka*), it is the principle which 'pursues everything to maturation'. It is the formative cause of the evolution of Nature. This time creates causal vibration (*vikṣobha*) in the very constituent of Nature. It is indivisible and said to constitute a power of the Lord himself. Time I glides over the creation but Time II 'the Lord made the instrument of his creation'. The Universe is said to be a 'finite thing produced under the force of the Time by the Lord'.¹

Before we proceed to consider the next higher aspect of Time let us discuss in brief why Time II (and consequently Time I) moves in cyclic order. In what follows I am not at all trying to prove that the process of Nature is actually cyclic. I shall simply try to bring out what might be some of the reasons which led these philosophers to think as they did.

It has perhaps been noticed that for the ascertainment of any truth of fact the Vedāntist naturally takes recourse to three sources of the Scriptures, second is the demand of rational thinking and the third is corroboration in experience.

It is needless to repeat that the Upaniṣads very strongly suggest the fact that the process of the evolution of Nature is cyclic. Certain Upaniṣads of later date, such as Subala, give us more or less clear and systematic statements of the stages of both evolution and involution of Nature to and from the Lord. The Lord does not destroy anything but takes within. And hence the word destruction which has a bad connotation for us, is almost always understood by the Upaniṣadic seers in the sense of going back to the source wherefrom something originated (*abhiśanvīśanti*).

¹ *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, iii. 10-13.

Aristotle, we know, believed that circular motion is the most perfect form of motion. There is something divine about it. What concerned Aristotle was the movement of the heavenly bodies through space. We all know today that the heavenly bodies do not move in circular orbits. But nevertheless we may stop a moment to consider why Aristotle thought rotary motion to be the most perfect. Aristotle thought so because, I take it, circular motion is more rational than rectilinear motion. A circle has a pattern. It exhibits an order and a rhythm. But a line lacks all these characteristics. It appears that a line may be accidental but a circle always displays rationality and purposiveness. This seems to be the first reason why circular movement, whether through space or in time, appeals to our rational faculty more than does a rectilinear one.

Human reason demands unity. It looks for an 'idea' amidst a chaotic array of facts. Socrates as well as Aristotle likes to define everything whether abstract or concrete. But we cannot define a thing when it does not exhibit a fixed and definite type. If the process of Nature needs to be defined at all, if it needs to be rationally understood, then it must have a pattern. A series of changes that has no rhyme or reason, no beginning and no ending, does not seem to have any pattern. Any point in the series either stands by itself or stands in relation to its entire past. If the first alternative is true, then it cannot be defined due to its unrelatedness. If the second is true, then also it cannot be defined because the entire past is unknowable due to the beginninglessness of the process. On the other hand if the process is cyclical then every point occupies a definite place in a coherent system and hence is rationally understandable.

From Kant we have learnt about the difficulty is conceiving an actual infinite time. Our reason demands a resting place. However far one may go one can still ask : What's before ? And so it is about the future. Neither the first term nor the last term is ever reached. It seems to be almost unbelievable that a process that has started in an infinitely remote date has reached just the state which it is in today. If the process is held to be one of aggregation the present state is certainly not a state that an endless aggregating process should arrive at. If it be one of disintegration, of running-down, then also it is strange that there is still so much left over in spite of the fact that constant wasting of energy is going on endlessly. Whichever way we try to get

around the issue, our reason does not seem to find satisfaction. On an endless path reason refuses to travel, but still if the natural process is rectilinear it must have rushed through that path which reason dreads to tread. If, on the other hand, the process is a rhythmical one in which there is a regular alternation of evolution and involution, there is no difficulty in conceiving it. Our reason finds rest and satisfaction. Whatever we may think of Hegel, his contention that the real is rational and rational real still seems to be the presupposition of all intelligent inquiry.

It will perhaps be urged : whether cyclical or rectilinear be the process of Nature in time, the difficulty of conceiving the endlessness of time is not at all improved. If the circular movement goes on repeatedly then there is no avoiding the *regressus ad infinitum*. Do we therefore gain anything in the way of reasonableness when we maintain the cyclic rather than rectilinear character of the cosmic process.

We answer in the affirmative. We do gain a good deal. We do not commit the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum*, for, that fallacy is committed when some process is stated in such a fashion that the true understanding of any member of the series requires the knowledge of its antecedent. Such a situation makes the true understanding of the system in question impossible. This is precisely what takes place when the process of nature is conceived of as being rectilinear. But if we think of it as cyclical then every member is understandable in the light of the whole process (and not simply in the light of the antecedent) which is complete and consistent within itself. Nothing in the system demands that time should be endless. In the former case the very nature of the process itself demands that time should be infinite and thus shows its irrationality and lack of self-consistency, while in the latter case there is nothing in the nature of the process that demands the endlessness of time, because the cyclical process is self-explanatory. If time has to be endless even in that case it is due to the nature of Time itself and not of the cosmic process. And this is precisely the reason why the Hindu thinkers have asserted throughout the ages that the creativity of the Lord is beginningless (*anādi*) and at the same time the rhythm of the cosmic process is cyclical. This position of theirs, I say, does not commit the *regressus ad infinitum*. Rather this seems to be the only position that does justice to time, cosmic process, and reason. From such a position as this both time and the cosmic process are

what they are due to their own essential characteristics. If there is a time that is beginningless and endless and the difficulty of conceiving it such is a demerit, it is due to something inherent in the character of time itself and not to anything in the process of nature. Then that is either merit or demerit of the comprehending capacity of man, but not of the process of nature. The process of nature, far from determining, cannot even suggest to us what the precise character of beginningless time is. This then only shows that there is another kind of time which transcends the natural process and of which nature cannot give us any information. This time we shall consider presently designating it as Time III and Time IV. But before we come to it we must show just where in his experience the Vedāntist finds the process of nature as cyclical. We have mentioned the scriptural authority and the demand of rationality. Next we show the actual instance of experience which warrants the conclusion accepted.

Ordinarily it is presumed that the ancient people uncritically accepted the idea of cyclic process from their experiences of circularity in certain natural happenings such as seasonal vegetation within a year, waxing and waning of the moon within a month, or even of the sunset and sunrise within a day. It may be true that the ancient people at first struck upon the idea due to those everyday happenings of nature. But one can say with certainty that the ancient Hindus did not remain satisfied with those instances only. They based their conclusion on another experience which they considered deeper, truer and more intimate. Undoubtedly all those events of natural happenings are in cyclic order. But they were not the main sources of the doctrine. Those instances of the objective world only substantially strengthened another deeper experience of theirs. By experience Vedāntists usually mean psychological experiences which to them are more immediate and direct as compared to the experiences of the outside world which are mediated and a step removed. If it were only from his experience of, say, seasonal changes of the year that the Vedāntist derived his doctrine of cyclical process, he would not have it the way he has it. According to the Vedāntist the circular movement of the natural order is a movement which goes around something that does not move with it. The wheel of time rolls on like a ball but the wheel has a centre that does not move in the same way as the circumference does. The axle is relatively permanent, and "immortality is the axle of the

wheel of time"—so declares the Veda. What constitutes this axle? It is the monads that transcend Nature. The monads, the spiritual self or oversoul of the individuals mark the limit of the cyclical evolution of Nature. How and why that is we shall discuss shortly. The point we are interested in making at present is that if the deduction of the Vedāntist had its basis in his experiences of the natural happenings such as the change of seasons, he could by no means say that the circular evolution takes place around some entity which is permanent. Summer, autumn, winter and spring follow one another in regular succession in cyclic order but they do not seem to revolve around any fixed centre. Day follows night and the night follows day, but there is no fixed point about which they turn. Instances of circular movement in time that take place around a centre, the Vedāntist must therefore have experienced elsewhere. And here it is. He has seen it within his own self. Every object that he finds around him changes constantly, but his 'I' which he calls 'witness' seems to remain permanent for all time. Here we must recall what we said before about the Vedāntists' conception of his self. The self, according to the Vedāntist, to say very briefly, is that consciousness in a person which does not sleep even in dreamless sleep. The self is that which is never unconsciousness but always a conscious witness of all the states and processes of our mind. The self is not one of the states, neither is it the combination of them all. It is something that transcends them but imparts life and light to them all. This we discussed before.¹ Once this position is granted or accepted in sympathy with the Vedāntist, it will not be very difficult to understand him when he says that his waking, dreaming, and dreamless stages of life come and go one after another in a circular order day after day, while the self of his remains unmoved, seated at rest in the centre, witnessing all the changes around. Whether the self itself has any movement of its own or not is not the question now. The object of inquiry at this moment is whether or not the self also moves in circle with the other three states. According to the position that the Vedāntist takes we find that it does not. The self could not be conscious of its own waking, dreaming and dreamless states and could not be able to recall them back together with its own identity if it were itself completely involved in the cyclical occurrences

¹ Vide *Supra*, Part I, ch. i.

of the various states of its mind and body. A witness as a witness has to be a third person and an indifferent man, too.

It is to this experience that the Vedāntist appeals. This psychological experience of his is transferred to the World-soul and it is asserted that the evolution of Nature is cyclic and the circle revolves around the soul of the world—*Paramātmā*. Neither the Supreme Soul nor the individual souls are involved in this circular process. It is only the secondary Power of the Lord that moves cyclically. The Primary as well as the Intermediary Power of the Lord are independent of it. It is only the psychophysical nature—the first and the second dimension of reality that revolves in a circle since that much is the scope of 'Nature', neither more nor less. Nature, as we observed, means what has the three reals for its constituents, its scope is extended both in the mental and the physical realm. The third and the fourth dimensions of reality belong to a trans-natural realm of existence. There they move in a different rhythm in a different kind of time which is called *nitya* (eternity). This leads us to consider still higher conceptions of time : Time III and Time IV.

The nature of eternity we suggested while we spoke about the dialectical movement of the Love-life of the Supreme God-head *Hari*. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that every moment in it is endless. But we shall consider it further in the next chapter because it does not belong to *this* world order. Within eternity itself, then, are *two* kinds of time : one is *pure* eternity, and the other is *mixed*. The latter we call Time III and the former Time IV. Let us see the reason for this distinction which is suggested in the writings of Śrī Jīva.

The two realms of existence, cosmic and divine, are not utterly isolated. They are interpenetrative. Whenever the Lord incarnates Himself the eternal order invades the cosmic. But that occasion does not introduce any difficulty. Though one order enters into the other they remain more or less distinct, because the Lord never loses His integrity (*ahina-svarūpa-svabhāva*). His purity is eternally preserved, nothing can touch it. Rather, if He wills He can overpower the natural order by His supernatural glory and grace.

But besides the incarnation of the Lord there is another occasion also when the eternal enters into the cosmic order. All monads are spiritual ; they are the Intermediary Power of the Lord ; they belong to the eternal order. When they are born in

the world it is the eternal that through them enters into the cyclical order of the cosmos. That event takes place, we know, in the dawn of creation. The intermingling of what we have called the germ and the sperm (*vīja* and *garbha*) is virtually the intermingling of the eternity with temporality. Every individual, therefore, is an eternal being who is incarnated in this world of nature. But there is a great difference between the incarnation of the Lord and that of a monad. The power of the sun and its rays are not equal. The Lord preserves His integrity or even lords it over Nature by His power, while a monad loses his integrity almost invariably due to the false identification between his two life centres : empirical and metaphysical. His oversoul becomes overshadowed by his natural self. His eternal essence is encased by the temporal. The eternity and the temporality thus get intermingled. But in spite of the fact that they are intermingled in this way, neither loses its essential character and the monads begin to assert their supremacy as soon as they find an opportunity. The eternal monads tend to move upward right within the cosmic order while its cyclic process goes around them. This gives us a semblance of a spiral movement. The result of this upward movement we have seen in what is called *pratiloma* or ascending evolution. As long as the stage of manhood is not reached the divine nature and the cosmic nature are not distinctly separated. As soon as the ascending order of evolution reaches the stage of the human being, the two natures become clearly distinguished and man begins to be aware of the tension of higher and lower, of inner and outer, of temporality and eternity. It is right here that ethics comes in.

The time that pursues the eternal monads throughout their ethical struggle we have called Time III, or mixed eternity. And while the struggle ceases and the liberated monads duel with God, they function with God in Time IV or eternity, pure and unmixed. As long as they walk *towards* God they are in Time III, when they walk *in* God they live in eternity. But more of this in the next chapter.

All that I have said above appears to be strongly suggested, though not clearly stated, by the writings of Śrī Jīva and his followers. It should be noted that the four kinds of time correspond very closely to the four dimensions of reality which we sketched in the beginning. In a very few sentences we can, therefore, summarize the concept of time as suggested in the

Vaiṣṇava Vedānta of Bengal school. Time is a power of the Lord Himself. It functions differently in the different realms of existence, from the lowest 'waking' to the highest, the 'Fourth' and beyond. The scale of value and truth thus correspond to the grade that the character of Time exhibits. Says the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* : Two ways does the Lord play with His Power of creativity—'as Personality within, as Time without'.¹ In the *Gītā* the Lord Himself declares, "I am Time."²

THE LAW OF *Karma*

The law of *karma* has two aspects : cosmological and moral. The cosmological phase of the law consists in the fact that the cosmic process owing to its cyclical movement throughout eternity has acquired a sort of habit pattern to behave in a certain fashion. These habits recur owing to their own momentum but this recurrence follows a definite line of order. That order or law has not been formulated by any lawgiver, neither has it been externally superimposed on the cosmos. It is the law of the cosmos itself. It is impersonal and is its own maker. Though not mathematical or precise it has a more or less definite type. It is very analogous, as we said before, to our habits. Day after day we do many things from morning to morning so mechanically that we are not conscious of them unless there is something out of order. Our habitual activities seem to follow one another due to their own momentum and the more they repeat the greater becomes the momentum and the more they tend to become exact. Such also is the law of *karma*. Speaking cosmically, it may be conceived of as the habits of the Cosmic Person (and we shall see later that they are mediated by the monads). These habits may even go out of order when the conscious intervention of the divine being becomes necessary. We may notice again that what we would usually consider as a miracle has been in this way made a necessary part of the cosmic order. The Lord can change the law at any time He wills.

The cyclical pattern of the cosmic process is conceived of as con-cyclic. That is to say, there are cycles within cycles. Usually a day of twenty-four hours is taken to be the *smallest cycle* and through the months and years and *yugas* ; the *highest cycle* is reached in a *kalpa* which consists of a huge number of

¹ X. 1. 7.

² XI. 32.

some million million years we mentioned before. All these cycles and their movements are taken care of by the law of *karma*. The term *karma* means action. The law of *karma* then means the rhythm and pattern that Nature has developed owing to its own repeated action. Sometimes Nature and *karma* are even synonymously used since all that is in nature is in some sense owing to its *karma* or behaviour. But it does not replace the will of God any more than our habit can displace the free operations of our mind.

It is often supposed that the law of *karma* and the circularity of the cosmic process takes away the novelty from nature. This does not seem to be true any more than the beauty and the grandeur of the sunset and sunrise are lost or taken away owing to the fact of their cyclical appearance every evening and morning. Rather it is on the assumption that the exact mathematical laws of nature constitute the complete explanation of natural events that the novelty of nature seems to become inexplicable. The law of *karma* simply says that there is a rough pattern according to which Nature behaves and it always keeps the room for novelty open.

It has been thought by some modern thinkers that owing to the discovery of the exact laws of science the law of *karma* has become utterly useless. Such an assumption is based on the inadequate understanding of the scope of the law of *karma*. Scientific laws cannot take the place of the law of *karma* when both are correctly understood. Sciences explain *how* an event of nature takes place, but as to *why* it happens that way rather than another, it is no business of science to reply. Natural sciences are *positive*. They take up the facts as facts and analyze them to their constituents, which are believed to be controlled by certain basic laws. The laws are accepted as given. Even a strict materialist who starts with some nebulous matter, has to accept the laws of mechanics according to which the nebulae began their first move. Scientists consider it idle to ask why the laws are what they are. But is it not obvious that there is no logical necessity about a law of physics or kinematics? Of course they are what they are, but they might have been otherwise just as well. The law of *karma* attempts to answer that idle question if it is idle at all. It says that something in nature behaves in a certain way or some laws are what they are because they have learned to be that way gradually throughout the repeated cycles of

endless evolution. This answer of the law of *karma* should not be considered as mere tautology. If a person asks why he gets up every morning at six o'clock and somebody answers by telling him that he does so because he had been doing so from his very childhood perhaps the answer does carry some information and is not wholly tautologous. Be that as it may, and whether there is a bit of truth or not in what the law of *karma* says, one thing is manifestly true : that it attempts to answer some question which the exact laws of the natural sciences do not try to answer.

What has been said above constitutes the cosmological aspect of the law of *karma*. Its moral side we consider in the next chapter where we also show the relation between these two aspects of the law.

AN ESTIMATE

The subject that we have discussed in this chapter under the title 'The World Order', is undoubtedly a matter to be decided not by any *a priori* speculation but by the scientific analysis of the empirical data of experience. I have laboured with them only in order to explain what specific conception of the world-order was believed in by the Vedāntist and particularly by Śrī Jīva Goswāmī. This was, however, not the only conception of the world-order known to the Hindu thinkers. They had their choices. The Nyāyavaiśeṣika school (atomists), for example, maintains a theory quite different from the one we sketched above. The Vedāntist rejects the atomic theory of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school and maintains the Sāṅkhya theory of evolution just sketched. The Vedānta refutes Sāṅkhya only in one point ; that is the latter holds, unlike the former, that Nature is independent of the Absolute Being. In fact, Sāṅkhya denies the existence of the Absolute Being, whereas in the Vedānta the Absolute Being is all in all. Vedānta makes Nature utterly dependent on the Supreme Being. According to Śrī Jīva, as we observed before, Nature constitutes the 'Secondary Power' of the Absolute Consciousness.

Some able Hindu thinkers¹ of today who are also well acquainted with the most modern theories of evolution of the West, have attempted to maintain on both rational and experimental grounds that there are some deep truths underlying this ancient

¹ J. C. Chatterjee, *India's Outlook on Life* (New York : Kaolas Press, 1931) ; also *Kāshmīr Śaivism* (Kasmir, Srinagar, 1914) ; and D. Tagore *Gītāpātha*, op. cit.

doctrine of evolution as propounded by the Sāṅkhya school and that they are not in any serious way in conflict with the scientific theories of evolution. Results have been different, they say, due to different methods of investigation that have been employed but the truths, after all, cannot clash. I have, however, no intention at this moment to establish anything one way or the other. That, I consider outside of my immediate subject-matter. Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that the foregoing description of the world-order has the least importance and value for us today no less than the cosmology of Plato in *Timaeus*. Recently Professor Taylor has written an elaborate commentary on the *Timaeus* and has, I am afraid, read into it not a few advanced and highly complicated doctrines of Professor Whitehead. Be that as it may, so far as the philosophy of Śrī Jīva is concerned I feel that if Śrī Jīva would live today he would not hesitate to accept all that modern science has to offer us and still maintain all the essentials of his metaphysical system. And in making that adjustment Śrī Jīva, I believe, would not have to take a jump anywhere as big as a medieval theologian of Europe would have to do in order to be at home with Darwin or Whitehead.

As Sir Monier Williams has observed very truly ; “..... the Hindus were Spinozists more than two thousand years before the existence of Spinoza, and Darwinians many centuries before Darwin, and Evolutionist many centuries before the doctrine of Evolution has been accepted by the Huxleys of our time, and before any word like Evolution existed in any languages of the world.”¹

Whatever be the nature of the world-order presented by the twentieth century scientists, Śrī Jīva would find very little difficulty to admit it and still uphold the doctrine that the power underlying cosmic order is the secondary Power of the Absolute Consciousness. The laws of nature, he would still advocate, are the habit patterns of the cosmic Person and they as such, when considered apart from the source, are, like our habit patterns, unconscious (*jaḍā*) and utterly powerless to bring forth the creation. Śrī Jīva would say nature, being unconscious, lacks spontaneity and cannot, therefore, evolve without the joyful presence of the Supreme Personality of the God-head. As to the

¹ Sir Monier Williams, ‘The Religions of the Hindus’, *The Indian Magazine and Review*, No. 244 (Sept., 1891).

question how absolute consciousness can have unconscious nature for its secondary power, Śrī Jīva would possibly reply in the language of Mr. Avalon :¹

All is consciousness but the consciousness assumes the appearance of changing degrees of unconsciousness not through the operation of anything other than itself but by the operation of one of its own powers. . . . It may be asked how can consciousness become unconscious and cease to be itself ? The answer is that it does not. It never ceases to be conscious. It appears to itself as jīva (monad) to be otherwise and even then not wholly : for as recent scientific investigations have shown even so called 'brute matter' exhibits the element of that which when evolved in man is self-conscious. If it be asked how consciousness can obscure itself partially or at all the only answer is '*Achintya Śakti*' (supra logical power of the Lord) which Śāṅkarites as well as all other Vedāntists admit. Of this, as of all ultimates we must say with the scholastics *Omnia exeunt in mysterium*.

Before we pass on to the next chapter we should say a word or two about the three ultimate reals because if there is no truth whatever in them our next chapter would be of little value. We shall see that the ethical ideals depend not so much on the different stages or particulars of the theory of evolution as on the essential fact that the fundamental constituents of Nature exhibit three tendencies, namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

I am inclined to think that there is some deep philosophic truth underlying this concept. Many great thinkers of the Western world also, from Plato on, have taken recourse to three categories, phenomenon intelligible, for, for some unknown reason, no phenomena seems to be well explained from either one or two elementary principles. There seems to be some peculiarity about the mystic number three. Monad, diad, and triad comprise the keynote of the philosophy of Peirce. Thesis, antithesis and synthesis constitute the backbone of the Hegelean theory of evolution. It is true, however, that thesis, antithesis, synthesis of Hegel are more or less logical categories (though he himself did not distinguish between logical and metaphysical) and *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are held to be actually existent things and whether

¹ Arthur Avalon, 'Śakti and Maya', *The Indian Philosophical Review* (October, 1917), II, 132.

they exist or not requires to be decided more by science than by philosophy. Nevertheless, we can still maintain that the concept of these three fundamental principles is not in any way in contradiction to the findings of modern science. We have pointed out where in our experience we find them. We can safely equate *tamas* and *rajas* with matter and energy of science. Difficulty seems to arise about *sattva*, but is it not true that even Eddington of the twentieth century has told us that the ultimate stuff of the cosmos is 'mind-stuff' ?¹ It is not unlikely that *sattva* is very close to the 'mind-stuff'. Or, perhaps mind-stuff is too vague a concept to bring out the essential nature of *sattva* as it is conceived by a Vedāntist. To a Vedāntist, as we observed, *sattva* is really what is 'universal' in the Platonic-Aristotelean tradition. If we let experience speak for itself we may realize that not even a single act of perception knowledge is possible without the existence of 'universal' in the object of knowledge. It is what Santayana endeavours to convey to us by his technical term 'Essences' which 'are indispensable terms in the perception of matters of fact, and render transitive knowledge possible'.²

Physical sciences cannot find it simply because sciences analyze abstractly or arbitrarily or conveniently the *objects* of experience rather than the experience itself. *Sattva* is the universal in thing which accounts for intelligibility. This is the reason why *suddha sattva* or pure *sattva* is held to be the reflection of the Universal Mind. It is and through *sattva* that Nature participates in God. In the three principles of Nature some Vedāntists³ see a reflection of the *sat-chit-ānanda*—existence, consciousness and bliss of the Absolute Being. Let us then go with Vedāntist to admit that Nature does exhibit *three* elemental characters,—inertness, energy and intelligibility—and we pass on to the consideration of ethics.

¹ Eddington, *Nature of the Physical World*, op. cit., p. 276.

² G. Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (Scribner's Sons, New York, 1924), p. 80.

³ Cf. Bhagavān Dās, *The Science of Peace* (London : Theosophical Publishing Society, 1904), pp. 132-36.

CHAPTER VIII

ETHICS

Introductory

Whatever may be the exact scope of ethics, I intend for the sake of convenience to entitle this chapter *Ethics*, having in mind the most comprehensive sense of the term. By 'Ethics' here I propose to mean the science that deals with the conditions and characteristics of such practical activities of human beings as are directed towards the realization of an ideal end. I shall use the term *morality* in the narrower and perhaps the usual sense of the term ethics. By moral action I shall mean only that behavior of man which he carries on as a member of an established society. In the wider sense ethics may include art, religion and even intellectual pursuits as far as they are directed towards the realization of some idealized goal. In the narrow sense, morality concerns only what may be called social justice or righteousness or goodness of character. I make this distinction particularly because in Hindu thought *śāstra* is a very wide term identical in its scope with ethics in my proposed sense. Within *śāstra* various sciences are differentiated, such as *Arthaśāstra* (Political science), *Nītiśāstra* (Economics), *Kāmaśāstra* (Science of sense pleasures), *Varṇāśrama-dharma* (Science of social relationship), *Mokṣaśāstra* (Science of Religion) and so on. My hope is that by making the aforesaid distinction between ethics and morality I shall be able to bring out, to a certain extent, some of the peculiar features of the Hindu mode of thinking.

We observed that the task of the Vedāntist is two-fold : practical and theoretical. His theoretical task consists in the fact of formulating a systematic relationship between the four dimensions of reality which he accepts from the Upaniṣadic tradition. This task of his virtually means writing a systematic account of the relationship between man and God, between man and Nature and between God and Nature. This he usually does by writing a commentary or a super-commentary on the aphorisms of the Vedānta. Śrī Jīva did it by writing separate discourses on

each topic. The first and the second dimensions of reality—physical and psychical—fall, as we discovered, within Nature (*prakṛti*). Their relationship is explained by the evolution of Nature which shows how both mind and matter evolved from one single source : *prakṛti*.

The practical task of the Vedāntist consists in actually realizing in his own life the ultimate truths that his metaphysical system teaches. He has also to teach others the actual ways and means by following which they may also attain the same goal. As regards the theoretical part of the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta as formulated by Śrī Jīva and his followers, we have discussed them in a very general way in the foregoing chapters. Now we turn our attention to the practical side. It should not, however, be forgotten that this distinction is arbitrary to the Vedāntist himself. He hardly distinguishes between the theoretical and practical side of his duty. He does not hold that at certain times we are purely thinkers and at other times we are purely actors. His own experience shows that such distinctions are purely logical and not actual. Hence in our discussion of ethics we shall come across a number of theoretical considerations and we shall see that the knowledge of the actual activities and duties of man will help us to understand the relation between man and Nature and man and God more thoroughly and intimately than we did before in our purely theoretical discussion.

The discipline of a Vedāntist is a thoroughly ethical one. He is equally interested in getting at a unified system of theoretical knowledge and in realizing in practice That Reality which actually unifies all systems of knowledge and aspects of life. The ultimate Reality in the philosophy of Śrī Jīva, as we know, is God. An endeavour to realize God in life is what we usually call religious or spiritual endeavour. Thus the practical aspect of life in which Śrī Jīva, in common with all Vedāntists, is directly interested is religious or spiritual. For what we have called the realm of morality Śrī Jīva has no immediate interest. As a matter of fact, no Vedāntist has ever written any treatise on morality. He takes it for granted. But that which he takes for granted we must discover first before we can understand the nature of his spiritual pursuit.

Within the realm of ethics in our wider sense we now distinguish these two fields which immediately concern us—‘moral’ and ‘spiritual’. Any Sanskrit scholar would know that I have in

mind the distinction between *artha* and *pāramārthik* or *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti mārga*, which is so vital in the Vedānta philosophy that not even a casual observer of it can fail to recognize. The real distinction between these two realms of practical activities—‘moral’ and ‘spiritual’—will be clear as we proceed. First of all, I propose to present the Hindu theory of moral justice or social righteousness. What follows is the common property of all Hindu thinkers, and not a mere theory but an actually functioning principle in society even in these days.¹

MORAL SCIENCE²

The Hindu moralists (law-givers) start to investigate the nature of morality, not as Kant did with a categorical imperative, but as a sociologist does with a thorough analysis of the nature of man as a member of an actual society. It is an empirical science based on social and individual psychology. It is not derived from any system of metaphysics. The metaphysicians accept the truth of its findings and attempt to criticize and rationalize some of its postulates. Moral science, as we shall see, presents some grave problems to the Vedāntist which he tries to answer consistently with his system.

The root of all human activities, according to the Hindu moralist, is *vāsanā* or desire. Desires to have pleasure and to avoid pain (*sukha prāpti* and *dukha parihāra*) are said to lie at the very root of all our endeavours. These desires are recognized to be of *three* kinds which are qualitatively different from one another. *One* kind of desire is *never* satisfied and it tends to repeat itself again and again, as for instance, desire for a drink on the part of a drunkard. He is never satisfied. This is true of all lusts and sensual pleasures. By satisfying the desires for such pleasures one gains a very temporary relief only to repeat the same again. The same is wanted again and again and there is no progress. The *second* kind of desire is comparatively progressive or at any rate palpably changing. This does not necessitate repetition. This we may illustrate by a man’s desire for fame or honor or wealth or some such material goods as this. This desire also is never completely satisfied but it is not

¹ S. Rādhākrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life* (London : Allen & Unwin, 1928).

² For an excellent exposition see K. Motwani, *Manu* (Madras : Ganesh & Co., 1934).

stagnant as the former. It keeps one going. One wants wealth or fame but not the same wealth or honor again and again. One has millions, he wants billions. One is a minister, he wishes to be king. It is in this sense that this kind of desire for pleasure is progressive and different from the first kind. Besides these two there is another kind of desire for pleasure. This *third* kind is the desire for harmony of art and life ; for goodness of character ; for righteousness in social relationships. The pleasure that one gets from the satisfaction of this desire is what Plato calls 'pure' in the *Philebus*. All activities which Aristotle would call 'virtuous' spring from this desire. The distinction between these three kinds of desires and the pleasures that arise from them are so obvious in our experience that they hardly require further elucidation. The third kind of desire is called the highest. The second kind is middling and the first kind is the lowest. If we now remember the three 'reals' we spoke of in the previous chapter, we shall recognize that these faculties of human mind are nothing but the results of the three reals, which are the ultimate constituents of the entire psycho-physical reality. So the metaphysicians can at once check up these findings of the moral scientist (he may be the same person) and buttress them up with his philosophy. He would say that we have these three different kinds of desires because of the fact that our organism is constituted of three different ingredients which have such and such peculiar characteristics. The first, the second and the third kinds of desire are thus held to be due to the *tamas*, *rajas* and *sattva* elements on our organism.

The moralist then divides the members of a society according to the development of these three desires (we should say that we are using the word '*desire*' for the Sanskrit term *vāsanā* which is a richer term than '*desire*'). Desire seems to be purely volitional but *vāsanā* is the root of all activities (including feeling and thinking). The person in whom the virtuous qualities (*sāttvic*) are the most developed ranks highest. The person in whom the energetic (*rājasic*) qualities are predominant ranks next, and the one in whom the sensual (*tāmasic*) qualities preponderate is placed third. Lastly, the man in whom neither of them is developed enough to be singled out, is the lowest or fourth. All society is thus divided into four communities on this basis. The object of pursuit of the highest class is *dharma*, or righteousness. That of the second class is honor, fame, power,

authority, etc. expressed by one Sanskrit term *artha*. The object of desire of the third is *kāma* : sense pleasures. The fourth class has no definite objective. They are undeveloped and do the menial work. The highest ideal of a society as well as of an individual is righteousness. Let us inquire what is the precise nature of this righteousness. Righteousness consists in a harmonious compromise between the various ideals. Hindu moralists recognize that within the realm of morality there is no possibility of having one supreme goal of life. The three desires are qualitatively different from each other. They exist in every member of a society. Neither an individual nor a society can be a perfect organism with one single objective. This is impossible by the very nature of facts. The best that can be expected in either is the establishment of some sort of mutual concession amongst the three functions. Every person and consequently every society must naturally seek three ends : *kāma*, *artha* and *dharma*, sense pleasure, power, etc., and virtue. These ends are facts which you can by no magic bring under one consistent system for none of the ideals is logically derivable from the other. So the righteousness in a society as well as in every member consists in bringing about a harmonious compromise amongst the different tendencies as much as practicable. A man is born within a certain social and natural environment or he is placed by circumstances within a certain situation. His duty consists in doing the best that lies in his ability to bring harmony in his own life and in the life of the people around him. If one is a teacher his duty is to be the best teacher ; if one is a farmer his duty is to be the best possible farmer. There is no single common goal for all in society. All men are not equal. The only thing that should be common in them insofar as their respective duty is concerned, is to be thorough, sincere, and honest about their duties, whatever they may happen to be. The merit of a man consists in his being honest and loyal to his own duties, in the language of Socrates 'having and doing what is a man's own and belongs to him'.¹ And his demerit consists in his failure to do so. Doing well one's own duties—duties to which one is naturally entitled—is the last word of the moral science of the Hindus.² The value of a man or group within a society is to

¹ *Republic*, op. cit., Bk. VI, 433c.

² *Bhagabat Gītā*, iii, 35.

be judged not by the light of any absolute imperative or some supreme goal but by his merit and demerit in discharging his respective duties. This system of morality is known as *vārṇāśrama-dharma*. The excellence of this system lies in the penetrative insight into the different drifts of the social mind and in the attempt to effect a compromise among them in the light of, to use a modern phrase, a practical absolute. One can scarcely think of this Hindu concept of social justice and not remember the *Republic* of Plato. One wonders whether the thought migrated from India to Greece or from Greece to India.¹ But let us turn to the Vedāntist.

The Vedāntist accepts this moral theory. But the moment it is accepted, the Vedāntist finds himself beset with new problems. He might have questioned this moral theory if he believed it to be based on mere speculation. As he considers it to be founded on the empirical study of the social and psychological data of experience, he does not find any reason whatever to question its validity. Moreover, since he finds, as we pointed out, that the three faculties of man and consequently of society depend on three cosmic principles which he also admits, there is no reason why he should question the validity of the findings of the empirical science of morality. As a psychologist does not question the truth reached by the research of the physiologists, even if it creates a hundred new problems in the field of psychology, on psychological data, simply because it entails new problems in his field. A Vedāntist has too much respect for the facts of experience to reject any truth that is based on facts, simply because they create new problems. He sets himself to the task of solving them. I am, however, not claiming—neither am I denying—that the moral theory of the Hindus is a true one; I am simply stating that the Vedāntist thinks it to be valid. Now let us see what are some of the new problems that a metaphysician (Vedāntist) has to solve if he wishes to incorporate such a moral theory as proposed. We shall notice that some of the problems are such that any metaphysician has to face them no matter what moral theory he accepts.

¹ E. J. Urwick, *The Message of Plato*, particularly the chapter entitled 'Eastern Ancestry of Plato', *op. cit.*

METAPHYSICS AND MORAL SCIENCE : *Tête-a-tête*

Let us briefly consider a few of the problems :

1. A moralist maintains on the basis of experience that all men are not equal. They are born with different capacities and aptitudes, in different environments. No two individuals are exactly identical. From the very childhood some functions are more or less developed in one than in another. One is born of a poor parent in a primitive society, another has a highly cultured heritage. These are facts. A moralist has to accept them almost as first principles. But a metaphysician has to speculate over the reason why it is so. Why should there be so much difference ? We of today will perhaps take these differences as they are and never recognize that there is any problem which requires to be solved. But to a Vedāntist this is a serious problem.

2. That there is evil and that it has to be fought is the first principle of a moralist. But a metaphysician has to tell us where it originates. This has been a problem of all metaphysicians of all ages, and the Vedāntist is no exception.

3. A moralist has no need to question whether a man is free or not, because as a matter of fact everybody acts on the assumption that he is a free actor. Nobody ever sits down to question whether he has real freedom or not. A moral theory which is based on psychological data has no reason to raise the problem. It is the task of a metaphysician to discover whether man is really free or not. This has been a perennial problem of all metaphysics. This, to a Vedāntist, is, we shall see, not a problem but *the* problem.

4. The feeling of pleasure and pain lies at the root of all human activities. Man wants to have pleasure and avoid pain. I do not know whether any psychologist can deny it. At any rate a Hindu sociologist takes it as a fact, and the question of *why* does not concern him. But a thorough and consistent metaphysician has to answer this why. Why does man seek pleasure ? We today may look to a physiologist or biologist for its answer but the Vedāntist takes upon himself the task of answering it on metaphysical ground. Why does man seek pleasure and avoid pain ?

5. On the basis of the observed facts a moralist maintains that there is no single goal or ideal end that motivates all human activities. Experience simply does not warrant such an end.

There are, as a matter of fact, three ends instead of one. They are *kāma*, *artha*¹ and *dharma* : sense pleasure, mental pleasure, and righteousness. By no Herculean effort can you subsume them under one end. They are all ends in themselves. One is not derivable from the other. Justice lies in some sort of compromise amongst them in the life of an individual as well as of a society. This is not only a problem but a menace to the whole structure of the Vedāntic metaphysics. We have seen in the previous pages that the fact of one supreme goal is the pertinent demand of Vedānta. But the moral theory does not support it. How to overcome this difficulty ?

6. And last and not the least is the problem of a standard. A moralist maintains the view that there are three functions in man. One of them the emotional (*rājasic*) is superior to the appetitive (*tāmasic*) and the intellectual or virtuous (*sāttvic*) is higher than the emotional. The moralist bases his contention on the approbation and disapprobation of society. It is a question to the metaphysician whether there is a real standard of all this evaluation. Are the value judgments real or conventional ? Is kindness better than cruelty ? If so, why ? That something is better than another thing is a first principle to a moralist but it is a problem of supreme importance to the Vedāntist and to almost all the leaders of human thought.

Should a Vedāntist answer all these bewildering questions ? He must, if he wishes to establish his metaphysics and at the same time accept a moral theory which is based on the study of facts. The Vedāntist can evade some of the above problems if he maintains with many Kantians or Hegelians or Anglo-Hegelians that the moral theories should be derived from metaphysics with the help of logic and no consideration need be given to the facts of experiences. The Vedāntist cannot do this because, as we repeatedly pointed out, 'experience' is his first and last court of appeal.

METAPHYSIC OF MORALITY

The above questions seem to be perplexing at first sight, but as we proceed to answer them we shall find that they are all

¹ I may mention again that the term *artha* has no exact English equivalent in one word. It means wealth, honor, authority, fame and all good things of practical life. The literal meaning of the term *artha* is 'use'. All things that are useful for our secular well-being is *artha*.

related and the solutions of all the problems raised point towards one answer. First of all we shall answer the questions from the standpoint of the Vedānta philosophy in general and later we shall consider in particular the position of Śrī Jīva Goswāmī and his school within the Vedānta.

To take up the first question, why is there so much difference between man and man? Vedāntists answer this by saying that everybody reaps the fruit of his own action. Every action that a person does creates for him a tendency (*saṁskāra*) which inheres in him. Due to the various kinds of acts that an individual does, he acquires varieties of tendencies. They may be classified under three heads: *sāttvic*, *rājasic* and *tāmasic* in accordance with the way in which the original action is performed. To elucidate: the psychophysical organism of a man is made up of three constituents. If, while a person acts, the intelligible stuff (*sattva*) of his constitution preponderates then the tendency which that action creates becomes *sāttvic* or good. While if an action is initiated by the energy stuff (*rajas*) of one's organism a *rājasic* tendency is created. And likewise if the inert or appetitive aspect of his system is predominating during his action it results in a *tāmasic* tendency (*saṁskāra*). These tendencies cling to the agent and lead him to and fro from place to place. The essential characteristic of these tendencies is what might be called sympathetic attractions. By virtue of this attraction the tendencies drive a person to the environment of a similar kind or attract and bring close to the person the objects and individuals of analogous tendencies. This occurs in order that they (the tendencies) may work themselves out. Let us illustrate. When *A* does a kindly act of charity for *B* the act itself creates a tendency in *A*. That tendency becomes *sāttvic* because the act has been done with a virtuous motive. This tendency will continue to live with *A* as long as it does not lead *A* to some person who will show similar kindness to *A* or at any rate make *A* as happy as *A*'s original act of charity made *B*. This is what is meant by a tendency working itself out. No act, not even a single stray thought of a person, can be lost, because some element or other of his organism was undoubtedly involved in it. Every little action or event is in this sense immortal. Each and every one of them lives as a tendency and since the very act of working out of a tendency is itself another act and involves other acts they keep on accumulating in a never-ending and undying series.

On the basis of a different classification these tendencies are divided into *three* groups. Like seed every individual possesses some potential tendencies. They are to be worked out and the specific channel in which they will find outlet in the future is unknown except in a very general way. These hidden tendencies are called *sañchita* or 'stored'. Another group of tendencies is being worked out in the life of the person. They are called *prārabdha* or 'begun'. There is still a third group of tendencies which one is now creating for his future. They will be responsible for the general shape of his future. These tendencies are called *kriyamāṇa* or 'on the point of being created'.¹ Thus, for instance a man has money in the bank, the cheque for which he carries with him. This is similar to the accede or 'stored' tendencies. He may have money in cash which is being used now, for his needs. This is similar to the 'begun' tendencies ; and lastly, if he is working now he is thereby making money which he is going to receive at the end of the working period. This is similar to the 'creating' tendencies. But our analogy with money ceases when we come to the end of our physical life, that is to say, when we die. A millionaire leaves all his wealth behind when he dies but *not* so with these tendencies. At the time of death all the tendencies of a person except those which have been already worked out in this life-time, acquire a very subtle seed-form and cling to the agent, the monad who does not die. These seed tendencies derive the monad to be born again in some definite place where it has the most chance of working out some of its strongest tendencies. It is always the strongest tendencies that tend to fructify earlier. That a child is born to certain parents within a certain social and natural environment, and that it has some definite aptitude from the very beginning—this is no accident. This is all due to its past tendencies. That within the same or similar environment one person becomes a saint while another becomes a villain is due to their own past deeds. Over the past tendencies no one has any control. But a person is free to create his future tendencies. What you are today is due to your yesterdays and what you are going to be in the coming tomorrows depends entirely on what kind of tendency you are creating in the present. A villain of today may be a saint

¹ Śrī Rūpa Goswāmī, *Bhaktirasāmrita Sindhu*, ed. Vidyāratna (Mursidāvād, 1880), p. 17.

of tomorrow. This theory of tendency (*saṃskāra*) is what we have previously called the moral aspect of the law of *karma*.

This answers our first question as to why there are so many differences between man and man. Dr. Wadia writes :

Why should one person be so different from another in his looks, in his abilities, in his circumstances, in his character ? To these questions I got a satisfactory answer only from the Karma theory of the Hindus. If one man is born a king and another a beggar it must be due to their past *Karma* : actions in a previous birth. All my subsequent reading and thought have not dislodged this principle from my thought. In European philosophy I do not find any serious or successful attempt to grapple with the problem. The story of the Fall is only a myth and no just God can be expected to visit the sins of the fathers on the heads of their innocent children millennia after millennia. It has always been a puzzle to me why European thinkers—apart from the old Pythagoreans or the modern Theosophists—have not been attracted by the *Karma* theory. The main reason assigned against it—that it breeds fatalism—is not entirely justifiable. For *Karma* has not merely a retrospective aspect, it has also a forward look. It is not merely effect but it is also a cause. Our past *Karma* determines the *Kṣetra*, the field of our life. It is our duty to make what we can of it, and that will determine our future life. Suffering may be the effect of our past, but *doing* is our most precious privilege.¹

Before we answer our next question we shall stop to consider what light, if any, this moral aspect of the law of *karma* throws on the cosmological aspect of the same law. How they are related is the subject of our inquiry now.

We have discussed² the cosmological aspect of the law of *karma*. It has been said that repeated action tends to produce a habit of acting in a definite way in the future. This law governs the entire physical world. Now we find this moral law of *karma* which controls the activity of the psychical world. But we know that to a Vedāntist there is no line between the psychical and the physical world. 'Nature' means to him the entire psychophysical reality. The three ultimate 'reals' are the only constituents of our

¹ 'Pragmatic Idealism', *op. cit.*, pp. 355-56.

² *Supra*, ch. vi, sec. 6.

body-mind and the objective world. The moral aspect of the law of *karma* then instead of becoming an additional aspect becomes a qualification of the general cosmological law of *karma*. That is to say, the cosmological and the moral aspects of the law of *karma* are not two aspects but they are one and the same. In other words, the cosmological law of *karma* is itself moral. The law that controls the universe therefore is a moral law. From the beginning to the end the three constituents function according to a moral necessity. But who is to account for this moral principle? Is it God? No, the answer is emphatically in the negative. The law is moral not in the sense that a morally good God has superimposed this law on Nature. It is the infinite number of monads that accounts for this moral nature of the cosmic principle. Nature therefore exists exclusively for the monads. That the law of Nature is moral does not mean that it is kind or good or merciful. It means that Nature is stern, just, austere, honest. If you are a virtuous person and no one in the world recognizes you to be so, the law of Nature will make possible your reward here or hereafter in the lives to come. Nature will create circumstances to repay you for any sacrifice that you might have made. And so also on the other side, if you are a dishonest person and even become successful in hiding all your sins from the eyes of the world, the law of Nature will make possible your punishment here or hereafter in your future lives. Nature will create circumstances to measure out your due for whatever wrong you might have committed. This is what is meant by saying that the law of *karma* is moral. The whole process of Nature is meant for the monads so that their innumerable tendencies may find adequate fruition; so that they may live and develop and work out their destiny.

The process of Nature is not only meant for the monads; its very possibility is dependent on the monads. The process would be impossible if it were not for the tendencies that are created by the monads. Their relationship is so intimate that one lives only for the other. At the end of one cycle when nature goes back to the state of equilibrium, then monads cannot do anything. But each of them has innumerable tendencies still to be fructified. With all these tendencies all the monads remain dormant in the world-soul in the form of a very subtle seed-life. There they sleep throughout the night of creation. In the dawn the equilibrium of nature is disturbed again by the 'glance' of the

Lord. But the process of evolution cannot begin until the seed-life is put into it, because the real initiative according to which the process has to take place lies in the monads. In other words, the law of *karma* has no meaning when nature and the monads are apart. It acquires functional significance only when the two are associated. This is precisely the reason why the law of *karma* is said to be moral. The different stages of evolution that take place after the seed-monad is put into the 'disturbed' Nature we have discussed in a previous chapter. What we have learned now is that the process is a moral one. One stage of evolution follows another stage not simply because of the interactions between the different constituents of Nature, nor merely because of its adaptation to external environment, but particularly because of the moral necessity. The organ of sight, for instance, that has evolved in the human being today is, according to this theory, due not merely to a continuous and gradual adaptation to external environment but because of an inner urge initiated by the tendencies of the monads. Nature brings forth an eye because there is a desire or will to see in the monad. In working out that will, however, Nature transforms and adapts itself variously. So far as the law of *karma* carries along all the past tendencies, it is analogous to the law of heredity also, with the distinction that not the tendencies of the parents but those of the previous state of a monad itself are held responsible for the continuity. Why do Nature and the infinite number of monads, it may be asked, work so harmoniously? Why is it that for the tendencies that are actually brought about by the monads, Nature works so ceaselessly? The answer is simple. Because they are the twin children of the same parents. They are not alien or foreign to each other. They are the Intermediary and Secondary Power of the one Absolute Being. For the various processes of evolution and involution the Absolute Being is responsible only in a very general sense. Speaking specifically they are mediated by His Intermediary Power. The Intermediary Power and the Secondary Power are two different things but their sympathy is due to the oneness of the source from which they both spring. The universe is a vast drama in which Nature supplies the stage and the monads are the actors. If during the play there happens to be any blunder which one likes to call evil it is the monads who are wholly responsible for it. If sometimes the *tāmasic* tendencies predominate in the greater number of the monads the resultant is

bad. If the *sāttvic* tendencies preponderate the outcome is good. Between the two extremes there are infinite possibilities. All good and evil that there are within the order of Nature, be they individual, social or external, are all ultimately due to the *karma* of the monads. As one sows so one reaps and the austere law of *karma* takes care of it. This is the solution of the problem of evil. To quote Dr. Wadia again :

The problem of evil raises two questions : Why does it exist ? And what is the way out of it ? Neither of these questions receives adequate treatment at the hands of the great European thinkers, while theologians are apt to lapse into mythological dogmas. The Hindu doctrine of *Karma* has answered the first question quite convincingly.¹

We may also mention that the law of *karma* not only answers the problem of evil but also solves the difficulty of Kant for which he has to postulate God. Perfectly virtuous men, thought Kant, should be perfectly happy, but they are not. There must be a God to make this possible, either in this life or in the hereafter. The law of *karma* may say to Kant : why invoke God for that job ? I can do it more adequately than your absentee God. Baladeva writes :

In *Brahman*, as Creator, there exists no fault of partiality or cruelty. The differences of condition in which creatures are born and the pleasure and pain which they suffer, depend on their own *Karmas*, and the Lord creates the environment, in which the creatures are placed with the strictest regard to such *Karma*.²

Indeed, the law of *karma* has solved some perennial problems but perhaps at the cost of creating some new ones. Within the network of tendencies the power of men seems to have been lost. Has any freedom been left to man or is he a mere puppet in the hand of the law of *karma* ? This leads us to the third question we raised. We have explained why men are so unequal and why there is evil by appealing to the law of *karma* which in its turn has drawn our attention to the problem of freedom.

During the last two centuries when the fetish of the exact law of the sciences haunted the imagination of the philosophers they thought that man cannot be free because all laws are mathe-

¹ 'Pragmatic Idealism', *op. cit.*, p. 356.

² *Govindabhāṣya*, ii. 1. 34. See the next *sūtra* also which establishes that the law of *karma* is beginningless (*anādi*).

matical and everything that will ever happen is theoretically calculable even in the first day of creation. But since the principle of indeterminacy in the quantum mechanics has come to light the philosophers have begun to feel somewhat relieved and will perhaps continue to do so for a while until come new set of phenomena crops up to upset again the set-up of modern physics. Philosophers seem to be earning their poor living on the crumbs that are falling from the physicists' table. This is one phase of the problem of freedom in European history. There has been another connected with the Augustinian-Calvinists' dogma of predestination, which has left no room for human freedom. The theologians have tackled that problem for a long time. There has been a third trend associated with the omniscience of the Almighty. This one is more serious because it presents a dilemma. To whom to do justice, God or man? I mention these different phases of the problem of freedom neither to solve nor to criticize but simply to point out that the history of the problem of freedom has been quite a different one in the philosophy of India. The conception of exact laws has no hold on the Indian philosophers because the law of *karma* that governs the world is not thought to be precise or mathematical. Never the dogma of predestination has any correspondence in Hindu thought. Also the question of divine omniscience offered no problem to the Hindu thinkers. The world drama being exclusively a transaction between the monads and Nature, divine knowledge did not seem to them to have any effect on the natural destiny of man. Of course, divine omniscience still might have been a point to threaten the freedom of man but it did not attract their notice for various reasons. A careful reader of my previous chapters must have noticed some of them and will more fully realize them in the sequel. What is a real menace to the freedom of man, according to a Hindu thinker, is the law of *karma* itself, in spite of the fact that it is not exact. The precise nature of the difficulty we shall now see.

We have already shown to a certain extent that the law of *karma* leaves room for human freedom. We have seen that the law of *karma* does not entail fatalism. In our analysis of the three kinds of *karma* we recognised that as regards the 'creating' (*kriyamāṇa*) *karma* we are perfectly at liberty. Regarding the law of *karma* and the theory of re-incarnation (which is a corollary of the law) Swāmī Vivekānanda speaks as follows :

It is the only hypothesis that advances the idea of the

freedom of the human soul. It is the only theory that does not lay the blame of our weakness upon someone else—a common human fallacy. . . . Blame none therefore for your own faults. Stand upon your own feet, and take the whole responsibility upon yourself. Say this misery that I am suffering is of my own making, and that very fact proves that by me alone it will be unmade ! That which I created I can demolish ; that which was created by another I could never have demolished. Stand up, therefore. Be bold. Be strong. Take the whole responsibility of your own lives on your own shoulders. Know that you yourself are the creator of your destiny.¹

All that has been said is plausible. The law of *karma* is not a dogma or make-believe. Due to past *karma* you may be born in a palace and I in a cottage. But our future is of our own making. Success does not necessarily attend the palace. It is not the persons of distinguished pedigree that command the love and adoration of mankind. Those who shine in history very often come from obscure places. “The world is open to him who dares.”

What has been said is true but unfortunately it does not do full justice to the issue. Let us analyze it more profoundly.

Is a man really free ? The law of *karma* is his own creation, it had been said, and so it cannot bind him. Indeed, but how long is this true ? Only as long as we consider man within the jurisdiction of the law. A prisoner is free within the four walls of the jail but this freedom is within bondage. The question of freedom would not concern the prisoner if he had not experienced freedom outside of his jail and so to say that he is free is mockery of his true freedom.

What is a monad ? and particularly what is a man ? Is he a creature of Nature ? No, not according to Vedānta philosophy. True, his body and mind belong to Nature but his self transcends nature completely. Nature is meant to be his instrument. Even his I-maker or ego (*ahamkāra*) is the product of Nature and the real man or true monad who is a spiritual unit simply uses his ego. The lower ego is the apparent man, but truly speaking it is an organ of the higher ego, the true monad. The true monad, we know, is the intermediate power of God according to Śrī Jīva.

¹ *Jñānayoga* (Calcutta : Udbodhana Office, 1911), pp. 185-87.

He is an indivisible spiritual atom. His essence is pure consciousness. His freedom consists in being completely independent of everything that is other than him. Nature which is an aggregate of three 'reals' is other than him. He is responsible for the law of *karma* but he is truly free as long as he can use that law and is not used by it. As long as he transcends Nature he is free but the moment he becomes possessed by his possessions he has lost his native freedom. One digs a well and as long as he is out of the well he can drink its water as he wishes, but when he falls within the well he has no choice ; he drinks and dies. To say that he had some freedom before he died because the well was wide enough is to ridicule his genuine freedom. Does all this appear to us as the meaningless rambles of a Vedāntist who is preoccupied by a false metaphysics ? To quote a few lines from one of the most outstanding American thinkers, Ralph Waldo Emerson :

Man is the dwarf of himself. Once he was permeated and dissolved by spirit. He filled nature with his overflowing currents. Out from him sprang the sun and the moon ; from man the sun, from woman the moon. The laws of his mind, the periods of his action externalized themselves into day and night, into the year and the seasons. But having made for himself this huge shell, his waters retired ; he no longer fills the veins and veinlets, he is shrunk into a drop. He sees that the structure fits him, but fits him colossally. Say, rather, once it fitted him, now it corresponds to him from far and on high. He adores timidly his own work. Now is man the follower of the sun and woman the follower of the moon.¹

It has been claimed that the law of *karma* allows freedom within its scope. But what is the extent of its scope ? The world of nature of course. But Nature has no will and no consciousness.

The self assertion of ego-sense is the broken and distorted shadow in our minds of the truth that there is a real self within us which is the master of all and for whom and at whose behest Nature goes about her work. So too the ego's idea of free will is a distorted and misplaced sense of the truth that there is a free self within us, and that the will

¹ *Works* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1863), II, 75.

in Nature is only a modified and partial reflection of its will.¹

Is a man then really free when he is acting within the law of *karma*? Let us consider. It has been admitted that according to the law of *karma* one's past is already determined but one's future is open. Undoubtedly, therefore, the body-mind and ego of the doer are also included within his past. Now, an act of choice is a single act. Its constituents cannot be separated one from another. They are not like chemical ingredients to be isolated into test-tubes. When once admitted that there are some circumstances, *e.g.* one's own ego, that determines one's action, it is meaningless to raise the question of how much of one's behavior is, and how much is not, a matter of free choice. One may just as well ask how much of the explosion is due to the powder and how much to the spark.

The ego from which we act is itself an instrument of the action of Nature and cannot therefore be free from the control of Nature. The will of the ego is a will determined by Nature. It is a part of Nature as it has been formed in us by the sum of its past action and self modification, and by the nature in us so formed and the will in it so formed our present action also is determined.²

But within the realm of practical morality "man has to be considered free and praise and blame should have their place. The sense of free will is a necessary machinery of the action of Nature, necessary for man during his progress and it would be disastrous for him to lose it before he is ready for a higher truth."³ We spoke about the upward evolution of the monad through mineral, plant, animal life to human life. The sense of freedom, in spite of the fact that it is a delusion, had been a necessary instrument in his upward rush. Without it he could not have risen to his full possibilities. "But a time must come in our progress when we are ready to open our eyes to the real truth or our true being and then the error of our egoistic free will must fall away from us."⁴

It is not a sheer delusion, it is only an error of standpoint and an error of placement. The ego thinks that it is

¹ Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gītā*, op. cit., p. 330.

² *Ibid.*, p. 328.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

the real self and acts as if it were the true centre of action and as if all existed for its sake and there it commits an error of standpoint and placement. It is not wrong in thinking that there is something or some one within ourselves within this action of our nature who is the true centre of its action and for whom all exist ; but this is not the ego.

It is the spiritual self, the divine monad, of which the ego is a mere reflection.

From the time, therefore when a monad has become a victim to the law of *karma* he has lost his original freedom. The question of freedom, therefore, in Indian philosophy is not whether a man has freedom, but how he can regain it. That he has it is an indubitable fact or reality, the problem is how to re-attain what has been lost. ?

But he has not wholly lost his freedom. If he did he would not even know that he had lost it. It is not lost but only covered. A veil of ignorance prevails over his true identity, the essence of which is 'eternal purity' (*nitya nirmala*). In spite of the fact that there are innumerable coatings of tendencies and desires and habits, he is still faintly aware of his 'own greatness' (*svarūpavāk*). This is the reason why he strives to be completely himself. Really and truly he is a God in miniature and that is what he struggles to be again. That native nature of his is the source of genuine freedom and joy. Pleasure and pain, we have said, are the roots of all his activities. Herein lies the reason for it. Real pleasure, unmixed joy, consists in being free again. Pure pleasure is the indication of freedom whereas pain is that of bondage. When a person seeks pleasure, what he actually strives for is to be free. Sometimes he misjudges pleasure for pain and embraces pain. But this he does ignorantly because he thinks it will bring joy. He suffers through ignorance. That he suffers also proves that at the innermost core of his heart he knows what is true joy. If he could once recognize that one object which is the source of all joy, all his miseries would disappear. He would be perfectly joyful and perfectly free. But is there such a *one* object which is the source of all joy ? This leads us to the fifth question concerning the singleness of goal.

According to the moralists' analysis of the facts of social life we find that there are three ideal objects of pursuit. They are

some pleasure (*kāma*), mental pleasure (*artha*) and social righteousness (*dharma*). To the philosophers who believe that morality is a normative science and has to be derived from a preconceived metaphysics, the moral ideals appear to be Truth, Beauty, and so on, and then it is easy for them to show that they are all one. However, for whom moral science is as much *positive*¹ as physics and is to be based on the positive facts of psychology, they can see the ideals, at which actually living human beings aim. The ideals are not one but various and can be roughly put under three heads. They are hard facts and to deny them is to shut one's eyes. They are bewildering and there is no way to derive any one of them from the other. The best that can be expected is some sort of mutual concession.

As to why this is so is the first question the Vedāntist asks and then answers. These facts are what they are because the very constituents that go to make up our organism are three and consequently the ends they seek are three. *Tamas* or inert stuff seeks sense pleasure. *Rajas* strives to realize wealth, honor, prestige and the *sattva* looks for harmony and justice. Because the three ultimate ingredients are not derivable from each other the ideals towards which they point have to remain incompatible. These moral ideals lead us nowhere. They are fantastic, for they never can be realized, and that is so because they (the ideals) have no warrant in reality.

Let us take up sense pleasure first. It has been already said that they are never to be satisfied. A lustful man satisfies his lust, but does he ever come to its end? Never, because such is the character of *tāmasic* desires. Consider the second ideal, accumulation of wealth and prestige and the like. We acquire and acquire and are tired of acquiring. The desires keep on accelerating never to be quenched. It is like adding fuel to fire all the time or, as the Hindus are fond of saying, 'putting melted butter into flames'. We chase the horizon which we never catch. Let us consider the third ideal, that of social justice. Is there any end to it? What is justice? We have already discovered its nature. When in a society every person does his own duty sincerely and thoroughly, then justice prevails. But is there any end to its approximation? Can a society be perfect? A society

¹ The sharp line between 'positive' and 'normative' science does not exist in Indian thought. It seems to be a difference of degree.

cannot be a perfect one unless all its individual members are perfect ; but can the individual be perfect as long as he has a number of ideals to pursue ? Supposing somehow he becomes perfect, does the society then remain a moral society ? The very existence of morality depends on the fact that there are unrealized ideals. When every individual has acquired all he wants the society will cease to be a moral society. Even if we admit that by some miracle society will continue to be moral, there is no way to escape the last day. No organization in nature can be everlasting according to Vedāntic cosmology at any rate. The whole Nature will some day complete its cycle and go back to the equilibrium state ; time's arrow will cease and with it all perfect societies !

This then is the reason why moral ideals are fantastic. They keep us going, to be sure, but by virtue of the very fact that they never come true. They cannot come true because they have no justification in reality. What are they ? They are creations of our own imagination. We are dissatisfied with our present situation ; we create some utopia, set up some ideals and place them in front of us to get at in the future. If by chance we attain to some of our ideals they at once cease to be ideals and we have to further project newer ones to keep us moving. Can there be a final goal in such a procedure ? Never, not unless some unforeseen change takes place in the very constitution of human society. This is the ultimate paradox of moral life.

Is there a remedy ? Not within the realm of morality. We have to go beyond. Before we find out where it is, let us once more seek, more profoundly, the rationale of the moral paradox. The first step toward cure is the adequate diagnosis of the ailments.

Why is it that the pursuit of our moral ideals is like chasing the horizon ? It is due to *three* facts :

1. We are always dissatisfied with our present.
2. We live in a time-series where we can project our present fancy into the future. Those fancies are again created with the help of past memories. In other words, therefore, our time-series has past, present and future.
3. Our projected ideals are not warranted by the reality. That is to say, they are the net of our own weaving and have no justification in the nature of reality itself.

The cure, then, lies in finding another ideal that remedies those defects. Is there such a one ?

Undoubtedly there is, according to the Vedānta philosophy. It is the realization of our own true being, our own native freedom in the image of God. This realization is a state of perfect blessedness in which not even an iota of pain exists to discontent us. Our true spirit lives in eternity (Time IV), where our everyday distinction between the past, present and future lapses. We have already discovered that the true spiritual monad transcends the cyclic order of Natural time (Time I and Time II). More of it we shall learn presently. This ideal of our eternal self is not a fantasy. It is already perfect and exists in the very nature of reality. It is part and parcel of the Ultimate Perfection. It has to be discovered.

Before we pass on to the consideration of the process of its discovery we must answer the last question regarding the standard whereby we are justified in saying that *sattva* is better than *tamas*—just is better than unjust. We have just found that standard—it is the true and genuine ideal ; the realization of our spiritual self. This is the standard of all value judgments. But how, it will be asked, can the standard ideal which is supposed to be in the trans-natural realm of existence serve as a criterion of value of things that are obviously in the natural order ? We answer : It can, because the eternal order and the cosmic order are not utterly bifurcated. Between Time II and Time IV there is Time III. With the monads eternity has invaded the natural order and has become intermingled with it. The progress of a monad is a process from Time II to Time IV through Time III. We transcend nature through nature. “We have to climb to it through the *sattva* ; but we attain to it only when we get beyond *sattva* ; we reach out to it from the ego, but only reach it by leaving the ego.”¹ In other words, we have to acquire moral excellence as much as is possible within the natural order before the gate of eternity will be open to us. This is the reason why to a student of Vedānta moral goodness is the requisite of foremost importance. He must have harmony and poise of character. Only *sattva* can give it. That is why *sāttvic* qualities are the essential and most highly desirable ones. They are the best. *Tāmasic* or appetitive desires do not lead us anywhere. They are

¹ Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gītā*, op. cit., p. 327.

least desirable. They should be eliminated as much as possible. *Rajasic* qualities lie midway. They may be good if we can use them for *sattva*. They are bad if used to accelerate the sense pleasures. *Rajas* should, therefore, always be kept under control. Thus we see that it is the only one standard of self-realization or the 'tendence of soul' in the language of Socrates, that makes all value-judgments meaningful. If a man did not have this double nature—a higher and a lower self, a true and pseudo ego—then all judgments of right and wrong, of best and worst, would cease to have any metaphysical significance. They would be purely conventional, not even pragmatic, for, even pragmatic value, it seems to me, demands that there should be an *actual* ideal. As Professor Hocking expresses it, 'Pragmatism requires a non-pragmatic truth'.¹

MORAL AND SPIRITUAL

When we have realized the unrealness of our everyday ideals and have turned our attention to the true and the only ideal of self-realization, we have transcended the domain of 'morality' and ascended the sphere of 'spirituality'. The main point of distinction between the moral ideal and the spiritual ideal consists in the fact that the latter, unlike the former, is already actual. Paradoxically, spiritual pursuit is an act of actualization of an actuality, and therein lies, perhaps more paradoxically, the fulfilment of all our idealized ideals. This is what the Upaniṣads are trying to say in the well-known dictum : "Thou art That." You are already perfect, know that and you well have it. This is the truth which St. Paul labored to tell us by saying, "He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world."² We hear Śiśurāja Mahendrajī, a mystic of our own time pray :

When, O Merciful, Thou wilt transform me
Back in my true home, shall I serve Thee
With devotion, love and eternal body ;
To worship at Thy feet for eternity.³

Many quotations can be cited from the utterances of great seers of all religions to substantiate it as a fact of genuine spiritual experience that man has a hidden self which already belongs to

¹ *The Types of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 164.

▪ *Ephesians* 1 : 4.

▪ *Mahānāma* (Calcutta : Śrī Gaurāṅga Press, 1928), p. 46.

an eternally perfect order, and this, I believe, is the core of all religions. Here, and not in Humanism, lies the basis on which a true brotherhood of mankind is to be founded. This is the secret of true democracy, for, on no other basis can it be shown that two men are alike. Equality lies in the spirit and there only. Neither in Nature nor in society is there unity. But to proceed.

This fourth ideal, or what we call the true ideal, is called *mokṣa* or liberation. This is so called because one cannot attain it unless one liberates oneself from the delusion of the pseudo-ideals. The attainment of liberation is the attainment of true freedom. Adam lost paradise ; in Christ's crucifixion it was regained.

We saw that the moralist has three ideals. Now he adds another to his list for whether he approves of it or not he has to accept the fact that Vedāntists are members of society and they want liberation. The moralist has now *four* ideals : *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. These four words are well-known to every Hindu. They are called 'The Group of Four' (*chaturvarga*). It may be noticed that these 'Four ends' correspond very closely to the four dimensions of reality sketched before. This is one of the many instances to indicate how integrated the whole system is.

But our moralist is still intent on compromise. Sukrāchārya, one of the greatest of the sociologists, writes : "Let no one try to get *mokṣa* (liberation) without trying to acquire the other three, and let him constantly follow the path of *mokṣa* without discarding the other three (*dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*)"¹. Accordingly, therefore, it is maintained by the moralist that an individual's life is to be divided into four periods, of which the first period is to be meant for probation and preparation, the second and the third periods for the realization of the first, second and third ideals and the fourth period should be saved for the cultivation of the spiritual goal. These four divisions of Hindu life are known as *āśramas*. One can observe the extent to which the moralist compromises in order to keep the social order in a harmonious state.

But the metaphysicians are radical. All the thinkers of the

¹ *Sukranīti*, iii, 4-5, trans. B. K. Sarkar, Vol. XIII of *The Sacred Books of the Hindus* (Allāhābād, Paṇini Office, 1914), p. 102. Sukra, Kauṭilya, Yājñavalkya, Nārada, Brihaspati, Kātyāyana are the outstanding ones of the hosts of Hindu sociologists.

major systems of philosophy recognized the peculiarity of the 'Fourth ideal' and they all discovered that it is qualitatively different from the rest. Compromise, says a metaphysician, is all right within the realm of practical activities but we, the seekers of ultimate truth cannot be contented with the makeshift of moralists. And hence all the metaphysicians started their inquiry with one ideal, 'liberation'. The first thought of a Hindu philosophical treatise is this : the world is full of misery, the only joy lies in liberation ; how to avoid this misery and attain that supreme bliss ? Herein lies the root of the much criticized pessimism of the Hindu philosophers. In the first place, before condemning it, one has no reason to overlook the desperate compromise of the moralist. One should also not forget that the actual functioning of the Hindu life had been more in accordance with the moralist's theory of compromise. In the second place, let us enquire as to what is wrong with the pessimism of the metaphysicians. They have stated the truth and that is, I presume, what metaphysicians must do. The world is full of misery—by this statement is not meant that there is no pleasure in eating a good meal or listening to a symphony orchestra. What is intended is that all the ideals that we pursue within the limitation of our worldly career appear under critical analysis to be full of contradictions and paradoxes. They are inconsistent and incoherent and ultimately unreal. The only ideal worth pursuing therefore is liberation. This position might be called pessimistic, in case liberation was unattainable. But they are all optimistic and make a unanimous declaration about the fact that liberation is attainable even here in this life. One becomes perfectly free when all the seeds of his *karma*, which are the causes of bondage, are burnt down. And this can and does take place if only one strives for it. Instances are cited from history by the metaphysicians to point out the great ones who actually liberated themselves in their lifetime. If this is not optimism, one wants to know what is. Furthermore, and finally, when we come to Śrī Jīva Goswāmī we marvel at the boldness and consistency in his philosophy in throwing aside even the fourth ideal of liberation and establishing the 'Fifth' one (*pañchama*) still beyond. He thereby brings about a transformation of the older optimism and pessimism into a new 'agapism', to borrow a coined term of Charles Peirce, for, that fifth goal is nothing but *Preman*—Love with capital letters. Let us see now, how that came about.

THE NATURE OF REALIZATION AND THE FIFTH END

So far all that has been said is granted by all Vedāntists. Śrī Jīva simply inherits it from his tradition and accepts it, but not without an adequate analysis. After a critical exposition of the characteristic finality of liberation in his 'treatise on love' (*prīti sandarbha*) Śrī Jīva sums up by citing a quotation from the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* as follows : "And of these ends liberation (*mokṣa*) alone is admitted to be the final and supreme goal, for the other three are ever subject to the fear of Time."¹ Then he stops for a while and ponders. He says that this being established, let us consider the issue more profoundly.

Before we actually state what Śrī Jīva discovered by further reflection, we shall consider a while why Śrī Jīva stopped to ponder over the issue while other great Vedāntists, Śaṅkara, for instance, did not even conceive of speculating beyond the fourth end. In order to understand clearly just what troubled Śrī Jīva in this particular point, we shall indulge in recapitulating very briefly some of those ideas of his that we have touched upon previously in our chapter on Theology. As before we shall try to see Śrī Jīva in contrast to Śaṅkara.

The fourth end we have just reached from the moral side through the criticism of the moral ends. Its precise nature, however, must follow from the metaphysical side. That is to say, the definite character of liberation has to be derived from the ultimate nature of man and God and their relationship. According to Śaṅkara there is no difference whatever between man and God in the final analysis. They are perfectly identical. The egoistical personality of man is illusory. When this illusory personality is transcended man becomes what he really is—one with the universal consciousness which is Impersonal and Absolute. The experience of this oneness is liberation, which is the final end. Śrī Jīva agrees with Śaṅkara without much hesitation, but he does not stop there, because in his metaphysics, as we observed before, the ultimate nature of man is not impersonality. That there is a vain personality and it has to be transcended Śrī Jīva also believes but that transcendence does not constitute the final stage. He has to reach his true personality which sits high on the throne beyond the impersonality. The impersonal self

¹ IV. 22. 35.

forms a 'halo' as it were around his true self. Corresponding to these three aspects of the innermost nature of man we found Śrī Jīva discovering three aspects of the life of the Absolute Being Himself. We discussed them previously under the heading 'Trinity'. *Paramātmā*, the world-soul, the third person of the Trinity, is involved in the affairs of the world. The Absolute *par excellence*, the second person Impersonal, immovable, immutable lies beyond the world-soul. Śaṅkara stops here. But Śrī Jīva goes a step beyond. It is the *Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa*, the supreme God who is the First Person and the Highest Person : the *Puruṣottama*. If this analysis and correspondence between man and God is true, as Śrī Jīva believes it to be, then the nature of supreme realization of Śrī Jīva can never be identical with that of Śaṅkara and Śrī Jīva has enough reason to ponder a while when he sums up his discussion on the fourth ideal of liberation.

For Śaṅkara, liberation means simply freedom from bondage. This is a negative definition but Śaṅkara would not say a single affirmative word about it. We should not fail to see the consistency of Śaṅkara's thought. For him, Absolute Consciousness is static and bondage is illusory. When the illusion ceases the static Being shines alone in its solemn quietness. Say not a word, Śaṅkara would warn us, break not the silence, be quiet and steady like the "flame of a candle in a windless room".

But Śrī Jīva is not ready to listen to Śaṅkara's warning. What is freedom, he thinks, if you have not demonstrated it? He would say : if you are liberated, move freely, dance freely, sing freely, and then I shall know and you also shall know that you are free. We must notice how consistent Śrī Jīva is. The Absolute Being, according to his conception, is a dynamic Personality. He moves, He dances, He plays on his eternal flute. He grows. He flows forth. Due to the exuberance of joy and fullness of perfection He expands. If you have become one with the Absolute Being, contends Śrī Jīva, then demonstrate it by growing with Him.

After pondering, Śrī Jīva writes : Liberation is comprised of two stages, a stage of homogeneity and a stage of differentiation.¹ The latter comes after the former. The latter is a developed state of the former. If it is a state of differentiation, the

¹ *Prītisandarbhā*, ed. P. Goswāmī (Navadvīpa, Vaiṣṇava Pāṭhā, 1930), p. 32.

Śaṅkarites would say that one is then going downwards, but Śrī Jīva would say that one is going upwards. Śaṅkara would not see how the experience of a state of differentiation could possibly be going up, the stage of homogeneity being what it is, static and final. Śrī Jīva cannot see how it can be otherwise, the Absolute Being being what He is, namely a dynamic Personality. Both Śaṅkara and Śrī Jīva say that the Absolute Being is a perfectly free Being. But to Śaṅkara freedom has only one side—the negative side ; it means freedom from bondage, freedom from darkness, freedom from ignorance. Śaṅkara can express his view by a single sentence—the Absolute is free from *māyā*. To Śrī Jīva, on the other hand, freedom has two sides and its positive side is of more importance than the negative one. To him freedom means freedom in movement, freedom in fullest life, freedom in eternal joy. He, too, can express his view by a single sentence : the Absolute Being is free in *Love*.

This is precisely the reason why Śrī Jīva thinks that after the stage of homogeneity there begins a new life of differentiation within the love-life of the supreme God-head. If one wants to remain contented in the homogeneous stage of liberation one has not unlocked the highest mystery, because the great secret of one's true personality lies beyond one's impersonal state.

The question now arises as to how to unlock the mystery and actualize that utmost possibility of ours. Let us first see how we come to achieve our lower personality. The copy may help us to find the original. The point now is how do I come to know myself. I am born and brought up within a family. My mother fondles me with affection and I respond to her. In that response I begin to realize something of what it is to be a son. I know myself as a son because of my mother. One knows oneself to be a brother, friend and father in one's response to one's brother, friend and son, respectively. A mother is born when a child is born. A wife is born when a husband is born. A woman knows herself to be a daughter, friend, wife and mother in her relationship to a mother, friend, husband and child. What constitutes the personality of a woman ? Nothing but the sum total of these social relationships and ultimate responses. This is what we have called our lower personality. What then is the higher personality ? We know, according to Śrī Jīva, it is a spiritual unit of consciousness, a unity of will-to-be, will-to-know and will-to-love. The different relationships and responses

that are manifested on the lower plane are nothing but the various facets of that unity of being. How to realize that unity? The process is just the same. 'As above, so below'. One has to discover some person in relation to whom one can respond not only as daughter or friend or mother or wife but as all of these combined, fully and completely. If one such single person can be found to whom I can dedicate my whole being in its absolute entirety, I can actualize my utmost possibility, the inner core of my being, my true personality. Analogy can teach us this much. But analogy cannot tell us whether there is any hope of finding such a person who would be the end-all and be-all of my life, particularly after I am liberated from the bondage of *karma*. Apparently it does not appear to be so, because the liberated state is a state of detachment from all relationships and oneness with the Absolute Being who is purely impersonal. So the Śāṅkarites give up that hope. Such hope according to them belongs to the moral order. But not so with Śrī Jīva and his followers. For they know that the calmness of the Absolute is the silent gate-way to the *Goloka*—the sweet abode of the supreme God-head : Śrī Kṛṣṇa. And it is in the complete self-commitment to that supreme Person in all-absorbing Love that the hope of realizing our true personality is going to be fulfilled.

It is necessary to recall here what we have said before about the sweet activity of the Lord in His eternal abode. We saw how in the process of the dialectical movement of love the God-head realizes himself by separating Himself from Himself as Being-for-self and Being-for-expression (*Kṛṣṇa* and *Rādhā*) and then uniting again. The sweet home of the Lord is the eternal archetype of all homes. There the Being-for-expression (*Rādhā*) gradually approaches the Being-for-self (*Kṛṣṇa*) step by step as servant, friend, mother and wife and finally intermingles with the Lord. Now, Śrī Jīva seeks the final consummation of the second stage of liberation (*i.e.*, of differentiation) in participating in the eternal love-life of the God-head in his sweet home *Goloka*. In other words, the consummation of the stage of differentiation which begins after the stage of homogeneity, consists in sharing in the dialectical process of Love with the Lord. Here Śrī Jīva finds his final end. He recognizes five steps beginning with the state of liberation. The first step is called state of 'Calmness' (*śānta*) when the devotee is lost in the homogeneous experience. The next step is called 'servantship' (*dāśya*) when the devotee is

servant and the Lord is master. An important point that is remarked in this connection is that when the second step is reached, the first step does not cease to exist, it lingers in the background. In other words, this servanthship is the servanthship of a liberated soul and not of an unliberated person. Similarly, the second step continues to linger in the background when the third step is reached, which is named 'friendship' (*sakhya*). In this step the God-head and the liberated self enter into intimate relationship. In the next stage the relation matures into that between mother and child—motherliness (*vātsalya*). The devotee loves the Lord as a mother does her child. The last step is called 'sweet' (*madhura*) wherein the Lord and the devotee as lover and beloved are merged in the sea of delight. Śrī Jīva stops here. Some of his followers continue. This movement of Love they say knows no end. The Supreme Being manifests sweeter and sweeter aspects of His in the second and third round of the dialectical process. The five steps beginning with calmness become fuller and richer. At the last, when the devotee is lost in the love of *Harī Puruṣa*, there emerges a new tonal quality : when the lover and the Beloved Lord remain absorbed in one another there arises an intense desire to share the same with all beings and the Love overflows. Every unit of being in that stage is called *śiṣu* (child) and the sweetest experience that arises from the sport of the children with the Supreme Lord as their Prince is called *śiṣu bhāva*.

A transformation of *antaḥkaraṇa* (inner self) takes place in devotion. This transformation is wrought gradually. The life of devotion has an inner history and development of its own. The finite throbbing pulse gives itself up to the surrounding expressions of the delight current and realizes a greater and more expansive being in this course. . . . The little self of ours in wise passiveness feels itself placed in an enveloping and all pervasive consciousness. Feeling the immanence of bliss the seeker gives up himself totally and completely. Every modification of mental being then acquires a new colouring and meaning. . . . Everything appears delightful.¹

Saṅkara thinks that in the state of liberation the self is com-

¹ Sircar, *The System of Vedāntic Thought and Culture*, op. cit., p. 224.

pletely lost. But Śrī Jīva believes that it still retains its identity much as a piece of iron does when thrown into glowing flames. With Jacob Boehme Śrī Jīva would say, "In such a manner is the soul set in the Deity, the Deity penetrateth through the soul and dwelleth in it yet the soul doth not comprehend the Deity but the Deity comprehendeth the soul but doth not alter it from being a soul but only giveth it the Divine source of the Majesty."¹

Thus in 'Love' Bengal Vaiṣṇavism finds its final goal. Bengal school calls it the 'Fifth End' (*Pañchama Puruṣārtha*). This love-experience it says is *Tūriyātīta* beyond even the fourth dimension of reality. Since the time of Śrī Jīva 'Fifth End' is used as a technical term in the vast literatures of the Vaiṣṇavites of Bengal.

The more Bengal school thinks of his 'Fifth End' the more it becomes averse to the fourth end. By and by it does not find the need of the fourth end any longer. Liberation, of course, is necessary but it does not find any need of troubling itself about it. When the sun rises, it gives light. It does not have to make any extra effort to dispel darkness. And so it is, when the sun of divine love rises in the heart all the bondages of darkness and ignorance drop off without any additional effort whatever. The best way to achieve liberation therefore is to forget all about it. Dedicate your whole heart, Śrī Jīva tells us, your whole life to the loving Lord, blend your soul with His and lose yourself into the sea of sweet love. Liberation will take care of itself.

The Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism has laid a deep stress upon the unalloyed loving expressions of divine sweetness and joy in the life of realization. The intellectual appreciation of majesty, the delight accompanying communion through intellect and heart in the depth of meditation has found little recognition in Śrī Jīva Goswāmī, Baladeva and others. Baladeva has, no doubt, sought almost to identify knowledge and devotion; still, the peculiar vibrative expressions of love consciousness distinguish it from intellectual calmness. No doubt, both are delightful, but whereas the delight in the one is more pensive and calm, the delight in the other is more intensive and quick. The one has a vision sublime and exten-

¹ 'The threefold life of Man', *The Works of Jacob Boehme*, Vol. II (London: M. Richardson, Paternoster Row), vi. 88, 68.

sive, the other, a vision and a beautitude with expressions of maddening attraction in sweetness and beauty.¹

Lost in sweetness, as Śrī Jīva becomes indifferent to the need of liberation, he rejects some of the age-old techniques of liberation. For Śaṅkara and his followers, for example, the most important technique of liberation is the process of elimination by denouncing what oneself is not. This process is usually expressed as *neti neti* : not this, not this. Śrī Jīva has no need of this process. He tells us instead : Do not say what you are not. Assert what you are. Admit and realize that you are an eternal joyous partner in the life of the Supreme Lord. Devote your heart and soul to Him and for Him. This method of Śrī Jīva is known as *bhaktimārga* (path of devotion) as distinct from *jñānamārga* (path of wisdom) which is accepted by Śaṅkara. It should be remembered that neither Śrī Jīva nor Śaṅkara are the inventors of these different paths mentioned. They are as old as the Upaniṣads. The philosophers simply showed their preferences and augmented the respective paths in accordance with the demand of their metaphysical system and personal experiences.

The path promulgated by Śrī Jīva may be divided into two broad sections. The first section consists in 'Devotion' and the second in 'Love'. There is no sharp line of demarcation ; in certain aspects, however, they are distinct from one another. In the devotional stage the expression is 'worship' and the prayer is, "Thy will be done, O Lord, not mine." In 'Love' the worship is replaced by ecstasy and the lover says no prayer but feels "Thy will and mine, O Lord, are one." In devotion the worshipper is advancing *towards* God whereas in love he is dwelling *in* God. They may be called pre-liberated and post-liberated stages of the self. As long as the monad functions in what we have called Time III he is in the pre-liberated stage. As he becomes more and more free of Time II, *i.e.*, of the natural order, he approaches eternity. It is through devotedness and loyalty towards God that one proceeds. When the worshipper reaches the Lord he is a Lover. He dwells in eternity.

We are now ready to give our final word on the problem of freedom or *mokṣa*. We have seen that the problem of freedom in Vedānta is not whether man *has* freedom but *how to attain* freedom which once was his and now is lost. This attainment of

¹ Sircar, *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, op. cit., p. 114.

freedom is, according to the Śāṅkara school, more or less abrupt. You can get it in a flash. Light does not require a thousand years to dispel the darkness of a thousand years. You are either in darkness or in light, either free or unfree. But this is very different from the standpoint of Bengal school. The attainment of freedom is a gradual process of deification. Every person is free to a certain extent but perhaps no two persons are equally free. The monad in its very lowest stage has the least freedom. As it advances towards God it begins to become comparatively free. When it reaches the human stage it can make a deliberate attempt to raise itself towards God through the path of devotion. The more it rises the more free it becomes. In other words, one is free to the extent that one is divine. God is the only Person who has perfect freedom. And you are free to the extent you have incorporated God in yourself. One has also transcended Nature to the extent one is free. Freedom in transcending Nature, and particularly one's inner nature, is true freedom. Freedom within nature is false. It is, therefore, not the so-called free-will to choose between different natural objects but the depth of devotedness to the Lord which constitutes the genuine criterion of one's freedom.

As we saw that in Vedānta different dimensions of reality—the truth, the value and even the time—are all graded in an ascending scale, so also is the case with freedom. It is a continuous system ranging from zero to infinity. How free you are depends upon where you belong. In eternity one moves in perfect freedom with God. Let us now say a word or two about the character of 'eternity' (*nitya*). A devotee is cautioned not to say much about it because all Vaiṣṇava teachers tell us that it is utterly impossible to put into words the precise nature of 'eternity'. The Lord Jagad Bandhu warns us never to try to conceptualize 'eternity'. But in spite of the warning the Vaiṣṇava devotees are never tired of singing about the eternal sport (*nitya-līlā*) of the Lord. Apparently it can be sung, perhaps because music does not demand logic.

The reason why the Vaiṣṇava teachers tell us repeatedly not to conceptualize 'eternity' is that two apparently contradictory ideas seem to be involved in that concept. Logic alone, it is felt, cannot resolve them but life itself which is deeper than logic can actually experience it.

The *two* apparently contradictory ideas are the following : (1) There is no past, present or future in eternity. (2) Eternity is dynamic, it moves and enriches itself constantly.

Nowhere in the Vaiṣṇava literatures have I found these two propositions to be sufficiently explained. But a contemporary devotee of the neo-Vaiṣṇava order, Śiśurāj Mahendrajī, on one occasion told me about the nature of experience of being in eternity. Eternity, he said, has no past, present and future—not because it does not move but because it is full and complete. And again ‘eternity’ moves, not because it has any unrealized possibility but because of the very momentum of its perfection. In the experience of ‘eternity’ there is no consciousness of ‘no longer’ because in every moment the entire past is present. Again, there is no consciousness of ‘not yet’ because all possibilities are exhausted and nothing else is wanting. But still it is a never-ending process in the course of which it becomes fuller and fuller every moment with newer and newer values and richness. The temporal order moves because the equilibrium has been disturbed, but the eternal experience moves because the spiritual equilibrium has been perfectly attained.

The apparent contradiction and its solution lie in the following facts : In the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta the Supreme God-head (*Bhagavān*) is an eternally sportive Being. He is always new and his experiences are always new (*nitya nūṭana*). Owing to the agency of *yogamāyā*¹ or divine creativity He even does not know what is going to come next. As we observed before, there are two orders of existence : divine and cosmic. The latter moves in a circle, but the former is eternally creative and newer and newer values emerge from it. These two processes we have called two life-histories of God-head. They are due to the Primary and Secondary Power of the Lord. The Intermediary Power, that is to say, the individual monads belong to each in due term. The monad’s real home is in the higher arc but he has descended to the lower, where he has *three* possible states of existence : (1) He may forget the higher arc and become natural. (2) He may remember it and try to reach there. He then becomes a devotee (*bhakta*). (3) He reaches his true home and dwells in God. This time he is a lover (*premic*). In the first place, he moves in circles and all his ideals are illusory. In the second

¹ *Supra*, Part II, chap. iv.

place, he has his true ideal and his growth is real. In the third place, he has exhausted all his possibilities as a monad. He is now a liberated spirit (*gopi*). But that he has no possibility left does not mean that he turns into a stone; instead, he is infinitely more active and his evergrowing experiences add to its richness every second even unforeseeingly. The fact is due to his being one with God in the higher arc of divine creativity. The apparent contradiction is due to the different nature of *possibility*. Let us illustrate the point.

Let us imagine that a husband and a wife who loved each other very dearly became isolated from each other owing to some strange circumstances and are forced to live apart for a long time, separated by sea. Each tries to reach the other. After strenuous efforts of, say, a quarter of a century they succeeded in coming close to each other and then lived together happily for another quarter of a century. Now, the differences between the actuality and possibility of their lives in the first quarter and in the second are considerable. The natures of their hopes and expectations in the two periods of their lives are quite unlike one another. In the first quarter the woman, who was already a loving wife, was trying to actualize her actual wifehood. All her memories, her strivings and anticipations during the period of separation were meaningful only in relation to that one ideal goal which is already actual. Then when she has attained her long-looked-for object we may say very justly that her possibilities are completely achieved. There can never be any other ideal in her life in which her total personality will be involved save the one which she has already attained, namely the love of her husband. But this statement in no way means that she has no chance of experiencing a thousand and other happy things in life in the capacity of a good wife of her husband. But the nature of her memories and anticipations and ideals are quite different in this second period of unification from what they were in the first period of separation.

When some of our great thinkers of the present century (*e.g.*, Bergson and Whitehead), who have taken *time* very 'seriously' speak about the difference between memory and expectation they often times seem to be speaking in abstraction. True, the difference between memory and anticipation brings out the difference between past and future very vividly, but neither memory nor anticipation can exist in vacuum. Memory and anticipation are inherently related to some experiencing conscious individual.

It is the consciousness of a particular individual that makes memory and hope at all meaningful. If the nature of Time has to be determined by the difference between memory and expectation and by the process involved in passing from one to actualize the other, it has on that very account to be understood by the state of consciousness on which experiencing memory and expectancy is dependent. Ultimately, then, it is consciousness that has to give the final word on the nature of Time and not merely abstract memory and anticipation considered in vacuum. In other words, the difference between 'no longer' and 'not yet' has to be understood in relation to a particular experiencing self endowed with ideas, ideals, emotions, feelings and interests. When this is done it will be seen that there is no universal formula that expresses the difference between 'no longer' and 'not yet'. Their differences in different stages of life are quite unlike each other, provided those separation and union between the husband and wife in our illustration. An oversight of this important distinction seems to me to underlie many new theories that have deified change and the process of time with it.

There are great differences underlying the distinction between memory and expectation in three individuals or in one individual in the three periods of his life : (1) When one has no concern with God ; (2) when one is striving towards God, and (3) when one dwells in God. If this is not true spiritual endeavor has no meaning. For Śrī Jīva spiritual pursuit is the greatest thing of life. And if this contention of his is at all valid then there must be a time in experience when 'not yet' must cease. And that is the experience of eternity. When I have realized my identity in God, it is in a very definite sense that I say that all my possibilities are exhausted and there is no more 'not yet' for me. But this in no way means that I may not have a thousand other possibilities that would be enhancing the richness of my evergrowing experience with God. Perpetual growth is the nature of God-head and I cannot help being so when I am in Him.

It seems to me that owing to the fact of over-emphasis on the concept of change and growth some of our modern thinkers tend to forget that there are different kinds of growth. The growth of an organism and the growth of a spiritual consciousness are in many respects unlike one another. Acquiring of possessions and property is one thing and the integration of a character and personality another, though both of them go by the name

progress. In one, we grow by the multiplication of possessions, in the other, we grow by regeneration of our very being. In one case we acquire something more, in the other we *become* something different. If there is a God, then the difference between growth with God and growth without God is one of supreme importance and should not escape, as it unfortunately does, the attention of the advocates of growth.

The apparent contradiction in the experience of eternity is due to the ambiguity of the term 'possibility' when used in connection with two realms of existence : the higher and the lower arc. That all possibilities are exhausted is spoken about *man* in relation to his position in the lower arc and that there *are* infinite possibilities is spoken about God, and about man too when man is with God in the higher arc of life.

Śrī Jīva would agree with Spinoza when he writes in his *Ethics* :

Eternity is the very essence of God insofar as this involves necessary existence. Therefore to conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things insofar as they are conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or insofar as they involve existence through the essence of God.¹

But where Śrī Jīva would differ from Spinoza lies in the very nature of the essence of God himself. Unlike Spinoza's, the God of Śrī Jīva is a moving, living conscious Personality and hence 'eternity' which is His essence has to be of similar nature. No doubt, for Śrī Jīva too, eternity involves necessary existence, but that 'existence' to him is not simply form of knowing logical or geometrical truths but a mobile following self-enjoying substance. That to know reality 'in the form of eternity' is to know it truly would be maintained by both Spinoza and Śrī Jīva alike.

It may also be mentioned that in the Vaiṣṇava thought of Bengal school, the experience of eternity in the higher arc has hardly any reference to life after death. Such experience is possible here and now. It is true that eschatology has a great place in the Vedānta but Vaiṣṇava philosophy of love has pushed it into an obscure corner. Cases are not rare when devotees are found praying to be born a thousand times in this world if only he can love the Lord and serve His children. This may appear

¹ Prop. xxx, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

impossible in the face of the fact that the moral order has been condemned as full of illusory ideals and abode of delusions. But is the moral order really so? Let us look back at it once more.

RECONSIDERING THE MORAL ORDER

We started with 'morality' and found how desperately inconsistent it is. No systematization of its ideals was possible; the utmost that could be attained was a makeshift or compromise. We, therefore, left it and entered the 'spiritual' realm wherein we discovered the hope of unity. We ascended it and reached liberation. We climbed still higher with Śrī Jīva into the realm of eternity. Let us now look back at the moral realm and reconsider it from this standpoint.

Three different views of the moral order have been taken from this height. One is taken by the men of wisdom (*jñānī*), another by the men of action (*karmī*) [perhaps the moralist himself] and the third view is taken by the devotee, the *bhakta*. Their differences are due, perhaps, to the differences of attitude of their spiritual attainments. All these views are as old as the *Bhagavad Gītā*, where a synthesis seems to have been attempted.

1. The first view is the view of the wise man. He is liberated. He looks at the moral order dispassionately and disinterestedly. He lives in the world but does not belong to it. He is like "a drop of water on the lotus-leaf". He is usually contemplative and prefers to be alone but he may be vigorously active. If he acts he is untouched by anything. The whole world may burn down, but he is not concerned; yet he works for it. It may be of great interest to know in this connection that Śaṅkara himself was a great social and religious reformer. During his short life of thirty-two years his fame spread from corner to corner of India no less than that of Mahatma Gāndhī today.

2. The second view is that of an active man. He also has realized or almost realized his fourth goal. He looks at the moral order and says that there is nothing wrong with the world itself. The defect lies in the illusoriness of the wordly ideals. It lies in our hopes and aspirations and false projections, which have no limit and which never bring contentment. That the law of *karma* binds us is not the fault of the moral order itself but that of the false ideals. The real defect, therefore, lies in our own motives and purposes and interests. Let us therefore give up all hopes for the result. Let us never think of the fruits of our actions.

We shall do our duty for its own sake and then the law of *karma* will not be able to bind us. It is interesting to remark here that this attitude of the men of action (*karmī*) has striking similarity with the Kantian doctrine of 'Duty for duty's sake'. This view is however much older than Kant. This is practically the theme of the *Bhagavata Gītā*. All great men of action such as Lokamanya B. G. Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi are inspired by this gospel of the *Gītā*.

3. The third view is that of a devotee (*bhakta*). He has not yet attained but has started in his pilgrimage towards the city of God. He differs from both the men of wisdom and action. The stoic coldness of the wise men does not appeal to him. The man of action seems to him to be attempting something which is psychologically an impossibility. Even if it is possible, it is not the way of a devotee. He takes the moral order quite differently. He does all his duties for God. Every action of his life, he performs for God's sake. He does all his duties neither so dispassionately as the wise man nor without any hope of result as the active man. His hope is to serve the Lord. The result of every action he offers to the Lord. When this is done *karma* cannot bind the devotee. And as the law of *karma* falls off, he gradually attains his freedom. This is the view of the devotee. Śrī Jīva accedes to this view. But, as we have already learned, the position of a devotee on his path is never a fixed point. His path is graded and consequently his position is ever progressing. As he advances from 'devotion' to 'Love' his view changes considerably. Now, what he now says is : No longer do I need to offer the fruits of my action to the Lord because now I have offered my entire self to Him. It is only *His* work that I now do.

The subtle but important difference between these two stages should be carefully observed. In the stage of 'devotion' the devotee has his own duties, his obligations, his responsibilities. He discharges them as well as he can and then dedicates their fruits to the feet of his Master. But in the advanced stage of 'love' the lover has no duty which he can call his own, because his own self no longer belongs to him. He has entirely dedicated himself to the Lord. He belongs to the Lord. He performs whichever duty the Lord assigns to him.

There is still another higher stage, when the lover loves the Lord so much so that he does not have to wait to know which duty the Lord assigns to him. God's mind and his are one ; he

does simply what God would do. Servantship of the Lord finds manifestation in the service of humanity, for it is the Lord's humanity. The wifehood of the Lord means to take care of the Lord's home. In his home is included not only humanity but all monads, all lives. Everything in Nature is part of the home of his Beloved. Says the Lord Jagad Bandhu, "You are all one and one in Me."

Be compassionate to all beings with all your heart and soul. Be forgiving, benevolent and distribute righteousness and liberation. The best thing you can give to them is the sweet name of *Hari* and joy and blessedness. This is the best service you can do to God.¹

Thus the Love of the eternal order overflows, and makes a true devotee, a lover of the world. The 'spiritual' seeks its genuine realization in the 'moral'. 'Spiritual' ideals fulfill the defects of 'moral' ideals and now the moral order pays its debt back with compound interest. Their friendship is established.

The moral order after all is not so bad as it appeared at the outset. The world which appeared desperately inconsistent now assumes an organic status. It has a definite shape and its evolution has a definite direction and goal. The entire structure points towards a spiritual end. All the other ends have meanings in so far as they are means to that one end. Leave out that one thing, the world is a chaos. Place it back the work is an organic system. The moral order—the society has an organic unity only. When and not until then, man is a spirit and is a participator in the spiritual life of the World-Spirit. The philosopher's stone can transform base metal into gold. "The dead world becomes alive in God."

The world is like a great painting. *Sattva* constitutes light, *tamas* constitutes shade and all other colors are supplied by the activity of *rajas*. If the colors are analyzed too hard they vanish into vibrations. If the painting is looked at from very close it appears very clumsy. But if at a certain distance a true perspective is taken it is a masterpiece. It declares the grandeur and beauty of the Person who painted it. Philosophers attempt to find out that true perspective. Śrī Jīva thinks he has found it. It is the spiritual perspective.

■ Jagad Bandhu, *Harikathā* (Calcutta : Mohan Press, 1935), p. 44.

Bhajana : DISCIPLINE AND DEDICATION

Our treatment of the philosophy of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta will remain sadly incomplete if we do not add a few words regarding the practical disciplines that lead to the ultimate goal. All schools of Vedānta insist on certain disciplines and daily practice of meditation. These practices are usually called *bhajana* by the Vaiṣṇavas. The true significance of *bhajana* is two-fold ; it connotes self-discipline as well as self-consecration. The reason for this seems to lie in the fact that consecration of the self to the will of God is believed to be not possible until one has attained the realization of his true self ; and conversely, such realization is considered to be not possible until the self has been dedicated to the service of God. The two facts are the two aspects of the one process of growth. *Bhajana*, therefore, means the practice of the 'tending' of the soul in worship. The character of this worship changes as the devotee approaches the Lord ; that is to say, the culminating stages of *bhajana* are in many respects different from the initial stages. Śrī Jīva devotes two complete volumes : discourses on Devotion (*bhaktisandarbhā*) and the discourses on Love (*prītisandarbhā*) to the consideration of the definitions, differences, conditions and characters of *bhajana*.

The first and the foremost requirement of a devotee is that he must possess a clean and chaste character. Baladeva says that a neophyte must possess the following virtues : aversion to worldly objects, purity of mind, fondness to take part in spiritual discourses, devotedness and quietness of disposition.¹

Nine different ways of the 'tending' of the soul (*bhajana*) have been formulated by the Śrīmad Bhāgavata. Śrī Jīva treats all of them very minutely and they are named nine ways of devotion (*nava-vidhā bhakti*). In spite of the fact that they are all important and illuminating, space does not permit me to enter into the discussion of them. I shall say a few words on one of those ways of meditation, the one on which very special stress is laid by all the Vaiṣṇavas and particularly of Bengal school of Śrī Jīva. This way is called *nāma-saṅkīrtana*, chanting of the holy name.

The Lord is said to have a thousand names and any one of them is considered to be just as good as any other to invoke Him. Baladeva goes so far as to say that *all* words are the names of

¹ *Govindabhāṣya* i. 1.

the Lord.¹ Nevertheless certain specific names have attained great prominence and power due to the fact that they have been used and taught by the great ones. With the coming of some great *avatāra* or incarnation, such as Rāma, Gaurāṅga or Jagad Bandhu, some forgotten *nāma* has found recognition and also new names have been added to the list. All the 'names' of the Lord have profound philosophical significance as will be somewhat clearer when I try to interpret two or three of them. The devotee is supposed to let his mind dwell on the significance of the *nāma* while he either repeats it alone in silence or chants it loudly in chorus with certain musical instruments.

One of the most important of the holy names of the Lord which had been recognized since the day of the Upaniṣad consists of *three* letters which can be expressed in English as *AUM*. The first letter 'A' means *Brahmā*, the second letter 'U' means *Viṣṇu* and the third letter 'M' means *Śiva*. These are the three names of the three aspects of the Lord. These three aspects are explained in the following way by Professor Rādhākrishnan :

The one God creates as *Brahmā*, redeems as *Viṣṇu* and judges as *Śiva*. These represent the three stages of the plan, the process and the perfection. The source from which all things come, the spring by which they are sustained and the good into which they enter are one. God loves us, creates us and rules us. Creation, redemption and judgment are different names for the fact of God.

This sacred word *AUM* has hundreds of different interpretations. Practically a considerable portion of certain Upaniṣads such as *Chāndogya* and *Maṇḍukya* are devoted to the analysis of these three mystic letters.²

Lord Gaurāṅga demonstrated the infinite potency of *Hari nāma*. The word *HARI* literally means 'one who steals our heart.' The devotees add two other holy names of the two Incarnations of the God-head, namely *Rāma* and *Kṛiṣṇa*, with the word *HARI* and chant them as follows : "*Hare Kṛiṣṇa Hare Kṛiṣṇa, Kṛiṣṇa Kṛiṣṇa Hare Hare, Hare Rāma Hare Rāma, Rāma Rāma Hare Hare.*" Space does not permit me to go into the interpretation of these words. It may be noted that these names

¹ Baladeva, *Govindabhāṣya* i. L.

² For a very profound treatment of the meaning of *AUM* see Dās, Bhagavan, *Praṇavavāda*, and *The Science of Peace* (London : Theosophical Publishing Society, 1904).

and the definite order of their arrangement have philosophical value and great devotional significance. This name is well-known as *Tāraka Brahma nāma*, the holy name of the Lord the Deliverer. The devotees of the neo-Vaiṣṇava Order add three other different 'names' to the word *HARI* and use them in their daily prayer in the following order : "*Hari Puruṣa Jagad Bandhu Mahāuddhāraṇa*." I take the liberty of explicating very briefly some of the significances of the above words which is called *Mahānāma*, or the great name. It will be of interest to discover that a complete philosophy lies hidden behind those mystic words.

HARI. It is a name of the Lord. The devotee is asked to conceive of the Lord when praying under the name *Hari* in the following way : "Conceive *HARI* as the self-consciousness of God and the entire Universal Consciousness as His subconsciousness. Realize *HARI* as the centre of all life and the embodiment of all Love and Beauty."¹

Puruṣa. It indicates a specific relationship between the worshipper and his Lord. It is explained thus.

What kind of relation should there be to give us the fullest possible realization of His Perfect Bliss? The relation between master and servant, between mother and child, between a boy and his playmates, between husband and wife—the sum total and the essence of all these relationships, plus something more which is inexpressible by language constitutes the relation indicated by the term *Puruṣa*.²

Jagad Bandhu. It is really the name of an incarnate personality of the Lord. Literally it means the friend of the world. "The word *Jagad Bandhu* means the one who eternally binds all these beings together by the tie of the Transcendental Divine Love."³

Mahāuddhāraṇa. This is really a compound of two words, *Mahā* and *Uddhāraṇa*. First, the second word is explained; in contrast with liberation.

Uddhāraṇa begins after salvation (liberation). We are said to have liberation when we free ourselves from bondage, when we realize our identity with the soul. Liberation is negative in its essence. It means getting rid of limitations. *Uddhāraṇa* means something beyond that. It is positive realization of *HARI*. It is the enjoyment of God in His

¹ Brahmachārī, 'A New World Saviour's Message', *op. cit.*, pp. 235-39

² *Ibid*

³ *Ibid*.

family circle. Who constitutes this family of God? Each unit of being, each unit of consciousness. Herein lies the significance of *Mahā* which means all-inclusive.¹

Thus we see that within those few words the essentials of the system of philosophy we expounded lie hidden in a nutshell. This is the nature of almost all holy 'nāma'. That is why they are called 'seed-formula' (*vījamantra*). Sometimes the Vaiṣṇava devotees get together and chant those holy names for days and days together without stopping. It is well to know that the last one I just explained is being continually chanted even now in a town called Faridpur in Bengal for the last seventeen years without a second's cessation. This continuous chanting is believed to be broadcasting a spiritual power which is good for the uplift of all the monads, including those who perform it. Many such disciplines which have more or less spiritual justification are practised by the Vedāntists of different schools. This I say chiefly to indicate that the system of philosophy we have presented in our essay is not only speculative thought but a very concrete and vitally functioning religion of the people.

One very important aspect of the religion of the Vaiṣṇava devotee I have failed to mention in its proper place. It is the theory of grace (*krpā*).² The first 'turning of the devotees' face' towards the Lord is believed to be utterly dependent on the grace of God. God is pictured as "an eternal beggar waiting for the opening of the door that He may enter into the darkness and illumine the whole horizon of our being as with a lightning flash."³ Baladeva writes that "if the Lord had not the quality of showing special grace, then all His other attributes, however great, would not have been attractive to mankind and would not have evoked devotion and love towards Him".⁴ The concept of grace, however, introduces certain new problems which have been keenly felt and delicately resolved.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*

² For a very able exposition of the India's religion of grace see R. Otto, *India's Religion of Grace and Christianity* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930). Dr. Otto, however, does not seem to be acquainted with the philosophy here presented.

³ Rādhākṛishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, op. cit., p. 335.

⁴ *Govindabhāṣya* ii. 1. 36.

⁵ Viśvanāth Chakravarty, *Bhakti Ratnamālā*, ed. P. G. Goswāmī (Navadvīp: Hari Savā, 1930).

CONCLUSION

We have come to a point where we can close our rather lengthy essay. No one possibly is more keenly aware than myself of my inadequacy to handle such a profound subject, which has not infrequently been declared by the devotees as 'too deep for words' or 'too sublime for expressions'. My task has been a more or less historical presentation of the subject matter. I have tried to do it with as much logicity as I command. I tried to be objective though at times, I know, I failed. I have said what Śaṅkara thought, what Rāmānuja thought and what Śrī Jīva thought, and why they did so. I have not passed any judgment. But if I am permitted to make a concluding judgment I would say that the synthesis of Śrī Jīva Goswāmī seems to me to be very harmonious, consistent and thorough. His comprehension and treatment of the different dimension of Upaniṣadic reality are well balanced and perfectly controlled by profound sobriety of judgment. In his attempt to reconcile he has gone further than both his predecessors and has discovered some deeper truth which both of them failed to see clearly.

Lest it is thought that I am not at all aware of the defects of this system I shall suggest only one point of criticism. One, I consider is enough since that one is sufficiently fatal to break down the whole structure. Not only the philosophy of Śrī Jīva but the very edifice of the Vedānta philosophy is founded only on one pillar : consciousness (*chaitanya*). It is on the basis of a very definite theory of consciousness that the whole monument is constructed. If that theory is denied or proved to be erroneous then the entire system falls to the ground. Here I am not attempting to bring out those points of criticism because they are easy and obvious. Any student of the history of philosophy knows that there are a hundred and one ways in which the Vedānta theory of consciousness can be criticized. Nevertheless I am led to believe that not a single of those criticisms would be conclusive enough to withstand counter criticism.

After I have heard all possible charges brought against the system of thought here presented I shall be inclined to say only this : The Vedānta philosophy still stands and stands like a colossal pyramid. In its inner consistency, in its integration, in its comprehensiveness, in its completeness, it stands as one of the marvellous creations of human genius. Its defect will not prevent

it from being an object of joy and adoration any more than the cold robs the Himalayas of its grandeur and beauty.

We shall summarize our findings in nine propositions, as did Baladeva in his *Premeya Ratnāvali*¹ :

1. God is the Supreme One.
2. He is known through all the Revelations.
3. The world is real.
4. The differences are real.
5. The monads are real.
6. There are various grades of monads.
7. Liberation is the attainment of God.
8. The way to it is worship (*bhajana*).
9. Proofs are three : experience, reason and revelation.

In the introductory chapter of his *Govinda Bhāṣya*, Baladeva summarizes his philosophy differently by one sentence : God, monads, Nature, Time and the law of *karma* are the five eternal categories (*tattva*). These five given, the universe is explained. Perhaps we should add one more, the one that integrates them all and that has a long history of a few millenniums. Years before the Christian era began, Varuṇa, a seer of the Taittīrīa Upaniṣad, spoke to Bhrigu, his son :

From Joy the world is born
By Joy it is sustained
Towards Joy it gravitates
Unto Joy it enters.

Again today, even in the twentieth century, we hear the same song in the same rhythm and tune. The devotees sing with Śiśurāja Mahendraji :

Be in Joy, Be in Joy, Be in Joy !
Ye sisters and brothers of the world of Joy !
Behold ! the Prince of Joy, Most charmingly Sweet,
The Lord 'Bandhu Hari', the Giver of Joy.²

Joy and nothing but this is the alpha and omega of the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta and religion.

Jai Jagad Bandhu Hari ! Hari Bol !!


Prem (Love) Ananda (Joy) Śānti (Peace)

¹ Calcutta, *op. cit.*, p. 107. See also Appendix, note 60.

² *Mahānāma*, *op. cit.*, p. 107. See also Appendix, note 60.

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APPENDIX

NOTE :

1. विश्वमिदं वरिष्ठम् । —*Maṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, ii. 2. 11.
2. नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन । —*Katha Upaniṣad*, iv. 11.
- वाचारम्भणम् विकार नामधेयम् मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् । —*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, vi. 1. 4.
3. Cf. पहिलहि राग नयन भंग भेल ।
 अनुदिन वाढ़ल अवधि ना गेल ॥
 न सो रमण न हाम रमणी ।
 दुहुँ मन मनोभव पेशल जानि ॥
 ए सखि से सब प्रेमकाहिनी ।
 कानु ठामे कहवि विछुरल जानि ॥
 ना खोजँलु दूती ना खोजलु आन ।
 दुहुँकेरि मिलने मध्यत पाँच वार ॥
 अव सोइ विराग तुहु भेलि दूती ।
 सुपुरुष प्रेमक ऐछन रीति ॥ —*Kavirāja Kṛṣṇadās*,
Chaitanya Charitāmṛta (Madhya-līlā), Ch. viii.
4. सर्वम् खल्विदं ब्रह्म । —*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, iii. 14. 1.
 स्वरूप आस्वादिवे प्रति अणु रे । —*Śiśurāja Mahendrajī, Mahānāma*,
 op. cit., p. 50., Cf. अणुते अनन्त सत्ता । —*Śiśurāja Mahendrajī*.
5. तत्तु समन्वयात् । —*Vedānta Sutra*, i. 1. 4.
6. आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् । —*Vedānta Sutra*, i. 1. 12.
7. उलुके ना देखे यैछे सूर्येर किरण । —*Kavirāja Kṛṣṇadās*.
8. तत्र भक्त्याधिकारिणः प्रथमं श्रद्धा । सा च तत्तत् शास्त्रार्थे दृढप्रत्ययमयी ।
 —*Viśvanāth Chakravarty. Bhaktiratnamālā*, ed. P. G. Goswāmi, Navadvīp, p. 117.
9. बाधकज्ञानान्तराभावाच्च । —*Sankarabhāṣya*, ii. 1. 14.
10. न व्यवर्त्तमानत्वमत्रमपारमार्थ्यहेतुः । —*Srī Bhāṣya*, i. 1. 1.
11. यथा जन्म प्रभृति कश्चिद् गुहावरुद्ध सूर्य्यं विविदिषुः कथंचिद् गवाक्षं पतितम्

सूर्यांशुरूपम् दर्शयित्वा केनचिदुपदिश्यते एषः सः इति । —*Śrī Jīva, Tattva Sandarbha*, p. 191.

12. तत्र यदि तम्पदार्थस्य जीवात्मनो ज्ञानत्वम् नित्यत्वम् च प्रथमतो विचारगोचरः स्यात्तदैव तत् पदार्थस्य तादृशत्वम् सुबोधं स्यादिति । —*Ibid.*, p. 196.

13. तदेव सिद्धायाम् भावशक्तौ सा च त्रिविधा—अन्तरंगा, तटस्था, बहिरंगाचेति मूल एव दर्शयिष्यते अत्रोत्तरयोरन्तरंगत्वम् ताम्भ्याम् परमेश्वरस्यालिप्ततया शक्तित्वञ्च ; नित्यतदाश्रिततया तदव्यातिरेकतया ततोऽसिद्धतया तत्कार्योपयोगितयाच । —*Sarva-saṁvādinī*, p. 61.

14. नीलाद्याकारा वृत्तयः एव जायन्ते नश्यन्ति च, न ज्ञानमिति भावः । —*Tattva Sandarbha*, p. 196.

15. स्वप्रकाशवस्तुनः सूर्यादेः प्रकाशबहुपलब्धिमात्रस्याप्यात्मनः उपलब्धिः । —*Ibid.*, p. 199.

16. अद्वयत्वञ्च स्वयं सिद्धतादृशतादृशतत्त्वान्तराभावात् । —*Ibid.*, p. 187.

स्वगतभेदोऽपि तत्रनेत्यभिप्रत्याह श्रुतिः “नेह नानास्ति किञ्चनेति” । “स्वगतभेद विवर्जिताव्या” इति नारदपञ्चरात्रे । —*Baladeva, Siddhāntaratna*, op. cit., p. 18.

17. शक्तिलेशम् विना न क्वचिदवगम्यते वस्तुतत्तमिति सर्वानुभवसिद्धम् । —*Sarvasaṁvādinī*, p. 33.

18. शक्तिर्नाम कार्यान्यथानुपपत्ति सिद्धौ वस्तुनः धर्मविशेषः । सा तु स्वस्मिन्नुपादाने निमित्त्वेच कारणे स्वरूपभूतैव मन्तव्या, कार्यविशेषोत्पत्तौ तत्कारणत्वेन वस्तुविशेषस्वीकारानर्थक्यप्रसंगात् । कारणस्यात्मभूताशक्तिः शक्तेश्चात्मभूतम् कार्यमिति शांकरभाष्यधृतः । तस्मात् वस्तुनः शक्तिः कार्यं पूर्वोत्तरकालेऽपि मन्तव्यादेरिवास्त्येव, कार्यकालं प्राप्य तु व्यक्तिभवति इत्येव विशेषः—तद्ब्रह्मणोऽपि भविष्यति । —*Ibid.*, pp. 29—31.

19. तस्माद् या शक्तिः कार्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रतीयते सा तत्वातत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयत्वेन मिथ्यैव न तु स्वरूपभूता । —*Ibid.*, p. 29.

20. अथ केवलेऽपि दोषो यथा ;—तत्रानन्द सत्तैव केवलानन्तानन्दस्फूर्तिः इति श्रुतार्थान्यथानुपपत्त्या च स्वरूपशक्तिर्मन्तव्यैव । —*Ibid.*, p. 32.

21. ननु स्वप्रकाशत्वादेव तद्भासिष्यते कृतं शक्येति चेत् । —*Ibid.*, p. 32.

22. स्वप्रकाशत्वम् नाम परानपेक्षासिद्धिरेव । —*Ibid.*

23. यस्मात् स्वप्रकाशत्वात् स भासिष्यते नदेवास्माकम् स्वरूपशक्तिरिति स्वयमेव कण्ठेप्रतिबद्धत्वात् । —*Ibid.*

24. विवर्त्तेऽपि रजतादिरफूर्त्ताविधिष्ठानम् शुक्तयादिकम् एवाङ्गीक्रियते न चाङ्गारादि ; प्रस्तुतेऽपि ब्रह्मण एव जगदधिष्ठानत्वम् नतु अन्यस्येति तथैवस्वरूपशक्तिर्विदितम् ।..... किञ्च जगद्रूपे विवर्त्ते ब्रह्मणः किञ्चित्करत्वमस्ति नास्ति वा ? नास्ति चेत् अज्ञानेनैव विवर्त्तताम् किं तदतिरिक्त तदङ्गीकारेण ? अस्ति चेत् आयाता तस्य ज्ञानाश्रयस्य शुद्धस्य एव शक्तिः । —*Ibid.*, 29-30.

25. ब्रह्मण्यज्ञानम् न सम्भवति इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । तथा च सति ततः पृथक् द्वेतम् केन कल्प्येत् । यदि च जीवत्वादि कल्पना निमित्तमज्ञानम् ब्रह्माश्रयम् स्यात्तदा देवदत्तवदज्ञानतमकार्यदुःखादिभिः ब्रह्मैव पीड्यतैवेति नापहतपाप्मत्वम् तस्य स्यात् । —*Ibid.*, p. 32.

26. अज्ञानेन जगत् जगदज्ञानमिति परस्पराश्रयादिप्रसङ्गात् । —*Ibid.*, p. 137.

27. अपि च चिन्मात्र ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्त कृतस्त्रनिचेधविषयज्ञानस्य कोऽयम् ज्ञानी ?... ज्ञातृतस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वे अस्मदीय एव पक्षः परिगृहीतः स्यात् । —*Ibid.*, p. 32.

28. ततः तस्य तु तद् विशेषवत्त्वे परमारवंडत्वमिति । —*Ibid.*, p. 44.

29. “सत्तानन्दयोर्योगात्चित् परंब्रह्मचोच्यते” (इति बृहद्गौतमीयतन्त्रधृतः) —*Sri Jiva's Commentary on Brahmasamhita*, ed. A. Avalon, Vol. xv. of *Tantrik Text* (Luzac & Co., London), p. 2.

हादिनी सन्धिनी संवित् तय्येका सर्व्वसंश्रये” (इति विष्णुपूराणधृतः) —*Baladeva, Siddhanta-Ratna*, op. cit., p. 36.

30. तत्र सदात्मापि यया सत्तां धत्ते ददाति च सा सर्व्वदेशकालद्रव्यहेतुः संधिनी, संविदात्मापि यया संवेत्ति संवेदयति, ह्लादात्मापि यया ह्लादते ह्लादयति साह्लादिनीति तत्तत् प्राधान्येन स्फूर्त्तस्तत्तद्रूपम् तस्या एकस्यावैदूर्य्यवदवसीयते । —*Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

31. तस्मात् स्वरूपादभिन्नत्वेन चिन्तयितुमशक्यत्वाद् भेदः, भिन्नत्वेन चिन्तयितुमशक्यत्वाद्भेदश्च प्रतीयते इति शक्तिशक्तिमनोर्भेदाभेदावेवाङ्गीकृतौ तौचाचिन्त्याविति । —*Sarvasamvādinī*, pp. 36-37.

32. नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयोऽन्त्या विशेषाः । —*Prasastapadabhasya*, op. cit., p. 38.

33. शक्तिश्च स्वरूपानतिरेकियपि तद्विशेषतया च भासतेऽन्यथा तस्य शक्तिरिति व्यपदेशासिद्धेः । —*Baladeva, Siddhānta-ratna*, op. cit., p. 38.

34. ताँहार अङ्गैर शुद्ध किरण मंडल ।

उपनिषद् कहे तारे ब्रह्म सुनिर्मल ॥ —*Kavirāja Kṛṣṇadās, Chaitanya Charitamṛta* (Ādi-lilā).

35. तदेव सत्ताप्रदम् सर्वाधिष्ठानम् सर्वदोषास्पृष्टम् स्वरूपसिद्धसर्वज्ञानादिसमवेतम् सर्वकत्तृमोक्षदातृ च सत्तानन्दज्ञानस्वरूपम् पदम् ध्येयम् । —*Krama Sandarbha*, p. 6.

36. अर्थेषु अभिज्ञः । —*Srīmad Bhāgavata*, i. i. 1. Vide *Krama Sandarbha* on it.

37. न तस्म कार्य्यं कारणञ्च विद्यते न तत् समश्चाभ्यधिकश्चद्वैश्यते ।

परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥

—*Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, vi. 4. Quoted by Śrī Jīva in *Sarvasaṁvādinī*, p. 35.

38. तदेवं वैदुष्यमबैदुष्यञ्चेति द्विविधम् । तत्र वैदुष्ये न विप्रतिपत्तिः भ्रमादि नृदोषाहित्वात् शब्दस्यापि तन्मूलत्वात् । —*Sarvasaṁvādinī*, p. 36.

39. पूर्णाविर्भावत्वेनाखंडत्वरूपोऽसौ भगवान् । ब्रह्म तु स्फुटमप्रकटितवैशिष्ट्याकारत्वेन तस्यैवासम्यगाविर्भावः । —*Bhāgavata Sandarbha*, p. 2.

40. अथ तथाविध भगवद्रूपपूर्णाविर्भावम् तत् तत्तम् पूर्ववत् जीवादिनियन्तृत्वेन स्फुरद् वा प्रतिपद्यमानम् वा परमात्मा इति शब्दयत इति । —*Ibid.*, p. 4.

41. तदेकमेवाखंडानन्दस्वरूपम् तत्त्वम् शुतृकृतपारमेष्ठ्यादिकानन्दसमुदायानाम् परमहंसानाम् साधनवशात् तादात्म्यमापन्ने सत्यामपि तदीय स्वरूपशक्तिवैचित्र्याम् तद्ग्रहणा सामर्थ्ये चेतसि यथा सामान्यतो लक्षितम् तथैव स्फुरद्वा तद्वदेवाविरक्ति शक्ति शक्तिमत्ताभेदतयाप्रतिपद्यमानम् वा ब्रह्मेति शब्दयते । —*Ibid.*, p. 2.

42. निर्विकल्पतया साक्षात् कृतेः प्राथमिकत्वात् ब्रह्मणश्च भगवतएव निर्विकल्प-सत्तारूपत्वात् विचित्ररूपादि विकल्पविशेष विशिष्टस्य भगवतस्तु साक्षात् कृते स्तदनन्तरत्वात् तदीय स्वरूपभूतम् तद्ब्रह्म तत् साक्षात्कारास्पदं भवति । —*Ibid.*, p. 18.

43. राधा प्रेमाविभु यार वाडिते नाहि ठाइ ।

तथापि से ज्ञणे ज्ञणे वाडये सदाइ ॥

—*Chaitanya Charitāmṛta* i. 4. p. 93.

44. “ब्रह्म बृंहति बृंहयति” इति श्रुतिश्च “बृहत्त्वात् बृंहणत्वाच्च यद्ब्रह्मपरमं विदुः” इति विष्णुपूराणश्च बृहत्त्वेन शक्तिमत्त्वं दर्शयति । —*Sarvasaṁvādinī*, p. 30.

45. नरवपु तांहार स्वरूप । —*Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, ii. 21, p. 665.

46. ईश्वरेर नाहि कभु देहदेहि भेद ।

स्वरूपदेह चिदानन्द नाहिक विभेद ॥ —*Ibid.*, iii. 5, p. 125.

47. सत्यादिरूपम् यद्ब्रह्म यच्च गुणाल्यये पश्यन्ति तदेव स्वरूपशक्तिवृत्तिविशेष-
प्राकट्येन सत्यादिरूपाव्यभिचारिणं गोलकम् । —*Srīkṛiṣṇa Sandarbha*,
p. 339.

48. सान्दानन्दचमत्काकरः श्रीकृष्णः तत् सारांशोद्वेकमयी श्रीराधिका । —*Ibid.*,
pp. 577, 565.

49. एकात्मानावपि भुविपुरादेहभेदं गतौ तौ । —*Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*,
i. 1., p. 3.

50. चैतन्याख्यं प्रकटमधुना तद्यं चैव्यमाप्तम् । —*Ibid.*

51. चैतन्यलीलामृतपुर कृष्णलीला सुकपूर दुइ मिलिहय सुमाधुर्य्य । —*Ibid.*,
ii. 25, p. 861.

तुमि गौरकृष्णराम सुरेश्वर नारायण (परमहंसबालकृष्णस्योक्तिरियम्) ।
—*Mahānāma*, p. 98.

52. आमाविना अन्ये नारे ब्रजप्रेम दिते । —*Chaitanya Charitāmṛta*, i. 3,
p. 53.

53. सुकुन्दकालिन्दी कल कलितकुले पुलकिते
पुरा मञ्जौकुञ्जे ब्रज युवतीवृन्दैरभसतः ।
सयरेमे सात्तान्मदनमदनो यो सुखमधौ
मधुध्वंसी वंशीधरकर कदम्याश्रितवपुः ॥
कलौलीलालौल गलित विमलास्रोहरिरिति
गदन् यो हेमांगनिजमधुरिमास्वादनपरः ।
कृपासिन्धुर्वन्धुहरिचरित संकीर्तन पिता
“जगद्वन्धुः” सोऽयं त्रिभुवनसरवश्चेत्यवितथम् ॥

—*Sarasvati Rādhāramana*, “*Bandhu Tattva Chandrikā*”.
Mahānāma vs. 6-7.

54. आमिह ना जानि ताहा ना जाने गोपीगण । —*Chaitanya Chari-
tāmṛta*, i. 4, p. 72.

55. युगधर्म प्रवर्तण ह्य अंश हृदते ।
आमा विना अन्ये नारे ब्रज प्रेम दिते ॥ —*Ibid.*, i. 3, p. 53.

56. संख्यातीतो हि चित्कणः । —*Ibid.*, ii. 19, 546.

57. सूक्ष्माणामप्यहं जीवः । —*Srīmad Bhāgavata*, xi. 16. 11.

58. अणोरपि अखंड देहः —*Paramātmā Sandarbha*, p. 114.

59. उदतिष्ठत्—वह्निरपि चेष्टां प्राप्तवान् । —*Krama Sandarbha*, p. 360.

60. आनन्दे रह आनन्दे रह आनन्दे रह भाइभगिनी ।

आनन्देर राजा आनन्दमोहन जगद्वन्धु जगभणि ॥

आनन्देर हाट आवार वसिवे स्वयं आनन्द आनन्द विलावे

विनामूल्ये महा आनन्द मिलिवे उठे यावे विकिकिनि ।

आनन्देर मानुष आसछे नेवे कत आनन्देर देवता शत शत शत

आनन्द धाम ह्रद्वे भूलोक कर जय वन्धु ध्वनि ॥

जय जगद्वन्धु वोले हरिवोले हरिवोले ।

जय जगद्वन्धु वोले हरिवोले हरिवोले ॥

जय जगद्वन्धु वोले हरिवोले हरिवोले !!!

—Śiśurāja Mahendraji, *Mahānāma*, p. 107.

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